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3. RELIABILITY PROGRAM 
3.1 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The objective of thiH program was to assure that the MDA 
would have a high inherent probahility of mission success. This 
objective was met through a comprehensive reliabj lity analysis of 
design as well as through establishment and surveillance of 
controls duri~g the procurement, manufacture, test, and operation 
of the hardware. 
The MDA Reliability Plan, ED-2002-1002, dated April 1970, 
and Change-Notice 1, dated October 1970, established the specific 
tasks required to attain the reliability program objective. 
Systems Engineering Reliability had prime responsibility for 
il1lplementing the plan and for 'I'di,abiUty analysis of MIlA 
flight hardware and mission essential ground support equipment 
(GSE). These analyses were performed to identify design and 
procedural deficiencies which could compromise theMDA mission 
and to assess the risk associated with the conditions identified. 
Where possible, cognizant design personnel performed the an~lysis 
with guidance from Reliability in accordance with the prescrihed 
requirements and ground rules. In other instances, the actual 
analysis was performed by Reliability and reviewed by the respon-
sible design organization. Analytical tasks were injtiated and 
documented early in the program to afford opportunity for timely 
corrective action. There were several instances where procedures 
and hardware design were modified to eliminate existing Single 
Failure Points (SFP) brought to light· by the analysis. The plan 
required publication of preliminary reports prior to CDR and a 
final report after CDR to'. reflect the .impact of hardware ch~nges 
at CDR. The ?nalysis effort continued after that point with 
informal documentation maintained after April 1971. The details 
of the Failure Modes and Eff~cts Analy.s.is (FMEA) are contained 
in ED-2002-2004. A separate Critical Items List (CIL) ED-2002-
2028, was base lined by the Sky lab Level II Configuration Control 
Board (CC-13) in August 1971and was maintained throughout the 
program. 
The approach used in the FMEA was to first develop block 
diagrams representing the composition and functional relation-
ships of the system. The block diagrams identified functional 
units of the system including redundant elements and provided a 
method for tracing single failure points. Each entry on the 
block diagram was analyzed and documented in the general format 
desc.r.ibed by the AAP Directive No. 13. 
3-1 
Items of hardware at the c'omponent level, whoRe failure 
would lead directly to loss of mission functions were identified 
as Single Failure Points (SFP). Criticality category codes used 
to designate the severity of the condition were as follows: 
Criticality 
Category 
I 
IS 
2A 
2B 
3 
4 
Potential Effect .of Failure 
Loss of life or serious injury to crew 
(Ground or Flight) 
Safety and hazard monitoring systems whose 
loss would fail to identify conditions 
hazardous to the crew 
Immediate mission flight termination at the 
next planned Earth landing area. (For 
Skylab includes loss of primary mission 
objectives) 
Launch scrub 
Launch delay (Fo~ Skylab includes loss of 
secondary mi6sion objectives) 
None of the above 
SFPs in Category 1, IS and 2/1., required a criticality 
analysis in general accordance with NASA Drawing l0M30lll, 
Procedure for Performing Systems Design Analysis, dated June 
1964. This was a quantitative analysis depicting the number of 
equipment losses per million mission attempts attributed to a 
specific piece of hardware, presumed to fail in a specific mode 
during a particular per~od of operation. The criticality numbers 
provided a means for ranking SFPs and assigning priori. ties and 
resources for corrective action. 
The more significant prob lems revealed through the FMEA 
were compiled tnto a CIL. The CIL consisted of Category 1, IS 
and 2A SFPs, critical redundant backup components, launch critical 
components and ordnance system components. A retention rationale 
was developed for each item prior to submission of the list to 
the Level II CCB for approval. 'l'he retention rat.ionale consisted 
of test programs, procedures, and controls to minimize the risk 
of component failure •. 
3-2 
Reliability pe'r[wnnel 'reviewed faU lire reports flnd f~i lllre 
analyses for concurrence with the ~lality Assurance disposition 
and corrective action decisions. In addition, the failure 
histories were reviewed to assure that all failures reported 
had been assessed for critjcal erfects and documented in the FMEA. 
The parts and materials program was reviewed perjodically 
to assure adeouacy of reliability considerations for procured 
as well ~s in-house build items. 
0ualification test procedures and test results were revie\.Jed 
to assure that tests were adequate to cover all failures identi-
fied by the FMEA And that all railures incurred wc.reconsidered 
in the FMEA. 
All design specifications and subsequent changes were 
reviewed by Re1.iabi1.ity to assure compliance with environmental, 
performance, and reliability requirements. 
Maintainability was a consideration in design and instal-
lation of MDA hardware to ensure capability for performing both 
prelaunch and inflight maintenance with a minimum impact on 
the mission. 
Design criteria guidelines, tailored to specific hardware 
items and installations, were provided in end item and subordinate 
specifications. The criteria identified design features to 
facilitate accomplishment of maintenance and eliminate the 
potential for human induced failures. 
Equipment and installation drawings wet:e reviewed for 
items critical to mission succens and items subject to prelaunch 
and inflight removal and replacement. Design of this equipment 
was evaluated to determine compliance with the maintainability 
criteria established by the applicable specifications. Design 
changes necessary to facilitate or improve maintainability of 
the equipment were coordinated with design and incorporated 
where feasible. 
'-' 
3-3 
\ 
3.2 DESIGN EVALUATION 
3.2.1 FMEA 
The analysis was conducted at the component level nnd 
revealed several critical SFPs. The principle failure mode 
leading to crew ha~ard or premature termination of the mission, 
was loss of MDA pressurization. The four-inch vent valves \-icre 
initially configured in parallel and were identified as Categury 
t SFPs prior.to CDR. Subsequently, the valves were plnced in 
series and the operating procedure was changed with both valves 
opened prior to launch followed by closure of both valves at 
the completion of venting in orbit. These changes provided a 
redundant means for preventing exposure of the AM/MDA to vaCl1um 
in orbit. Other components that contributed to potential loss 
of pressurization in the MDA included docking port hatches, 
structural bolts and flanges, and windows. The ultraviolet 
detectors were found to have category IS failure modes, e.g., 
loss of output results in risk of fire without warning. The 
initial FMEA was published in July 1970, Revision A was issued 
in October 1970 and Revision B was issued in April-197l. The 
analysis effort continued after April 1971 with evalu~tion of 
design changes and critical items. There were a total of 46 SFPs 
of all categories identified in the final FMEA: 1 Category 1, 
1 Category IS, 4 Category 2A, and 1 Category 2B. The remainder 
of the total were in Categories 3 and 4. 
3.2.2 Critical Items List (CIL) 
Each issue of the FMEA report contained a CIL. After the 
last FMEA r.ev{sion a separate CIL document was published to 
facilitate maintenance of controls required on critical items. 
The MDA CIL, ED-2002-2028 was issued in August 1971 and changes 
were released through February 1973. The content of the CIL is 
summarized in Table 3.2.2-1. The controls required for the 
items identified by the CIL are documented in the MDA CLLCD, 
82051000010. 
3.2.3 Trade and Special Studies 
Altitude Chamber Tests conducted at St. Louis required 
updating of the FMEA to reflect the test configuration of the 
flight article and 'later the backup article. The analysis con", 
sidered the interrelation of the MDA, AM, test equipment, and 
ground support equipment. The intent was to identify any failure 
during the manned altitude tun, which would he a hazard to crew 
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1. 
,.:;: 2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7:. 
. 8 • 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
.13. 
14. 
w 
I 15. \,It 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
2l. 
. 22. 
COMPONENT 
S190 WINDOW 
*8192 WINDOW 
**UV DETECTOR CONTROL PANEL 
UV DETECTOR 
HATCH ASSY AXIAL AND RADIAL PORT 
**EREP PANEL PWRDISPLAY SWITCH 
**EREP PANEL PWR CIRCUIT BREAKER 
FLEXIBLE COOLANT LINE 
4-PORT SELECTOR VALVE 
**DOCKING DROGUE 
**AM/MDA INTERFACE DISCONNECT 
**cSM/MDA DOCKING SEAL 
**PRESSURE EQUALIZATION VALVE ON 
AXIAL HATCH 
**ERE.P CONTROL PANEL 
CABLE HARNESS TO 4-INCH VENT VALVE 
4- INCH VENT VALVE 
SAFETY SHIELD, Blu S190 WINDOW 
EXTERNAL WINDOW COVER ASSY, 
. Blu S190 WINDOW 
CAP, Blu PRESS EQUALIZATION VALVE 
SPEAKER INTERCOM ASSY, Blu SAME 
1/4 INCH HAND VALVE, Blu MS12/479 
VENT LINE 
MS12/479 VENT VALVE(S) 
~\ 
'-.;~#/ 
SINGLE FAILURE POINTS 
CREW MISSION 
SAFETY CRITICAL 
(CATEGORY 1) (CATEGORY 2A) 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
LAUNCH 
CRITICAL 
(CATEGORY 2B) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
REDUNDANT/BACKUP 
COMPONENTS 
CREW MISSION 
SAFETY CRITICAL 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
*CRITICALITY CLASSIFICATION CHANGED PER CCBD 
**COMPONENT ADDED TO CIL PER CCBD 
Table 3.2.2-1 Critical Items List Summary (MDA) 
.-".. . ". ~. 
safety (either flight or ground), damage to MDA hardware, or 
cause premature termination of the test. There were no failure 
mode::; identified which were unique to the tests. The flight 
article analysis was documented i.n McDonnell Douglas-East 
Report MDC E041S Supp. I, dated June 1972. 
Asa result of this analysis one failure was identiried 
as potentially hazardous to the fli.ght crew and none were idcmti.-
fied as hazardous to test personnel. The hazardous condition 
results from Experiment S190 window breakage with its safety 
shield removed. However, the likelihood of occurrence of this 
failure condition was considered to he remote because: 
(a) The window was subjected to pres::;ure tests (31 psi 
each side) after fabrication, 
(b) Installed window integrity was checked_ during 
unmanned altitude chamber testing, and 
(c) The safety shield, which was removed only momentarily 
for a fit check during the manned altitude test, 
would provide protection against rapid depressuri-
zation in the event of S190 window breakage virtually 
throughout the entire manned test. 
The potential single failures which would prematurely terminate 
the test, but which would not jeopardize crew or test personnel 
safety were: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Experiment S190 window breakage with safety shield 
installed. 
Experiment S19] window hreakage (cover plate over window 
restricts rate of-atmosphere loss). 
Experiment S192 window breakage (cover plate over window 
restricts rate of atmosphere loss). 
Four-inch vent valve assembly, inadvertent closure during 
test ascent phase. 
Safety system fire control (water system) water line 
rupture or solenoid valve leakage. 
The backup article analysis was documented in MDAC-B 
Report MDC E076S dated April 1973. There were no significant 
changes in the MDA analysis from that of the flight article". 
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3.2.4 Design Review 
Design reviews were conducted at variolls phases of the 
program and reliahility participation consisted of preparation 
and presentation of material and general surveillance of the 
reviews to aHsure reli.ahili.ty requirements were met. Identifi-
cation of critical items and adequacy of retention rationale 
were specific topics addressed in each review. The chronnlog 
of these major reviews is shown in Table 3.2.4-1. 
3.3 ALERT INVESTIGATIONS 
Alerts are issued on a regulHr basis through established 
channels. They warn of suspect parts, materials, or processes. 
The majority of Alerts received during the Skylab program did 
not ifupact MMC huilt hardware. Usually, it was found, the date 
code, or vendor, or part number, etc, did not apply to the 
components used on MMC built hardware. However, in several 
instances, the Alert did apply and positive appropriate corrective 
action was taken. 
On MDA the Alert program was instrumental in accomplishing 
the following: 
• Improved the quality and reliability of hardware by 
identifying suspect parts, material, and processes, 
• Required engineers to reevaluate the existing circuit 
design to determine if the Alert was applicable. ThiS, 
in turn, occasionally led to circuit redesign that 
improved the performance, quality, and reliability 
of "the hardware. 
• Provided a means of communicating with other NASA 
centers and other participants. 
The following figures reflect a compilatiqn of all Alerts submitted 
to MMC Denver byNASA/MSFC for closure action applicable to the 
MDA: 
Number of Alerts identifying parts not used. 96 (39.3%) 
Number of Alerts identifying parts or processes 
that have "no impact" on the MDA- 107 (43.5%) 
Note: ''No impact" means that the part or pro-
cess is used; however, the vendor, or date 
code, or part number, etc identified on the 
Alert differs from those parts or ptocesses 
used at MMC/Denver. 
" . 
MDA RELIABl-LITY 
PLAN 
PRELIM. FMEA & 
SFP LIST 
FMEA & CIL 
(BAStC) 
MDA CDR 
FMEA &CIL 
(REV. A) 
FMEA & CIL 
If (REV. B) 
co ::::: 
CIL BASELINE.. 
-CIL DELTAS 
- _DESIGN,:REVIEWS 
2 
6 
!APR 
6 
iAPR 
1970 
3 4 
-' 
6 
JUL 
6 
AUG 
6. 
PCT 
D,CDlt 
1971 1972 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
. 
~ (E P 2002 1-2004) 6, 
AUG kED 20 P2-202 8) 
66 
,- JUL 
~SO CAR 6 ~AR 
Table 3.2.4~1 MM Reliability Program'Milestones 
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~~~S _-,~; :(i;~N".:";~"~,':; ...,,4,-;;,~="''''"-~;:!~''''''''--''"''""''''''!C'''';";:-';'"~";",,,,,,,,,:,,,,,,;;,-,, 
"..oj oM" 
l 
~;"":':.:~:;:::; _',;,,::=,::,,";.:_.!~:,,'.;;:;~:'~l-_~::';;:-:;t'....--< ';t._'F·::~_t"'··"-··~· 
! 
1973 
4 1 2 
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, 
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L ppCR ~F ~R 
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ALERT NO. 
F3-71-0l 
CAPS SL-039 
CAPS SL-039A 
F3-72-S0l 
SL-168 
F3-72-0l 
CAPS SL-072 
F3-72-02 
CAPS SL-128 
F3-72-03 
SL-U,5 
F3-72-04 
8L-126 
F3-A-72-05 
SL-157 
F3-A-72-06 
SL-215 
Number of Alerts identifying parts or 
processes requiring corrective action- 42 (17.27.) 
Total Alerts submitted for closure- 245 
ALERTS ISSUED BY MMC/DENVER - APPLICABLE TO SKYLAB 
15-10-71 
18-4-72 
29-11-71 
24-1-72 
23-2-72 
27 -3-72 
30-3-72 
24-7-72 
Semiconductor, Diode 
rectifier 
Capacitor, tantalum 
explosion under powered 
condition. 
Crystals 
Capacitor, fixed, 
wet tantalum 
Capacitor, tantalum 
wet foil 
Material nonmetallic 
encapsulant 
PROBLEM - CAUSE 
Diode came apart during 
soldering operation-
brazing operation durjng 
fabrication of diode was 
faulty. 
The explosion precluded 
determination of failure 
mechanism - probably due 
to capacitor being instal-
led improperly as regards 
po~arity. A safety bulletin 
was. issued and ()VRs included 
in the manufacturing process 
plans. 
Frequency was incorrect 
poor or no solder. 
Electrolyte leaked from 
capacitor - over etching 
of glass end seals during 
lead cleaning. 
The leads fell off -
improper reweld operation. 
N/A - This Alert was 
cancelled by F3-72-04A. 
Microelectronic circuit, Failed during prod. 
OP AMP acceptance test - gold 
particulate contamination. 
Resistor, variable, 
cermet, multiturn 
3-9 
Resistor wouldn't *diust -
void in resistor case 
allowed potting compolmd 
to enter. 
F3-A-72-07 
SL-190 
F3-72-0S 
SL-209 
F3-A-73-01 
SL-295 
14-S-71 
24-6-72 
12-2-73 
Transistor, PNP, power, Failed functional tORt -
planar, T059 metallic contaminate. 
Integrated circuit, 
dual inl1ne package, 
ceramic 
Materia~, nonmetallic 
Cracks were found in ceramic 
fillet - thermal and mechanjc 
flexing of DIP. 
ARtrovelcro had 10\v value 
of pull-back retention [orce -
the hooks on the diKcrepant 
material were mis-shapen. 
ALERTS THAT REQUIRED MAJOR RETROFIT 
OR 
EXTENSIVE ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION ON SKYLAB HARDWARE 
ALERT NO. 
*K4-70-04 
*MSC-71-03 
*MSC-7l-03A 
*Same Subject 
is referenced. 
GO-70-l 
~'(*GSFC-72 -10 
~b'(FS -A-72-0l 
**MSFC -7 2 -2 5 
~'(*M~C-72-25A 
**G2-A-73-0l 
DATE 
11-11-70 
6-5-71 
2S-9-72 
**Same subject 
is referenced. 
TITLE 
Hardware, keys & 
pins, quick release 
pins (pip pin) 
Capacitor, fixed 
ceramic 
Resistor, fixed 
film 
f. 
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PROBLEM-CORRECTIVE ACTION 
Pip pins used in hardware 
installed in the MDA, EREP 
& MS09 were defective - pip 
pins were redesigned by 
vendor & tighter inspection 
criteria added to the specs. 
Several M390l4/series 
capacitors manufactured by 
Potter shorted out. This 
type capacitor is used in 
the following Skylab hard-
ware M093 , Ml71, OB S ,MS09 , 
EREP, & ILCA. The cause 
was poor construction and 
inadequate screening req. 
per MIL-C-390J.4. 
Metal migration of the 
resistive. film due to the 
presence of contaminants 
caused the resistance of 
some Vamistor units to 
increase as much as 50% 
after approx. 200 hrs of 
operation at low powe.r 
levels. In some applications 
resistors were replaced, in 
others engineering ration~le 
was offered. 
.. , 
" 
;! 
I 
d 
.... , .t 
***F3-72-0S 24-6-72 Microcircuit, dual 
inline package, 
ceramic 
Thermal & mecll:mi cal r1.ex-
ing of DIP callsed cracks in 
ceramic fillet of the outer 
package - removed and rc-
pla,ced as reqldreu. 
~b"'*MSFC -A -72 -12 
*~"'~"'Same subject 
is referenced. 
MSFC-72"';4 2S-2-72 Microdot/airlock 
connector assembly 
The tolerance build-up 
between the plug and 
receptacle could allow 
loss of either electrical 
engagement or mechanical 
lock .. Programs using this 
combination are: 
MDA, EREP, MS09, OBS, GSE 
functional test set, M092 , 
M093 , T020, & T027. 
Special measurement tools 
have been designed to ensure 
compatibili ty. 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
From a reliability viewpoint, three critical functions 
existed in the MDA that required concentration of effort: 
• Maintenance of pressure integrity from launch of SL-l 
through completion of SL-4 mission. 
• Dock and entry to the SWS followed by egress and undock 
at the completion of each manned mission. 
• Maintenance of MDA utilities vital to the accomplishment 
of mission objectives associated with the ATM and EREP 
experiment programs. 
The MDA Reliability Program was designed to ensure achieve-
ment of these three functions with emphasis on the FMEA/CIL, parts 
and materials program~ design reviews, failure reporting and 
evaluation, and inflight maintenance. l'rogram attention was 
focused on MDA components related to the critical functions. 
These included docking equipment, hatches, pressure vessel pene-
trations (Windows/vent valves), and MDA interfaces with ATM and 
EREP equipment (power/thermal conditioning). The suce.ess of this 
approach is demonstra.ted by the fact that mission objectives 
associated with performance of the MDA were met without exception. 
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I. 
A trade-off exists between redundancy andinflight nlnintenallce 
as a means of compensating for equipment failure in future, IJInnned, 
earth-orbiting space laboratories. Factors involved in selecting 
the optimum approach for each equipment fallure must include: 
• Criticality of the failure effect 
• Safety 
• Complexity of system interfaces with redundant components 
• Weight and cost penalties 
• Accessibility 
• Tool and training requirements 
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4. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 
4.1 DES IGN REVIEW 
Quality participated in many design reviews during the 
design phase ·0£ the MDA program. Participation in the reviews 
was either by an !~zsigned Quality Project representative, who 
also followed the complete hardware build and test or, by Quality 
-Engineering personnel. lhe Quality Program MBnager designated 
what hardware Quality participation was requ~~d. This partici-
pation was required. This participation was normally based on 
complexity and criticality of hard~~re. 
A design analysis check list was used by the Quality ~ep­
resentative in performing design reviews. This check list 
comprised review to the following categories: 
• Contract Requirements • Procesl> App lica tion 
• Specificaj:ion Requirements • Tolerances 
• Interface Requirements • Drawing Clarity 
• Inspectability • Ca libra"t ion 
• Testability • Contamination 
• Repeatability • Material Use 
• Quality Tooling Requirements • Parts Use 
• Personnel Training •• Receiving Acceptance 
Quality was responsible for identifying many problems 
associated with contamination, testability, inspectability, 
calibration and documen!:ation during these reviews. The sur-
veillance of the S190 w:lmdow and associated hardware by Quality 
is one example. Quality"participated in Design Reviews at the 
supplier and was able to convey concerns of repeatability and 
handling to the supplier. These -items were favorably resolved 
with the supplier. This hardware was closely controlled by 
Quality through build and test and Quality was a party to many 
decisions made concerning hardware resolutions. 
During DeSign. Reviews on electronic components, Quality 
identified the requirement for develOPment of many non-standard 
processes (e.g., component bonding and multi-layer terminal 
board fabrication) for use in electronic component fabrication. 
In addition, Qhality identified the requirement for and helped 
establish a system for, component and wire traceability. 
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4.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF CRITICAL AND LIMITED LIFE COMPONENT 
DRAWINGS (CLLCD) 
4.2.1 Denver and St. Louis 
The Critical and Limited Life Component Drawings 
(82051000010 and 84000096100) were developed by Logistics 
Eng ineer ing us ing the technica 1 input of the res pons ib Ie 
Product Integrity Engineers (PIEs) for each component. Quality 
Project participated in several reviews of these ducuments with 
responsible departments,and Quality requirements were incorpo-
rated prior to release. The docum~nts were released with, many 
hardware items open with r~spect·to operational limits. This 
d~ta'was added to the docu!l1ents as it became a'!aUable to the 
responsible Engineering personnel. 
The structure of implementing, the CLLCD was established by 
Quality after initial release. This was accomplished in the 
test procedure and planning areas by recording of applicable 
requirements/limitations on a real time basis. Test procedures 
and manufacturing build planning were reviewed by Quality, and 
requirements incorporated to insure recording of CLLCD data. 
During the build and test cycle, Quality extracted data from 
the as-run test procedures and build records and incorporated 
the data in the Article Historical Records.' These records then 
became a part of the Vehicle Equipment Log. 
4.2.2 KSC Operations 
All time/cycle sensitive equipment installed in the AM/MOAt 
OWS was listed in the integrated Limited Operating Life Item 
(LOLL) ,list by part nu!Uber and list~d time/cycle limitations. 
Each piece of equipment was assigned a separate item numb~r 
(LOLl number). All work authorization documents (Le.,TCPsj' 
Test, Preparation Sheets (TPSa), and DiscJ"epancy Reports (DRs) 
were reviewed to assure incorporation of LOLl numbers for any 
time/cycle sens itive items func tioned. 
Time/cycle operations that were directly observable byMMC 
Quality Inspection were entered on work authorization documents 
and verified by MMC Quality Inspection. 
Time/cycleop.erations performed in integrated work 
authorization documents not covered by MMC Quality.lnspection, 
and time/cycle data that .was recorded on tapes, strip charts, 
etc.,wBS extracted and' sUI\1IIICIrized by MMC Systems Engineering 
and provided to MMC Quality Planning. 
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Completed work authorization documents and time/cycle data 
provided by MMC Systems Engineering were r~viewed by MMC Quality 
Planning and time/cycle data was extracted, summarized and 
entered on Historical Records and in the LOLl Time/Cycl~ Usage 
Summary report. 
The LOLl Time/Cycle Usage Summary was developed and main-
tained by Quality Planning to list all MMC LOLl items and to 
maintain a running summary of time/cycle usage for each item. 
All LOLl items were subjected to a continuous review by Quality 
Planning qn~ Systems Engineering was notified when an item 
exceeded 75% of its allowed usage. The LOLl Time/Cycle Usage 
Summary also contained an estimate of projected future usage 
for each LOLl item for use in resolving potential problems of 
exces~ive usage prior to occurrence • 
. The CLLCDs were used at KSC as sburce dhta for determining 
time/cycle sensitive equipment to be listed in the LOLl list; 
however, review of Acceptance Data Packages (ADPs) for GFE 
(EREP q.nd FeE) revealed addit{onal items of time/cycle sensitive 
eq~ipment not listed in the CLLCD ~nd in some cases the GFE ADPs 
identifi~d time/cycle 'limitations different from those listed 
in the CLLCDs. Also, review of the integrated LOLl t'evealed that 
some time/cycle sensitive items common to the MDA and AM/OWS 
were identified with different limitations in the AM and MDA 
CLLGDs. 
4 • 2 • 3 Summa ry 
i 
The above procedure worked well at KSC and provided accurate 
data. The LOLl Time/Cycle Usage Summary report was a particularly 
good method for maintaining visibility of status of time/cycle 
usage and the inclusion of an estimate of projected future 
functi6ning/usage for LOLls enabled replanning of some planned 
usage to reduce operating .time/cycles sufficiently to prevent 
excessive usage. 
The CLLCD drawings were developed with insufficient 
coordination or review of contractor/NASA imposed time/cyCle 
limitations on. GFE'. This led to the disagreement in .limitations 
identified above •. Future CLLCD drawings ~hould be reviewed and 
coordinated: for: GFE limitations prior tb issue .• 
4.3 SUPPLIER EVALUATION 
The evaluation of supplier performance was a continuous 
process from the time a supplier was selected through all 
hardware deliveries. This was accomplished through analysis 
of performance history and survey/audit results. . . 
4.3.1 Receiving Inspection Records 
Records were 'maintained for each supplier showing. quantity 
of items received, quantity rejected and type of defect on a 
cumulative basis. 
4.3.2 Latent and Source Defect History 
Information was gathered for each critical hardware supplier 
showing source inspection and latent defect history. This infor-
mation was obtained from reject history tab runs. 
4.3.3 Surveys/Audits 
The above information was compiled into monthly and quarterly 
performance reports showing total history for each supplier. 
These reports were utilized by Procurement Quality to establish 
the type and level of inspection surveillance required and the 
need for additional surveys or audits. 
4.4 MATERIAL EVALUATIONS 
4.4.1 Skylab MDA Chemical Analysis Quality Laboratory Su~ 
A. ~.terials and Processes Analysis Support - The Quality 
Laboratory ,provided analytical test support for acceptance or 
rejection of incoming materials and process control and process 
development in support of manufacturing operations. Specific 
areas of test and analysis were: 
• Spectrographic analysis on plate and sheet stock for 
Receiving Inspection. 
• Particulate distribution analysis to verify part 
and system cleanliness. 
• Control and maintenance of plating and milling 
baths. 
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• Testing of organic and inorganic coatings, adhesives, 
potting compounds and sealants [or Receiving Inspection 
and maintenance of these materials through Manu-
facturing Process cont~o1 testing. 
B. Special Analysis Support - Special chemical analysis 
support was supplied to the program in many areas. Specific 
examples of tasks perfo~mep are: 
C. 
• Analysis (spectrograph) of the hatch cover: The 
metallic portion of the cover was analyzed and 
determined no be per specification. 
• Analysis of vendor nickel conductor wire: The 
material was determined to be nickel wire per 
specification. 
• Coolant Solution: The Quality Laboratory provided 
development support and technical input related to 
writing and amending of SK820FL5729 (MDA Cpolant 
System Fluids Kit). 
Coolant Loop Corrosion Problem -
(1) 
(2) 
Numerous coupon and tube tests were performed by 
the Quality Laboratory to determine the cause 
and:aid ,in the solution of the coolant loop 
corrosion problem detected in EREPTape Recorder 
S/N 3 at KSC. The tests included atomic absorption 
and emission spectrographic instrumental analysis, 
PH, solubility and the effect of galvanic cellon 
corrosion rate. The corrosion product was deter-
mined to be mainly phosphates of aluminum and 
potassium created by attack of the aluminum 
tubing from coolant solution at high ( > 10) PH. 
Quality Laboratory representation was present at 
the Coolant Loop Contamination meeting held at 
MSFC (11 April 1973). The purpose of the meeting 
was to standardize tests, to resolve differences 
betweenMMC; MDAC and MSFC personnel and to 
formulate a diagnostic plan to eliminate the 
corrosion problem. These were accomplished and 
no 5 ignific~mt corrosioJ't products have been seen 
in the coolant solution or filters removed from 
SL II or SL III. \" ( 
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4.4.2 MDA Radiographic Inspection Quality Laboratory Support 
4.4.2.1 Radiographic Review at MSFQ 
A. Review of 11DA Shell MSFC SiN 2 (Flight Article) 
radiographs (Oct. 20 through Oct. 22, 1970 at MSFC) - Two areas 
were rejected for defects not in compliance with MSFC Spec-504. 
These areas were as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
Weld XSOIl-G film position 0-1: This was a 
repair area made by MSFC. The repair film 
showed an area of Lack of Fusion (LOF) located 
7 j , fr~m 0 towards 1 approxima tely 1/2 in. in 
length. MSFC's first evalu~tion of the LOF line 
in question was that the defect was a surface 
condition due to irregular\grinding. The second 
ppi~ion.was that a scratch existed -on the film 
in the repair area •. A visual examination of the 
actual weld failed to reveal any surface irregu-
lar.ity in the reworked zone. An x-ray re-shot 
clearly showed the LOF line. 
Disposition: X-ray image to be identified by 
MSFC in accordance with MSFC Spec-504 as Lack of 
Fusion and a weld repair to be made in this area 
by MSFC. 
Weld XS044A, Film Posit;ion O-l~ This area 
showed porosity with a sharp terminating point. 
This type of defect is considered in the same 
category as a crack. 
'. 
Disposition: MSFC to make a weld repair in this 
area. 
(3) A problem 'was encountered initially in properly 
ident;i.fying welds. The weld pictorials as 
presented were incorrect and did not match the 
film call out. 
Disposition: MSFC to establish a satisfactory 
method for permanently marking weld identifica-
tions. 
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B. Review of MDA Shell MSFC SIN 3 (Backup Article) 
radiographs June 29 and 30, 1971 at MSFC -
Weld XS07lE (Weld E) View 0-1: This area showed an Oxide 
Inclusion (dross line) not acceptable to MSFC Spec 504. Original 
disposition by MSFC for this weldment was No Defects. 
Disposition: There was concurrence by MSFC on the defect. 
Item was documented for disposition and was to be repaired by 
MSFC. 
4.4.2.2 Radiographic Review at MMC-Denver 
The QuaLity Laboratory provid~d review of all radiographs 
taken by Mamifactu;'ing on the MDA Flight Article and Back-up 
Article. This review included: 
A. Flight and Back-up Articles 
(1) Radiographs taken upon arr,ival of the ar~icle at 
the MMC Denver facility. 
(2) Radiographs taken after cutting th~shell pene-
trations and installing close out fittings before 
MMC proof pressure. 
(3) Radiographs tak~n a:l;ter proof pressure. 
Results: There were no rejections as a result of 
these reviews. 
B. S190 Window X ... ray Test - The purpose of this te'st was 
to determine degradation in Glass Samples aft'er x-ray exposure. 
The Back-up Article S190 window was suspected of being exposed 
to x-rays at St ~ LouH;. It was not known if the dosage rece i ved 
wou,ld effect signifi.cantly, the optical qualities of. the window .• 
The testing performed in the Quality Laboratory was to complete 
the definition of ~otential radiation effects upon the S190 
window. 
Results: Fo:hr samples were exposed to four doses of 108 
milliroentgens of x-radiation, then taken to Optics for measure-
ment of their transmission and comparison toa sample not 
radiated., A direct comparison showed that there was nodegrada-
tion 1n the glass ur the glass cqating. 
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C. Radiographic Inspection of 82000002720-002 Hatch Seals -
These seals are used on the pressure hatches, both axial and 
radial of the MDA. Radiography was performed for indications 
of voids within the seals after a seal used for engineering 
evaluation had been found to be deteriorating. Tho seal was 
'deteriorating to the point. where many irregularities were 
showing up on the surface of the seal. It was at this stage 
that the radiography was performed and the voids were found. 
Results: Six seals which had passed the hardness check 
were removed from stock and radiographically inspected. Three 
seals were rejected for voids. Further action was then taken 
to have the supplier (Kirkhill) perform radiography on all 
future fabrication of seals and no voids would be allowed. 
o D •. Radiographic Inspection of, the MDA Hatch Cover - A 
hatch cover was damaged as a result of a steel stamp impression 
ovet; :::he honeycomb area. Radiography was performed to determine 
the e~tent of the damage to the honeycomb. 
Results: After radiography the cover was repaired and 
radiography was performed again after repair to verify the fix. 
E. Miscellaneous - Spot radiography was performed on the 
MDA Handling Rings and Film Vaults to determine weld quality. 
Results: There were no rejections as a result of this 
inspection. 
4.5 PROCUREMENT CONTROL 
The procurement of hardware for this program was accomplished 
in accordance with requirements established in the MDA Quality 
Program Plan ED-2002-l003. This plan was compiled in general 
accordance with NHB5300.4 (lB) and meets the requirements of 
that document. These requirements were imposed on hardware 
suppliers by imposing Martin Marietta document M-64-ll9 (Supplier 
Quality Assurance Program) on purchase orders. Document;M,-64-ll9 
had been updated to satisfy the MDA Quality Program requirements. 
In addition to the above requirements, the following actions 
were taken because of the Manned Space Flight application of 
this hardware and due to the procurernent activity occurriI1g 
over a relatively short time span and involving relatively 
small quantitieso£ each item of hardware. 
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4.5.1 Procurement Quality Support to Program 
Procurement Quality provided full time representa.tipn to 
the program in the form of technically competent personnel to 
develop program plans) provide requirements, particip.'1te in 
program reviews and interface with Reliability for final 
prediction analysis. 
These same people were utilized to convey the established 
requirements to the Procurement Quality representative at the 
source in order to acquaint the field effort with the intimate 
details of the program. Consequently, each Representative in 
the field knew the ultimate goal of the hardware, based on 
criticality~ where incipien~ failures may occur and the extent 
of coverag~ necsN'ary. . 
4.5.2 Reliability Inputs to Procu~ement Qualitz 
Procuremettt Quality 
Reliability Engineering. 
this group, with special 
Procurement Quality then 
fonowing: 
provided a direct interface with 
Utilizing predictions generated by 
emphasis on "Single P,oint Failure", 
fed these data into one or more of the 
• Supplier Selection 
o Design Reviews 
• Manufacturing Planning 
• Process Control 
e, Ac(!.eptance Testing 
• Qualification Testink 
• Special Handling Instructions 
By concc,!ltrating on Single Point Failure analysis each of 
.. ,the above points c$mlcl be properlyevalua~ed. to ensure that 
disciplines could and did~eKist to accomnlodate the predictiRn. 
The criticality assessment W8"S utilized to determine the extent' 
of Procurement Quality coveri1ge. 
4.5.3 -Motivatiori 
Ii 
II 
During the course oi' Skylab, certain key personnel were 
selected to provide mqtivation to ,~upplier_.IJl.Enagement and 
employees. Utilizing" the critical:Lt,.v ;LiSt generated by 
Reli,sbility and in ,the company of Quality and Engineering, as 
well as NASA, visi:tations were arranged to acquaint supplier 
personnel with t;Jie goals of Skylab. Talk presentations, decals, 
and '~nne.d AWf.feness" literature were circulated to over 30 
suppliers of efrHical hardware to the MDA program. 
/i 
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4.6 TEST PROCEDURE APPROVAL/FIRST USAGE VALIDATION 
MDA test procedures were written by the Test Department to 
Engineering requirements. All acceptance criteria was based on 
contract requirements as defined by the MDA STACR. All procedures 
were reviewed and approved by Quality t'o insureadherance to 
contract requirements and for inclusion of Quality buy of£s for 
acceptance criteria. 
Prior to start of test, a validation test team comprised of 
Quality, Test, Engineering and the customer met to review test 
requirements and accomplishments. Quality identified all out-
standing work items that were open 9n. the system to be tested. 
These items were coded for time line accomplishment. Those'items 
directly affecting the test were listed on a "Certificate of Readi-
ness to Test" as prerequisites to test start. As the open work 
items w,ere completed, they were acceptance stamped by both Quality 
and the' customer.' Upon completion of all open work items, the 
form was signed by the test team signifying acceptance of test 
start. The "Official Copy" of the test procedure was mainta:i..ned 
by Quality during test. The procedure was redlined accordingly 
as the procedure was validated on a step by step basis. At the 
completion of test, the validation team signed the official copy 
in the appropriate signature blocks signi.fying acceptance of the 
"as run" procedure. All redlines were them incorporated into 
the master copy of the test procedure and submitted to Quality 
for checking and acceptance. After release of the updated 
procedure, it was reviewed with the customer and closed out. 
The procedure was then maintained in Quality Record ~etentions 
in accordance with contr.act requirements. 
The team concept for test v~lidation as described above 
proved to be an accurate and expedious means of assuring that 
all 'test requirements were accomplished to contract requirements. 
4.7 ,NONCONFORMAN CE /FA EVALUATION· 
4.7.1 Nonconformance Reporting and Related Corrective Action 
Prime responsibiliti'j\for resolution of reported Sky1ab 
\ I 
nonconformances was vested in the Skylab Missiori Success 
Corrective Action Control Center (CACC)o 
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4.7.1.1 Skylab Mission Success Responsibilities 
• Review all non-conformances that occur for failure 
mode, and pr~vious history,. 
• Apprise management of Major Impact Problems and Program 
Impact. 
• Define and coordinate corrective action tasks. Manage 
prpblem r~s9lution. 
• Define .. :failure analysis .~equirements·. Review and approve 
analysis results •. 
• ' Establish andmain,):ain gen~ral liaison with associated 
departments and personnel'.' , 
• Prep~re written reports on Major Impact Problem!:!. 
• Provide information for control center displays of open 
problems • 
• Issu~ Discrepancy Check and Report (DC&R) (see paragraph 
4~7.l.2.B (4» whenever problem warrants. 
4.7.1.2 Skylab Corrective Action Control Center Functional 
Description 
The CACC rev.iewed each nonconformance to ascertain the 
cause of the problem, assured that,ad~quate corrective action 
was implemented to prevent recurrence of the nonconformance, 
and provided a visible display of the current status and impact 
of all program problems by. use of a group of display and status 
boards located ·in the Control Center. 
A. N'onconformance Rep~rting - The Skylab program management 
required that all problems be reported and cleared through the 
CACC. The CACC actively participated in the trouble-shooting 
and failure analysis efforts and by company policy was responsi-
'ble for· the direction of in~eStigative and corrective actions 
and approved all problem closure actions. This waS accomplished 
in the following manner: 
F ' 
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(1) Nonconformance Reports - The Martin Automatic 
Reporting System (MARS) was used for nonconformance 
reporting to the CACC throughout the MDA fabri-
cation and test program at MMC Denver, MDAC-E, 
and critical ~uppliers. 
During the assembly and test oper<;ltion at KSC on 
the Flight Article MDA, the KSC DR was used for 
reporting nonconformances. All DRs generated 
against the MDA and installed FCE and experiments 
were reviewed by CACC. MARS were written by MMC 
Denver for the nonconformances identified on DRs 
against:MMC. supplied hardware that required 
corrective action or failure analysis by MMC Denver. 
Figures 4.7.1.2-1 and 4.7.1.2-2 reflect the monthly 
count of MARS and DRs. Significant events during 
fabrication and test are also shown to relate 
quantities of nonconformances to hardware activities. 
(2) Telephone ,Alert - Telephone alerts originated from 
those areas which generate MARS. A nonconformance, 
which in the opinion of the cognizant Quality 
SupervisoG represented a potential,program impact 
was immediately phoned to the CACC. The problems 
generally fell into one of the following categories: 
, 
,', 
• The nonconformance was cqnsidered to be a safety, 
mission,or major failur-~. 
• A defect which was found past its initial 
acceptance point. 
• A system failure which could not be immediately 
isolated to local Martin workmanship and fixed 
in place without component removal. 
• Any nonconformance found during manufacture or 
acceptance which could have been inherent in 
other previously installed or accepted hardware. 
• Any failure which would 'hold up test and/or 
de,Vvery of that or other similar hardware. 
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The Quality Supervisor identified the problem, 
its cause if known, its impact on the program 
and corrective action, if known. A Corrective 
Action engineer was immediately assigned to 
assess the impact on the program and initiate 
actions necessary to correct the problem. 
(3) Suspect Material Reports - The CACC received 
Suspect Material Reports from the Customer Plant 
Representatives Office. Suspect Material Reports 
were "Alerts" from other contractors doing business 
with the Department of Defense Agencies and NASA 
concerning discrepancies or nonconformances in 
materials or processes which in their opinion 
could have existed in other contractor programs. 
Each report was reviewed by a Corrective Action 
engineer for its effect on material or processes 
utilized by the MMC. A report was made back to 
the customer regardless of the outcome of the 
search. 
(4) Trend Reviews - Trend reviews were held monthly 
by the Directors of Quality, Manufacturing and 
Materiel. The CACC was required to account for 
the MARS Disposition and .Corrective Action to the 
satisfaction of the Directors during the trend 
reviews. 
B. Nonconformance Statusing for Flight Hardware Anomalies 
The CACC maintained a Control Room which displayed all open 
problems both minor and significant in order that a high deg~ee 
of visibility was maintained. Besides its visual display, the 
CACC also maintained a mechanized data system which cataloged 
all failures both significant and insignificant by part number 
and index code. Special runs by the computer also produced 
failure history by vehicle, location, cause, or repetitive 
failure modes. All MARS were routed through the CACC for 
.evaluation and processing to the mechanized data system. The 
following .visual displays were maintained by the CACC: 
i ~ 
(1) Open Significant MARS Status Board - The board at 
all times reflecteg all open MARS, their current. 
status, to whom they were assigned for closure, 
the GorrectiveAction engineer responsible for 
monitoring closure action; and the planned 
completion. date. 
MARS were ~eceived by the CACC, screened and 
logged in. The initial screening separated non-
critical MARS covering non-serialized hardware 
which was discrepant because of normal wear, 
expired shelf life, 'insignificant paper work 
errors, etc. The remainder of the MARS were 
distributed to individual Corrective Action 
engineers who had particular specialities within 
the Discipline. 
The Corrective Action engineer reviewed the MARS 
for the following: 
• To see that the MARS had been properly completed. 
• To 'determine the mode of failure from the 
descri~tion of the nonconformance on the MARS. 
• To determine if the cause had been properly . 
identified and documented. If cause was not 
known he would authorize a Failure Analysis 
(FA). 
• To, assure. that the Corrective Action documented 
had been implemented 3nd would prevent recurrence 
of the problem. 
, . 
• To assure that proper retest was initiated and 
that no unverified failures were in the system. 
Upon completion of the review, the CACC would code 
the MARS for the i:ollowing items: 
• Cause of the nonconformance. 
• Failure mode. 
• Whether the nonconformance was a design problem 
where the engineering,was at fault or a practice 
pt'o~lem where propedure:s.or personnel were 
affected. i.~. 
• Whethet;' KSC, MDAC-Eor Denver was responsible' 
for correc'tiveacition. 
4-15 i 
;! 
;1 ! i\ 
• The criticality of the nonconformance. Did 
it affect flight performance (Mission 
Critical), planned launch on time (Launch 
Critical), personnel safety (Crew Safety)~ 
major significant or minor. . 
• The type (if any). of the FA to be performed. 
• Whether the problem was still open requiring 
further action or was closed with adequate 
corrective action implemented to prevent 
recurrence of the problem. 
• The disposition of the hardware. 
The MARS ;hich were coded open were posted on the 
open significant MARS status board. Those' tha t 
were Crew Safety Critical, Mission Critical, or 
Major required that a Corrective Action Problem 
Summary (CAPS) report be opened and they were 
posted on" the Major Impact Board. . 
The Corrective Action engineer would assign the 
closure or corrective action to the organization 
responsible for implementing the action. He 
would establish a need date for the action in 
keeping with the actual needs of the program. 
Once the item was placed on the board, the 
Corrective Action engineer would continually 
monitor the progress of the item and make. 
additional assigrunents as necessary to effect an 
adequate" ane;!. timelys"olution to the problem. 
Red flags were assigned wh~re due dates were 
passed or which had been open for more than 60 
day,s. 
, 
Items were removed from the board only when 
corrective action had been implemented as docu-
m~):1ted on a MARS Corrective Action Closure 
Report.o The Closure Report was approved by the 
Section··Chief· o£.;(the ~esponsiblearea and the 
cognizant Corrective Action engineer. 
4;;'16 
:i~ 
(2) FA Status Board - When the cause of a noncon-
formance was not known or readily discernab1e, 
(3) 
(4) 
a failed parts analysis was required. The FA 
Status Board represented the status of all 
failed parts analysis efforts whether the 
analysis was being performed at the Denver 
Failure Analysis Laboratory, at the vendor's 
facility, or at the launch sites. Figure 
4.7.1.2-3 depicts the FA activity during the MDA 
program. The board showed the current status of 
each analysis, its impact on the program, and 
the promised completion date. These problems 
were also statused on the open Significant MARS 
Status Board. The FA Status Board highlighted 
the failed parts analysis efforts and placed 
added emphasis on that category of problems. 
Until cause was known, each problem was a 
potential program impact. 
FAs were closed onlY,after careful review by the 
Corrective Action engineer, assuring that 
adequate corrective action had been implemented 
to preclude recurrence. 
Flight Anomalies Board - The CACC participated 
in vehicle post flight Quick Look meetings and 
significant data review. Item(i resulting from 
those reviews were posted on the Flight Anomalies 
Board. The CACC assigned a Corrective Action 
engineer to each item for review of positive 
corrective action and/or its potential effect on 
ot.her flight articles. Some items coming from 
this review resulted in the opening of a CAPS 
report and the posting of the item on the Major 
Impact Problems Board. 
Discrepancy Check and~ Report (DC&R) Status 
Board - A DC&R was initiated whenever it was 
suspected that a discrepancy might exist in 
hardware already accepted or delivered (Figure 
4.7.1.2-3 depicts the MDA DC&R activity). The 
discovery of the discrepancy was usually the 
result of the investigation of an open signifi-
cant MARS or an Alert (refer to paragraph 3.3 
for Alert Investigations). 
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The DC&R was originated and controlled by the 
CACC. It assigned action items to Quality 
agencies to search out all hardware suspected 
containing the nonconformance, specified an 
inspection program, dispositioned the affected 
hardware, and specified the system's retest 
requirements where applicable. 
of 
The DC&R was statused' against each vehicle" 
.spar~ and the stocltrooms at Denver and the 
launch site. The Board reflected current status 
of each DC&R. 
A Dq~ was' removed from this board when all 
actions assigned by the DC&R have been completed. 
(5) Major Impact Problems Bqard - The Major Impact 
Problems Board provided agraphic display of 
problems identified from all sources which were 
considered to have greatest impact on the program. 
~roblems which were displayed on this Board fell 
into one or more of the,following categories: 
• Safety Critical - any failure which had 
degraded or could degrade crew safety. 
• Mission Critical - any failure which had 
degraded or could degrade mission success or 
launch-an-time probability. 
• Major' - a failure which, by itself, was not 
critical as defined above, but could have 
become so in the event of a second failure 
(such as, might occur in redundant systems) .• 
• Nonconformance which would significantly 
delay end-item acceptance test anp/or 
delivery. I. Any problem which in the'judgment of responsi-
ble Mart.in Marietta 'or customer personnel, 
cou,1d have had a degrading effect on Mission 
,Success, crew safety or1aunch-on-timel 
capability. 
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• Recurrence of any of the above nonconformances 
after corrective action had been implemented. 
• The recurrence of any failure mode (not in the 
above categories) on any critical component 
that indicated a problem in the judgment of 
responsible Martin Marietta or customer 
personnel. 
• Whenever a DC&R was issued or when airborne 
hardware was removed from a vehicle on-pad 
at the launch site. 
I 
Each problem statused on the Board resulted in 
the initiation of a CAPS report (Figure 4.7,.1.2-3 
depict's the MDA CAPS activity). The report was 
utilized to document the series of events which 
led'up to the decision to open a Major Impact 
problem, record and assign the action ieems 
necessary to understand and resolve the problem, 
and to document the final corrective action 
which was utilized to clos~ the problem. The 
NASA, RMO concurrence was obtained prior to 
clos'ingthe CAPS. The CAPS report therefore 
became a documented history of the problem from 
"cradle to grave". 
The Major Impact Board was arranged so as to give 
the. observer an instantaneous picture of all 
major problems open and their current impact on 
the program. The Board displayed the following 
informa t 1,0n: 
• Part name. 
• Part number. 
• Brief de~6ription of the problem. 
• The cause, if known. 
• The current status of the problem. 
• Impacts on current Martin and vendor builds. 
• The name of the person responsible for 
closure actions as the assignee and the name 
of the Corrective Action engineer who would 
monitor all actions in depth. 
• The daee the CAPS was opened and the planned 
closure data. 
• The problem or report numoer. 
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4.7.1.3 Skylab Mission Success Interface 
Skylab Mission Success (CACC) maintained continuous and 
effective lines of cQnuTIunications with the customer concerning 
anomalous conditions. This was accomplished in several ways as 
outlined below: 
A. Daily morning meetings .. The customer (NASA & AFPRO), 
CACC Engineers, and other concerned personnel participated in a 
morning telecon placed with MMC Quality personnel at KSC to 
inform all participants of current activity and those problems 
requiring resolutions. 
B. , ,Weekly CAPS meetings ... Updates to the previous weeks 
"open" CAPS were the main subjeut at a meeting held to insure 
the customer concurred in the completed and proposed corrective 
actions as identified in the CAPS. 
C. Documentation requiring concurring signatures .. 
Several forms (DC&R, MARS, Unsatisfactory Condition Report 
(UCR) , etc.) used to report nonconformances and related 
corrective actions were submitted to the customer for signature. 
4.7.2 Sky1ab Mission Success Data Retention and Rapid Retrieval 
System 
A. Purpose - The Sky1ab Mission Success Data Retention 
and Rapid Retrieval System provided for the collection, 
classification, filing and rapid retrieval of all Sky1ab 
nonconformances and corrective ,action data. To assure rapid 
,access, and retrieval, the fi1es~ere segregated by program 
syste)ll and/or experiment,. arranged in a1pha-numericsequenc~, 
and appropriately color coded and cross referenced. 
B. p'rocedure .. '.J!his system consisted of the following: 
(1) Master Index Card File .. The Master Inde'/t Card 
File contained a separate 3xS card for each MARS 
processed. Information contained on the card 
included applicable part numbers, nomenclatures, 
defect description, FA number, cross references 
(if any) and MARS number. 
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(2) ML\RS l:-1aster File - ML\RS copies received Lhrllugh till' 
nurmal ML\RS distribution system were catcgtlri?('d 
as a (unction of ML\RS status (open, advance, 
closed etc.) and program system and/or u>qH.'r1m(!nL 
type. 
(3) CAPS Master J?iles - Open CAPS require peril)dic 
updates to reflect on-going corrective actions 
and so were held in an active rile. Closed CAPS, 
along with all applicable information compiled 
,~while the CAPS was Open, were placed in individual 
folders and arranged in alpha-numeric order. 
(4) Failure Analysis - All FAs were filed in alpha-
numeric sequence and a log was maintained with 
suitable cross references. 
(5)' DC&R - All DC&Rs were filed in alpha-numeric 
sequence and a log was maintained with suitable 
cross references. 
(6) KSC DRs - All KSC DRs were filed in numerical 
se,quence. 
4.7.3 Skylab 1'11ss ion Success Program Audit 
The Sky lab Prog'ram audit function was utilized as. a manage 
met'lt tool to evalllate the performance of 4l.U program el.~ments 
insure mission success. All activities of th~ Manned Space 
Systems operations that contributed to mission succ~ss were 
audited and/or reviewed including program and support planning. 
These audits were bas~d on program direction. 
A master audit/review p1anwas prepared and approved by the 
Skylab Mission Success Department providing for all audit/review" 
requirements. This plan identified specific audits to be per-
[armed [or the particular activity· and contained sufficient 
detail to insure complete ev~luation of the specific areas o[ 
the ~ubject being audited. 
The types of audits were (1) standard audits for assessing 
working sys tems, processe's, methods, and operations (2) non-
standard audits performed to coincide with time. and event based 
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activity, (3) special audits that may be requested of activities, 
systems, or procedures as they were deemed necessary, and (4) 
spot audits initiated on a random basis by a phone call from 
the CACC Chief. The ~)pot audits were usually performed by the 
inspector in the a~aa and covered such subjects as housekeeping, 
current procedure$, proper handling, etc. 
The audit plan identified periodic program level reviews 
of all activities considered prime requisites to mission success, 
including,: 
e Safety • Human Engineering 
• Reliability • Ma inta tnah Hi ty 
• Test CD Quality Assurance 
• Op~rations e Contaminatiop. Com'::ro 1 
• Ma intenance • Training & CertHi/tation 
• Logistics 
The audit function'was designed to aid in the ~chievement 
of 100% mission success. Specific objectives were as follows: 
• Provide a management tool to evaluate the mission 
success'performance of all elements of the Manned 
Space Sys~ems Operatibn. 
• Provide a means of uniform assessment of all activities. 
• Conduct audits and program planning reviews to identify 
specific items that adversely affect mission success. 
• Plan corrective actions through the use of Corrective 
Action Directives. 
• Develop and maintain resolution status of a formal list 
of mission success critical items. 
• Prepare action items .!1nd data for hardware and program 
milestone reviews and meetings (e.g. Design Certification 
Review, Flight Readiness Rev~ew, etc.). 
The Manag~r of Skylab Mission Buccess was responsible for 
th\~' organization and conduct of a Quarterly Review with program 
and line organization management for the. purpose of evaluating 
the progress of the Skylab program. This .management review 
assured tha~ __ all functions were dynamic and align.ed with the 
Skylab program .. u?eds. 
\., /' 
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4.7.4 ~ylab Program Audits Conducted By NASA 
A. Audits of MMC Denver Operations - One major audit/ 
survey was conducted by NASA MSFC in October 1970. This audit 
occurred prior to commencing MDA hardware fabrication; there-
fore, the NASA audit team could evaluate only MMC's Planning, 
Policies, and Procedural Controls. 
The NASA audit team's findings consisted of~5 observations 
and 16 discrepancies, none of which was a signif!J.cant item. 
The MMC initiated innnediate corrective action. j The formal. 
Audit/Survey Report (S&E-Qual-70~11) w~s received by MMC Denver 
in December 1970. Closure action for all, findings was completed 
in February 1971. 
In addition to the above, the following reviews were 
conducted by NASA "Blu~ Ribbon Committies": 
(1) A "Critical Mechanisms Review", consisting of a 
review of MDA Single Failure Points. 
(2) A IISecond Looku critical items review of launch 
and docking critical hardware from the design 
phase through final systems test. 
B. Audits of MMC KEC Operations - Two major audits/ 
surveys of the MMC KEC Operations were conducted by the NASA 
KS C qua lity Survey Office. 
The first audit/survey was conducted in Marqh 1972, prior 
to MMC receiving hardware, and consisted of a review of the 
MMC Planning and Procedures. No items 'requiring a written 
response were identified from this audit/survey. 
The second audit/survey was conducted in December 1972. 
The MM;C initiated corrective action immediately bal',ied on the 
prelin\inary report of findings. The formal Survey Report was 
received in February 1973 and identified 13 observations and 
25 discrepancies (primarily dealing with deficiencies in 
,recording data and maintaining records). All of these items 
were closed by March 1973. 
. .... 
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4.8 CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION AND CHANGE ACTIVITY 
4.8.1 Denver and St. Louis Configuration Control 
The configuration of the Flight and Backup MDAs was 
controlled by use of the mechanized tab run system and supple-
meI1ted by shop folder, l1anufacturing Process Plans (MPP) 
Mission Preparation Sheets (MPS), Test Preparation Sheets (TPS), 
and Modification Instructions (MI). Quality involvement was 
as follo~s: 
A~ MeGhani zed Tab Run - Mechanized tab runs which 
o.ontained the complete hardware status were used to verify 
configuration. Tab runs were monitored by all affected 
Qualifty organizations for open work items to be accomplished. 
Quality verification of incorporation was required for closeout 
of all open tab run items. 
I' ". ,~ •• B~ .Shop'F9ld~rs - Shop folders w~re used for fabrication 
of d~tai1s and sub-assemblies. All shop folders required 
Quality verification tor completeness, Quality inspection 
points and incorporation of latest change prior to release for 
build. All change·s incorporated in shop folders prior to 
issuance were bought. on the tab runs by Quality Planning ~s an 
incorporation, into the MPPs. Al1,changes released after 
issuance ofshol? folders or not incorpoi:ated required' an 
issuance of a Change Noti~e to be attach~d to folder, which 
required Quality inspection verificationand submittal of 
buyoff for tab run. 
C. Manufacturing Process Plans - MPPs were issued for 
build of all assemblies and end items. MPPs were issued at a 
serialized level arid was the first point where assemblies could 
be identified with an end item usage. MPPs were required to 
meet :~all requirements of the shop folders. 
,;. D. Liaison Calls (Lies) .. 1./C8 were written to Engineering 
.f;;:'r drawing changes required to complete build assembly or 
modifications of hardware. L/Cs writ.ten during the generation 
of a shop folder, MPPs or MIs wereincludetl and required Quality 
verification of released engineering to Llc prior to acceptance 
of hardware. LICs written during performance 9f work or assembly 
were doct$ented on Quality Work Sheets and required Quahity 
verification of released engineering to Llc prior to acceptance 
.of hardware. All engineering released to c.over· work p'erformed 
to LICs required a Quality inspection submittal to tab run to· 
e:lose out Qpen items.' . 
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E. Recap and Movement Authorization (Recap) - Recaps 
generated and approved by Quality were used for movement of 
hardware from one work area to another area. Recaps contained 
all open work items required to comple.te the hardware specified. 
F. Material Inspection and Receiving Report (DD-250) -
DD-250s were used for acceptance of hardware and shipment. DD-
250s required all shortages and waivers to be included and 
signature of authorized government representative and Quality. 
Closeout of shortages and waivers required issuance of another 
DD-250 outlining items to be closed.DD-250s were required for 
shipment of modification kits to off-site usages and required 
Quality validation prior to shipment. Incorporation of 
modificat.ions/kits in Denver and St. Louis required Quality 
verification of incorporation and submittal. of DD-250. Nodi-
fications/kits installed at KSC did not require DD-250s. 
G. Modification Instructions - Mis were required for all 
hardware changes after acceptance on a DD-250 and required 
Quality validation prior to issuance. Upon completion of 
modification cotheMI, Quality was required to: 
• Complete Modification Instruction, including se~l­
off to NASA Rep. 
• Complete Installation Notice Card. 
• . Complete DD-250'including sell-off to NASA Rep. 
" Complete and submit Manufacturing incorporation 
verification buy-off transmittal for close out of 
open items on the tab run. 
H. Installation Notice Card (INC) - INCs were required. for 
all modifications performed after acceptance of end items, and 
required Quality verification. INCs were submitted to MSFC to 
ciose out the Configuration Identification Index and Modification 
Status. 
I. Mission Preparation Sheets (MPp) -MPSs were used in 
St. Louis to. control configuration of the hardware. All hardware 
changes by Modification Kit or Lie required a Quality approval, 
and were not closed for LICs until engineering was released and 
Modification Kit received. Numbers for MPSs and a log of all 
MPSswere maintained and controlled by Quality. 
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J. Part Number Changes - Assignment of unique part 
numbers to each piece of hardware was used to control the 
configuration of the hardware. Each' time the configuration 
was changed after initial release the part number was changed, 
except in the following conditions under which the part numbers 
were not changed: 
(1) If a design chapge was released to reflect the 
"as built" configuration, Quality verified that 
the:d~sign change was incorporated in all units. 
Quality verification was for fabricated hardware, 
h!'lrd~are in, fabricat.ion and inc1ude.d updated 
Process Plan shop folder for subseq\.~ent hardware. 
(2) If a desi&n change was released to change con-
figuration of hardware that was not yet procured, 
built or accepted and Quality could ensure 
incorpo~ation pf design change prior to procure-
m~nt, build, or acceptance. 
4.8.2 KSC Confi'gurationReview and COr.i.t~oi 
A. Receiving Inspection,Configuration Review - All hard-
ware received atKSC was inspected by MMC Quality Receiving 
Inspection. Each item of hardware was evaluated for ADP 
requirements. 
Receiving Inspection reviewed the ADPto assure accepta-
bility of the hardware for special handling requirements, and 
for identification of open work or test. The ADf was then 
forwarded to the MMCQuality Record' Center. 
'the Quality Recprcll;l Center performed ,g' detail review of 
the AP;P j;or open work/tests. 
B. Open Work/Test Statusin& -
(lJ MOA.'" All open work-hests on the MDA were, 
identified in the MMCOpen/Deferred Work 
Document ED2002-2045,Cet;'tificate of Flight 
Worthiness (COFW) Endorsement No.2, Log of 
Exceptions(~OE), and DeviatiqnApproval Requests < 
(DARs) 22, 23 and 24. ' 
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MMC Quality was directed by NASA/KSC to list all 
of the open work items on a separate log, list 
the KSC document (i.e. TCP/TPS/DR) that would 
close the open work item and deliver the log" 
reflecting closure of all items, prior to launch. 
This log was developed by MMC Quality and Project 
Engineering as the MDA Open/Deterred Work Compliance 
Matrix .• 
The ,open/De.ferred Work Compliance Matrix: was 
. reviewed by NASA/KSC Quality and Engineering for 
assurance that all open work/tests items were 
listed. MMC Quality reviewed the referenced 
.TCP/TPS/DR, when completed, to verify satisfactory 
clo~ure,of the open work/test items, obtained 
NASA Quality concurrence and delivered the com-
pleted matrix: to NASA Quality. 
GFP~ 'Experiments and Flight Crew Equipment - ADPs 
f'or hardware received separate from· the MDA were 
reviewed for open work/test items and any items 
discovered were recorded on DRs. The DR was 
tracked and the open work/test items were closed 
,in the same manner as described above for the 
MDA Ope~lD~£~r~ed Work,C?mpliance Matrix. 
C. Configuration Control - The ~onf'iguration of the MDA 
was tracked and con'trolled by the use of TPSs, TCPs, Parts 
Installation/Removal Records (PIRRs) and Temporary Installation 
Records (TIRs).' . 
(1) Installation and removal (either temporary 
or 1?~T;manent) of Hight harclware was tr.acked by 
use of ~~ forms or TCPs. 
The TCP had an entry verified by MMC and NASA Qua lity 
t·o assure recording, of pe;t;manent installations 
or removals and to assure re-instal'lation of 
temporary removals. 
Flight hardware removed or installed per TPSs 
and DRs was recorded on PIRRs. The PIRR entries 
were ~losed only when satisfactory installation 
or re-installation of removed parts was complete. 
Prior to launch all MDA PIRRs were.reviewed to 
assure satisfactory closure. 
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(2) Temporary installations of/either flight or non-
flight hardware, unless illstal1atLon .and removal 
was performed in a TCP'I waS tracked by use 0 f 
TIR forms. Also, a i'Ri:!move Be fore Flight II red 
streamer was attached to the .part. 
Each temporary installation was recoided on the 
TIR. form and cross referenced to the seJ;ia1 :'i 
number ·of the red streamer attached to the hard-
ware. The TIR entry was closed by MMC and NASA 
Quality verification of removal. 
Red streamers were assigned serial numbers and 
tracke~ by listing in a log. 
Prior to la\lnc~ all TIRs were reviewed by MMC 
',and NASA Quality to assure closure and all r.ed 
streamers were accounted for. 
(3) TPSs were used at KSC to incorporate hardware 
changes. TPSs were not reviewed or validated 
by quality, but Quality did.,control the assign-
ment of TPS numbers and were required for c~ose 
out of TPS. • TPSs that worked config~ration 
changes other than by released engineering 
required Quality verificatiori of released 
engine~ring to TPS prior to close out of TPS. 
DD-2S0s were not required for hardware changes by 
TPS and/or by Mod Kit incorporation. INCs were 
required only for those hardware changes that 
were a result of e~ginee~ing released in Denver. 
D. Summary - The use of PlRRs and TIR provided an accurate 
accounting of the ~A configuration. Attaching red streamers 
to temporary installations gave additional assudmce that all 
installations were complete and non-flight items werei'. removed 
prior to launch. On future programs, the requirement;: t<;> use 
PlRRs/TIRs and red streamers should be imposed in the beg:L'nnin~~ 
of the program at the module contractors plant. 
4.9 QUALIFICATION TESTING 
The MMC Quality role in the qualification test program 
consisted of verification of hardware~.con·figuration; failure 
reporting anc;lcorrectiv~ action, and monitoring Qualification 
Status. 
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A. Configuration Verification - MMC Quality verified that 
the item of hardware selected for Qualification Testing was 
built to flight configuration and had been subjected to the 
same test and quality surveillance/verification as flight 
hardware. 
After the'item of hardware had been selected for Qualifica-
tion Testing, MMC Quality assured the item was identified as 
"Test Usage" hardware to prevent subsequent use as flight hard-
ware~ 
Prior to the start of Qualification Testing, MMC Quality 
verified proper set-up of testing hardware/fixtures. 
B. Non-conformance Report~ng - MMC Quality assured that 
all discrepancies detected during testing were reported on MARS 
and that corrective action was completed. 
C. Qualification Status - MMC Quality at KSC verified 
documentation was available in the MDA ADP certifying completion 
of Qualification Testing prior to launch of the Flight MDA. 
4.10 MANUFACTURING IN-LINE SURVEILLANCE 
4.10.1 Team Assignment Philosophy 
Quality provided technical support for the various phases 
of design, manufacture and test of .a11 MDA hardware. The 
hardware consisted of mockups, trainers, flight, backup and 
associated Ground Support Equipment. Special emphasis wa's 
placed on critical space hardware whereby selected Quality 
personnel were assigned as specialists to handle all matters 
pertaining to Quality and to provide an interface with the 
AFPRO Quality and NASA RMO Quality personnel. 
A Quality Representative wa~ assigned to the MMC Huntsville 
Operations. The role of the Q~ality Representative included 
close liaison with the MSFC Quality, Manufacturing, Engineering 
and the Receiving agency. All hardware provided by MMC to MSFC 
for the MDA passed through NASA receiving inspection. Problems 
with NASA at the NASA receiving facility with regard to detail 
fittings which MMC was contracted to build were encountered. 
The problems WE:;re inainly due to interpretations of documentation 
or lack of documentation. These problems were worked. through 
the MMC Quality Representative and resolution was fast and 
effective. (., 
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MMC should always have knowledgeable personnel at the 
customer's facility when deliveries to the customer are made. 
This is especially true if deliveries are made over a long 
time span and consist of a variety of items. Furthermore, MMC 
should have a complete understanding of the customer's needs 
which include data requirements and system differences. 
In addition,to a Quality Representative permanently located 
at MSFC, it would have been desirable ,to have the Quality factory 
supervisor responsible for the MDA assigned TDY to MSFC. The 
QuaHty factory supervisor would be able to witness all critical 
operations, inspections and become ,familiar with specification 
variances which would enable the supervisor to better plan 
Quality operation at Denv~r. 
4.10.2 Neutral Bouyancy (N!B) Mockup Unit 
A. Receiving - The NIB Mockup Unit was received at MMC 
Denver frohl MSFC in November 1969. Quality' accomplished a 
receiving inspection of the item and noted the follow,i~g 
discrepancies which affected later build up and deliv~ry: 
• Areas of corrosion throughout mockup. 
• '~ointed ends of wire protruding around circumference 
o~ mockup, especially at middle of top assembly 
'where openings had' been made for installation of 
metal pads on the ring frame. 
• Longerons in the top and bottom halves of the:mock-
i. 
up were out of alignmel1t •. 
B. Assembly - The NIB unit was built to sketch engineering. 
Quality coverage during the build cycle was limited to major 
assembly level and installation. Records of article configura-
tion and installadonwere maintained in a NIB LOg and accepted 
at installation by MMC and Air Force Quality. Crab items 
against the article were entered into the NIB Log and worked 
off by Manufacturing. 
Lack of configuration definition inMSF·C contract modifica-
tion on hardware reqUirements caused many problems to design, 
engineering') ma'nufhcturing and quality. Mcisions as to the 
extent of modification were made by programmanagett}ent:and 
desigd engineering. MMC program management sent a letter to 
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MSFC defining the configuration of the NIB unit that MMC would 
deliver to MSFC unless otherwise notified. 
c. Inspection - MMC Crew Systems, Safety, Engineering and 
Quality personnel made an inspection of the NIB unit to de-
termine the adequacy for use in under water operations. Six 
major items noted below were found during inspection that 
required correction: (1) Exposed bolt threads , sharp square 
corners and edges, thin metal edges, and exposed wire ends. 
(2) No identification on installed components. (3) Surface of 
the MS12 grid did not fit flush with frame of work platform. 
(4) Both radial escape openings obstructed. (5) Red escape 
panel in CW, console area was blocked and should have been 
painted black. (6) The remaining escape hatch panels were used 
for attaching a fan and handrail installation which interferred 
with the capabi,lity of the panels being removed for under water 
activities. Most of the above items were noted by crew systems 
personnel. The requirements imposed by crew systems such as 
"no exposed bolt threads" were not reflected in the engineering. 
The previous~y mentioned problems could have been eliminated 
with a proper design review between MMC and MSFC. prior to the 
start of construction. The NIB unit was packed in two separate 
pallets and crates and sent to MSFC on 9 March 1970. Qua1;lty 
projects and inspection monitored all packing and shipping 
activities. 
D. Discrepancies - The NIB unit arrived at MSFC on 
14 March 1970 and MMC Quality Projects made a· visual inspection 
of the shipping crates on 16 March 1970 and found damage to 
the crate containing the larger upper section of the NIB u\1.it. 
According to the driver of the truck, the damage was due to 
wind pressure whipping the face of the crate back and forth and 
pulling ·out nails. The driver rigged up a covering and wire 
lash to keep the face of the crate from damaging the unit. 
Notice was later received by MMC that considerable damage had 
occurred during shipment. Th;l.s was later verified by MSFC 
Quality who also identified additionaL discrepancies relative 
to design and fabrication. An MMC team consis.ting of Engi-
neering, Manufacturing and Quality, was subsequently sent from 
Denver to MSFCto cQrrect the problem aJ;'eas on the N/I3 'unit •. 
/i ' 
In view of the problems stated·Yabove MMC MOA Qual;i.ty 
Program Management took the following corrective action: 
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o Increased coverage in the mockup build area 
from periodic surveillance to full time. 
• Established a new requirement that both design 
engineering and crew systems personnel participate 
in the receiving inspection of major items of GFP 
in mockup and trainer type hardware. This action 
was taken to identify both design and human factor 
d~ficiencies • 
• All deficiencies found during receiving inspection 
(with a reconunended ftx) were given to MSFC and (. 
local AFPRO with a request for approval of 
recommended actions • 
• , bnless otherwise defined b~ contract or released 
engineering, Quality would inspect mockup/trainer 
hardware to airborne hardware standards. 
• . Estab1is'heci' a requirement that crew sy.s tems perform 
a walk through and check prior to MMC Quality 
presenting the item to the customer for DD-250 
sign off. 
• Establish B,requirement that MMG Q4ality shall 
witness the'receiving inspection, after delivery, 
of major mockup/trainer items at the pOint ef 
receipt. 
E. Reconunendations - In the' future, when GFP is to. be 
provided, it is reconunertded that a MMC team b~ establishedD'e\J, 
inspect hardware on site and determine exactly what is required 
for delivery. It is also. r~conunended that pr~er to the start 
of any manufacturing,a thorough design review be made between 
the contracter and the customer, to. ebtain the customer's 
concurrence on all design and final configuration. 
4.10.3 Zero UGH Trainer 
A. Receiving, - The Zero "Gil 'Mockup shell was received at 
MMC Denver. frem MSFC in November? 1969. A receiving inspectien 
was perfermed and the follewing disp.repancies were noted: 
.• Interior and,~xterierI finish was damaged ~lnd dirt'y. 
• TWo holes had been drilled in the top left sfde of 
the dome sect.ion (looking forward). 
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• Half box on top left side of shell (looking forward) 
had come loose and was hanging by one bolt. 
e The following items were called out on the MMC 
Engineering Tear Out List but were not received 
with the mockup. 
lOMl60l5-1 Box 
lOMl6016-l Beam 
-
10M16l20-1 Box 
10M1602l-l Box 
10Ml6022-l Box 
• Minor damage to docking ring mechanisms. 
B. Control - Quality established the ground rules for the 
build up and control of thp. mockup unit as follows: 
• AFPRO notification of receiving inspecti.on 
discrepancies. 
• Class III engineering (sketch) would be used for 
modification, with red-lines' for minor chang~s. 
• Use of log books to control modifications on top 
assemblies. 
• All hardware purchased for the moc.kup would be 
designated and identified as EngiT.').eering Test 
Hardware (ETR). 
• 
• 
Detail manufacturing would work 'to shop folders. 
.~he detail and subassembly parts would require 
shop. supervisors' acceptance stamps when completed. 
Quality Project would provide surveillance and· buy 
off of major assemblies. 
4.10.4 One "G" Trainer 
A. Inspecdcn - Since the One "G"'Trainer was non-flight, 
non-test type hardware, the specifications.' were flexible. The 
team concept was used and one Quality Projlact Representative had 
the. complete responsibili,ty to direct Quality activities. The 
act'u.al inspect;i,on activities were haf\dledby one ins~ector. 
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B. Procedures - Sketch type engineering was used throughout 
the program. If a change was required in the engineering drawing, 
it was red-lined on the drawing and a copy of the drawing was 
retained by Quality for the log records. Periodic updates w~re 
made to the red-lined drawings and a final update was made at 
the time of final acceptance of the One "G" Trainer. All 
receiving inspection took place in the central, One "G" Trainer 
assembly area. Receiving inspection was the responsibility or 
the assigned Quality team. Although much of the received hard-
ware was of the non-flight category and designated GFP, it was 
stUl recorded. into the Property Accountability Records. 
If detail parts were to be fabricated by the central shops, 
a minimum process plan was utilized, with heavy reliance on the 
drawing for information. These parts were returned to the One 
"Gil 'trainer area and inspected by the local team representative. 
C. Bl,lild Logs - During the course of assemb ly and 
instaliation. work, a master build log WBIS prepared and main-
taine4. by the assigned Quality personnel,. This log described 
the build history and was' delivered with the hardware. 
At various intervals dur·ing the bund cycle, JSC personnel 
performed hardware reviews. ,The rE?viewfl were ins trumenta I in 
establishing a sound understanding of tbe hardware requirements 
for the high fidelity mockup and led to a smooth final acceptance 
and delivery. 
D. Parts and Materials - A main c.oncern during the assembly 
cycle of the mockup was the maintenance of a high level of 
fidelity. The location of various pieces of hardware was 
cl;'i,tical bec~use of the exact simulation required to meet the 
flight arUcle requi1iements. Other items requiring attention 
due to the Astronaut interface were clearahces, sharp edges, 
cornerS, legibility of decals/nomencTature, paint and general 
workmanship. Qual~:ty closely monitored critical structural 
areas where attachments were made for lifting devices and aU 
other hardware.which contained mass and had hole attachment 
tolerance requirements. 
In order to cortserve material, and acquire hard to obtain 
itelllS, a review was conducted of all e~cess material ,and parts 
for possible use on the, trainer. Material and standard parts 
changes were ~de freely, if structurif~.,.;:. integrity was not a 
factor, because only fidelity 'and location were of COncern. All 
changes in material and $tandard parts' were red-lined on tbe SK 
drawings. 
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E~ Discrepancy Records - The MAI~ system was not used on 
this program because all parts were tightly controlled in one 
area, they were one of a kind, non-flight, and required no 
co~rective action. Discrepancy records were maintained in the 
log on items requiring manufacturing rework. Since the trainer 
was ahead of much of the hardware in the build cycle, it proved 
to be a good test bed for design and fit check of many pieces of 
GSE. The designer had the opportunity to see the areas where 
hardware was to be used (EREP in particular) and make decisions 
as to space allocations and placement. Changes in the trainer 
kept pace with the flight article and. were made as mockup 
installations in many instances before formal release of the 
final eng.ineering. This was possible because the One "G" 
Trainer designers .received all advanced ~ngineering on which 
they based their planning. 
F. Acceptance- The One "G" Trainer received final 
acceptance after delivery to Houston. After the acceptance of 
the trainer by NASA, it became GFPand subject to a formal 
modification program. All modifications performed on the 
traine~ had to agree with the configuration changes taking 
place on the fli,ght hardware. A fo-rmal change incorporation 
syqtem was established whereby all modifications were installed 
by"formal modification instructions to released engineering. 
A team of MMC Manufacturing, Engineering and Quality personn~l 
were periodically sent TDY to Houston to incorporate changes 
into the trainer. 
4.10.5 Flight Article MDA. 
A. Turnover Reviews - Prior to delivery of the MDA to 
MMC~ a joint NASA/MMC Turnover Review was held at MSFC to 
review the build/test history of the MDA shell. Quality 
provided an x .. ray specialist to review turnover review data 
with engineering at MSFC (refer to paragraph 4.4). This type 
of stipport was worthwhile'because differences were resolved 
and time was saved by not waiting until the article was 
delivered before asking questions. 
Walk through inspections which permitted MMC team members 
an opportunity to perform a minimal hardware evaluation were 
performed as part of the Turnover Review. The Quality Froject 
teamrepresentGttive present at. the turnover review received 
first hand knowledge from NASA of what'1>1MC was to ,be accountable. 
; " () 
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The same representative was qssigned to the managem.ent team 
work directly with the MDA during the factory operations. 
to 
Much, of the data available for review at MSFC was pr~­
Liminary, and the final reports were a shortage to the ADP. 
Due to a lack of essential data, it was agreed that MMC ac-
tivities at Denver, after delivery of the MDA, would be 
restricted to receiving inspection (including any re-x-ray of 
welds) until receipt of the following data: 
• Alignment Report 
• Weight and CG 
• As-Built Drawings 
., X-ray report 
• Nonconformance data .. (Waivers and ~terial Review 
Di~pos it ions) 
~he team concept proved invaluable during the factory 
operar:ions because each major department had a representative 
assigned to the MDA who was able to pursue any open item 
within his jurisdiction, to their successful conclusion • 
. ,B. MDA Receiving Inspection - Receiving Inspection was 
performed on the MDA in the main factory building while the 
MDA was in a horizontal position. There were no major dis-
crepancies discovered during receiving inspection. The 
majority of items written (218) during the receiving inspection 
were of cosmetic nature (nicks, scratches, gouges, etc.) and 
were corrected by burnishing and irriditing the area. 
After receiving in~pection, the MDA was sent to t~e x-ray 
building. , The :MOA sheU had radiographic inspections performed 
while at MSFC, but additional requirements were established by 
MMC engineering which necessitated the additional operation. 
During the data ,.·;:-~view at MSFC, a concern was expressed with 
regard to two we'ldimages on film X-SOllG and X"S044A (refer 
to paragraph 4.:4). The weld areas were re-x-rayed at MMC and 
proven satisfactory_ ' 
C. Planning Operations There were seven major assembly 
log books (process plans) used to complete the factory operations. 
The paint and bake operations utilized separate control point 
logs. All of the logs werE;! reviewed by the MMC Qu~l,ity Engi-
neering Planning Department (refer to paragraph 4.10.9) for 
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completeness and accuracy to engineering requirements. It was 
the responsibility of MMC Quality planners to highlight specia 1 
Quality requirements in process plans and to show all m~ndatory 
inspections to be performed by both MMC and NASA. After review 
and acceptallce of the process plans by the MMC Qua lity planners, 
the plans were submitted to Air For~e Quality for review ana 
approval. 
D. Inspection Mandatory inspections created a problem 
during the build cycle because approvals were required by as 
many as five different disciplines before the next step of an 
operation could begin. For example: 
(1) 
(2) 
The first step in the operation was the location 
of a part. When manufacturing completed the step, 
it Watl stamped into the log. The Engineering PIE 
then reviewed the manufacturing operation and if 
the operation was found acceptable, the PIE 
approved the step. Quality then performed an 
inspection of the operation and stamped the log 
step if the step was found acceptable. Air Force 
Quality then performed their'review and also 
'stamped th~ step if it was acceptable. In some 
instances, the NASA RMO requested surveillance 
authoritY,before proceeding. The system required 
the presence of all pa~ties concerned because the 
absence of any discipline during the manufacturing 
cycle could "slow-down" the operation. 
The second step in the installation process con-
sisted of hole pattern layout and drilling. The 
sequence of events relative to approvals prior to 
performing the actual task was the same as men-
tioned above. Arter approval, the holes were 
drilled for the attachments. 
(3) All holes were inspected and gaged by Quality for 
proper diameter in accordance with the engineering 
requirements. A complete disassembly of all -" 
drilled parts'~\7as made whereby each part waS 
\~deburred and all metal particles were removed from 
'the fay.ing surfaces and holes. In the majority 
of cases , the removed parts were' sent to the -, 
paint shop for finishing and were later reaSsembled 
'into the MDAin the 8SB clean room. 
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Problems were encountered in the early stages of the 
factory operations with out-of-tolerance hole conditions. A 
majority of holes were being drilled without the benefit of 
special tools and 'drill bushings. The problem was thoroughly 
st\ldied by Quality and Manufacturing Engineering and remedial 
action was taken. Due to heavy material thickness ~nd close 
tolerance requirements, normal drilling methods were not 
adequate and the following actions were taken: 
. ~1). All· drill motors were reinspected for "on-center", 
~ight drill chucks. 
(2) Special drills were made with a smaller lead drill 
on a common shaft. 
. . (3) I~dividual drill bushing guides were developed. 
(4) Prior to drilling through heavy gage material, 
or many thicknesses, the mechanic pra.cticed on a 
simulated bench operation. 
(5) Only one hole at a titne was drilled with inspections 
performed in'a series operation. If problems were 
discovered, they were solved before attempting 
additional drilling operations. 
The MOA barrel proved to be less than nominal in its true 
diameter which caused gaps to exist between many of the instal-
l~~.j.ons assembled onto the skin surfaces. The ga.ps were 
shimmed.and theshinup.ing operation was either approved by the 
Material Review Board (MRB) or changes were made to the engi-
neering drawing. . 
'Out-of-tolerance conditiJ;)ns are. not unusual occurrences 
when working with formed heavy gage .material. To compensatq 
for out-of-to1erance conditions a worst case type drawing 
should be issued which authorizes. shima and specifies areas of 
the structure which are .J~ighly stressed and where shimming is 
not permitted. 
In addition to the normal operation of making certain. that 
all installations met the engineering requirements, inspection 
.. . . " 
personnel also verified that all engineering changes had been 
incorporated (refer to paragraph 4.8). Prior to the release·, of 
a process.,. p1an,engineering cbanges were incorporated in,to the 
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plan and the changes were accounted for by the planning depart-
ment. If an operation was in progress and a process plan was 
issued and changes were made, the inspector then had to account 
for the changes. The process plan defined the changes to be 
made and the inspector terfurmed a physical inventory of all 
parts in question to assure that the necessary changes had been 
incorporated. The change, control system employed on the MDA 
proved to be very effective. 
The ,inspector was also responsible for maintaining the log 
records which included writing Hcrab" items for non-compliance 
workmanship, accounting for work accomplished to non-released 
engineering (liaison calls) and maintaining a history of MRB 
actions. 
;rnterfaces with government inspection personnel were made 
throughMMC floor inspection personnel. A .great deal of 
attention by the inspection department was given to interfaces 
with government inspection personnel because many of the steps 
in the process plan required customer buy-off. 
After the Wijor penetrations were made in the shell (8190 
window, IR Spectrometer, ATM feed-through and AM feed-through), the 
MDA was x-rayed in sele'cted areas. X-ray waS performed in the 
factory area while the MDA was in the vertical position. X-ray 
operations utilizing portable equipment was acceptable because 
it cut. down the movement of theMDA to the x-ray facility. 
Good planning always brings equipment and personnel to an 
assembly, instead of allowing the assembly when it is a large 
one of a kind spacecraft to be moved to the equipment. 
E. Alignment - A number of MDA hardware items installed 
byMMCwhich included experiment support fittings, elements of 
major substructure, supports, and meteoroid shields depended 
on a system of reference marks and alignment information to 
facilitate proper location of the hardware itemsi 
Reference marks were placed on the MDA struc.ture by using 
MMC optical equipment, which proved to be time consuming because 
once the marking operation b~gan', all manufacturing oper~tions 
on the MDA stopped (the MDA was under the control of the personnel· 
performing the alignment). 
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During alignment set-up, MMC attempted to use alignment 
scribe marks on the MDA for the Y & Z planes provided by MSFC, 
but unfortunately more than one scribe mark existed. 'MSFC had 
made a singl,~ scribe mark on top of blue ink. During the 
receiving in~i'Pection cleaning operation, MMC removed the blue 
ink and expoJ':ed more than one reference alignment mark. The 
correct marks were established during alignment verification. 
It is recommended that a permanent or semi-permanent bonded 
tape be used to mark all critical references. The tape can be 
'removed during later manufacturing operations if desired. 
F. Miscellaneous Items - A method should be developed for 
one·of a. kind programs such as the MDA Whereby a rapid response 
engineering change system is made available. The change system 
could utilize a "Quick Change DCN" system with the L/c Sheet 
~s the . formal change similar to the system used for the DTA 
(refer to. pot'liagraph 4.10.7) .. The ,I?ystem used was too slow in 
respo~se and when many changes were entered into the, system, 
(,I it proved too costly and ti.me consuming to track the unreleased 
II engineering. MMC established a ,part identification system on 
(( the MDA that helped eliminate many changes in engineering' 
~rawings. Eor example, many detail parts drawings for fittings 
and ,other sheet metal parts, called for counterbore or. pilot 
holes. Due to the next assembly process, it was advantageous 
not'to have holes in the detail parts. Rather than engineer 
the holes in the next assembly, the part was accounted for in a 
process plan and i~entified as an ''M'' part. The ''M'" appeared 
with the basic engineering part number and meant that an 
operation was omitted which would be completed at another 
manufacturing control pOint. This system was used for,many 
detail parts sent to MSFC because requests were made to 
eliminate certain operations. 
After the release of engineering and at the time of 
completion of the installation phase of the factory operation, 
MMC Crew Systems performed a r,eview of the' MDA and its major 
sub-assemblies. :The purpose for the revie~~was to check ·for 
areas of concern to the astronaut, such as sharp corners, 
clearances, etc. It was a necessary operation,but in many 
inl:ltances, it was done after the fact.. Crew Systems should 
operate during the design phase and be part.of the drawing 
review.and sign-off in order to assure.incorporation into the 
drawingf:l, the consideration of crew interface items such as the 
elimination of sh~rp edges ,clearances, etc •. 
II 
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G. Moving of MDA - Instances occurred where the MDA, when 
moved from one factory building to another, would not clear the 
building. The MDA was then placed on a lower, or shorter low-
boy, and the problem was corrected. During the move from Lhe 
factory to the Leak 'rest Faciiity (LTF) the MDA was on a trailer 
that was too high to be compatible with the LTF wOrk platform. 
The MDA was returned to the factory and placed on a suitable 
tra iler and re turned to L.TF. 
The following are some of the disciplines found to be 
necessary for successfulMDA moves: 
. , 
(1) Prior to making a move, all operations must be 
carefully planned, and approved procedures must 
be made available prior to the mov~. 
(2) Select "Move Chief" to command and be responsible 
for the operation. All direction/orders and 
changes must be issued through the ''Move Chief". 
(3) Post lookouts at strategic positions to observe 
clearances, sh~fting of load and any other 
unusual conditions. 
(4) Hold a pre-move meeting with the ''Move Chief" 
and all associated pa~ties concerned with the 
hardware. At the meeting~ outline to each person 
on the move team his responsibilities. At the 
same time, conformation of the training/ certifi-
cation of personnel according to ap~licable 
procedures should be made as well as a check to 
insure that all loading equipment is properly 
proof loaded • 
(5) When appropriate, perform a trial run of the move 
with all participants who were responsible for 
the actual move. 
H. Proof Pressure and Leak Check - Proof pressure and 
leak check tests were'performed on the Flight MDA by trained 
certified crews. The test teams were certified via the ~C 
Crew Standboard Certificationnrocess. Quality personnel were 
certified and formed a part of the test team. Prior to the 
actual test start, a pre-validation riteeting was con.ductedand 
approval to test was obtained from. all validation team. members;. 
'"'.") 
I. Factory Paint Operations - The MDA was sealed against 
entry prior to the start of the paint operation. Only authorized 
personnel were allowed to enter the shell. The factory repre-
sentative acted as an advisor to the paint team because MDAG-E 
had completed a similarftperation on the AM and MMC needed to 
benefit from the MDAC-EeKperiences. Prior to the start of the 
paint operation, procedures were reviewed with all departments 
involved. The importance of "tight ll process control was 
emphasized. The entire operation was an unknown and any devi-
ations _from the pr.ocess could have resulted in a need to do a 
complete re~aint operation. 
One of the keys to the success 6f th¢ paint operation was 
to obtain,sur~aces clean enough to pass the ·'Water Break Test" 
whiGh meant a surface free of all contaminants which could 
create a non-adherance coridition. Quality had to work closely 
with Manufacturing and Materials Engineering to assure that the 
MDA was properly cleaned. An irridite operation was performed 
prior to ~ain~ing. ~he irridite qperation was a hand operation 
and requit"ed p;recise control because it was time oriented and 
had to meet a specific color requirement. After the irridite 
operations were performed, paint was applied to the MDA. Special 
paint sample strips were placed throughout the interior of the 
MDA for use by the Quality Laboratory technician for the final 
evaluation of the paint operation. The final evaluation was 
made after the completion of -the paint bake operation. 
In addition to the paint sample strips in each level of 
the MDA., extra sample 'strips were made for.the Quality Laboratory. 
The laboratory technician baked the sample strips in a laboratory 
ove,n, and evaluated the samples pr'ior, to the MDA bake operation. 
In the event a poor sample strip was noted, the particular area 
within the MDA.from which the strip was taken was reworked prior 
·to the MDA bake op~ration. This type of operation was possible 
because the. MDA int~rior was cleaned, irridited and painted 
level by level.. " 
The sub-assemblies and details were removed fr'om the MDA 
and painted separately. Sub-assembUes were processed by the 
paint shop and received the same controls a.s the basic MDA shell. 
An innovation was used to control the sub-assemblies. Rather 
than use individual process plans for each individual detail 
and sub-assembly, log books we.reused. The logs we.re controlled 
by paint shop Quality and all the information concerning details 
were contained in the logs for ready reference. 
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J. Bake Operations - After acceptance of the factory paint 
operations, the MDA was sealed against contamination and moved 
to the bake operation in the hydro-building. The operation was 
monitorec1 around the clock by Quality because the temperature 
to'which the MDA could be.exposed was a controlled operation. 
There was no significant program impact problems noted during 
the bake operation. 
K. Space Support Building (SSB) Operations - Prior to 
moving the MDA to SSB, considerable planning was expended in 
certifying the SSB clean room to meet contract requirements. 
Final approval of the certification of the clean room was the 
responsibility of the Quality Laboratory. 
Controls were exercised in the clean- room regarding hard-
ware as well as personnel. Each person assigned to the SSB 
clean room received training in clean room disciplines. Quality 
maintained surveillance over the clean room, the MDA and 
personnel. If out of control conditions were being approached, 
management attention was directed toward correcting the condi-
tions. 
Selected Quality' personnel were:assigned to the MDA in the 
SSB clean room operations. The Quality personn~l were skill 
certified for all installation and tests which were to be per-
formed ort the MDA. Additionally, they were certified as part: 
of the test teams for checkout of complex installations such 
as EREP. 
A hatcb,guard systelll was used during the entire SSB MDA 
operation. It proved to be an effective method of establishing 
personnel disciplines that otherwise could not be maintained. 
The MDA installatl,ons con·sist~d of the ,various sub-
assemblies previously removed in the factory and processed 
through the paint operatfons. (GFP experiments, and other GFP 
hardware such as radiator panels). In each case as hardware 
was received in the clean room, Quality performed a receiving 
. inspection. In many cases, it was the first time theartic.le 
was removed from its clean piastic wrapper. Quality performed 
a damage check, configuration verification, cleanliness verifi-
cation and a data package review. In the event data was not 
available, ., report was made to NASA RMO to obtain minim~ data. 
A data folder was started by Qu~1ity using information a·vailable 
and the hardware wa.$ put into inventory .. 
, 
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Problems were frequently encountered during the 88B MDA 
operation with regard to data packages and documentation. It 
was often noted that required documentation and/or data packages 
were late, incomplete, inaccurate, missing or misunderstood. 
Hardware was being delivered from various centers and contractors 
with no set ground rules regarding deliverable data elements for 
the ADP. In,order to define ADP requirements, MSFC issued 
MPDBo40.l4 and J8C issued MSCM80l0.30.6. These documents were 
released after hardware was already moving through the delivery 
cycle. On future programs of this nature, it is advisable to 
establish a common center type document similar to MPD8040.14 
early in the program and impose these requirements on all 
contractors and centers. 
The wire harness developll!ent utilizing the three dimensional 
mocku~ proved to be a very successful operation. The harness 
met its initial wring out and subsequent Hughes Analyzer Test 
with a minimum of wiring errors. 
MMC had a number of new materials which caused problems 
during the installation phase atS8B. The proceiss controjr':,~'for 
the use of the materials were liIllited and MMC h~d to profit by 
its first time experience. In the future, more study and 
development must be done by both Quality and Engineering so as 
to fully understand how to use and control unfamiliar materials 
such as those noted below: 
(1) The ployurethane coating on the interior of the 
MDA was hard to control and required extensive 
rework. At 88B and RSC the painters were kept 
c.:;nst,sntly busy making touch-up repairs,. 
(2) The Fluorel tubing used for covering over harness 
for flame retardent purposes required a complete 
reinspection after installation becau~e of suspect 
surface conditions. Addition~l research was 
required to estabU.sb. proper acceptance criteria 
and rework techni,lilues. 
(3) Mosites? O,pen cell foam - had a swelling and , 
shr~nl<frig problem at certain pressures • When . 
u!1[ng Mosites, an, allowance was not made for" 
1',fha,ngeSunder various environmen, tal c,' onditions , which necessitated a rework in many of the " 
applications of this, material. 
(4) Velcro - Problems were encountered downstream with 
identification of the pile and hook. Special checks 
were initiated to uncover latent de[ects. 
MMC developed procedures to control handling, shipping, 
rece~wing, storage and periodic inspections of the S190 experi-
ment .window. The procedures received a dry-run prior to use by 
personnel involved in the move of the window from the supplier 
to MMC. After receipt of the window, it was kept in a strict 
environmentally controlled condition and records were maintained 
by Quality. During and after installation the same strict 
environmental,controls ~ere imposed on the window including an 
emergency purge provision which could be used when an out-of-
tolerance, humidity conditioJ;l was noted. 
During installation and. test operations, many pieces of 
hardware both GSE and flight were moved into, around and out of 
the clean room. The moves required skill on the riggers part 
because of the criticality of the hardware. It was noted that 
the most sUccess was achieved by using factory trained rigging 
personnel to make all the moves. A Hydro Set should be used 
between the load and the hoo~ when moves are made. The Hydro 
Set device provides the minute control required during lifting, 
holding and placement of space hardware and itstecording 
mechanisms provide a ready reference for load values which are 
not otherwise available. . 
Quality maint'ained all documentation in one central area 
while the MDA was in the SSB clean room. Some of the data 
entries which required surveillance by the inspection personnel 
were as follows:·, 
.• '.I:iJ.l'~::!and· cycle/storage/shelf life for critical 
hardware. 
• Seriaf'izationrecords of installed· hardware. 
• Connectot;" mate and de-mate (bent pin log). 
• Re!,:!ords of non-Hight installed hardware. 
o Reporting of configuratton changes. 
• Records of fit checks performed for both GSE 
a.nd flight hardware. 
• As~run-test procedures. 
• Open liaison l/alls. 
• Records. of11P~complete and open. 
• Records ~ffQuality "crab" items. 
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Optical surface mapping was not a recognized requirement 
while the MDA was at MMC but did become a requirement at a 
point in time during the St. Louis Operations. Optical mapping 
sho.uld be .employed prior to delivery of optics after installation 
in~o a permanent lotiation and at suitable intervals as determined 
by the program. Opti'cal surface mapping provides permanent 
records oE any unusual configuration and establishes the point 
in time where a discrepan<;y .is discovered. 
L. ~ack & Ship Operation (P&S) - The pack and ship 
drawing was the controlling document utilized by all departments 
to plan their operation at time of delivery. The MDA P&S 
drawing was made available in advance of hardware shipment and 
planning meetings were held with all responsible departments to 
review the P&S drawing. In addition to the MDA 8SB Quality 
personnel, MMC use~ additional trained Quality packaging and 
shipp~ng personnel during the pack & ship operations. Plans 
(Certification Logs) were developed from t\::leP&S drawing which 
were used by Qua l:i.ty to check-off the sh,:i.Z~ loose, ship separa te 
and ship with items. 
Prior to ~oving the MDA to the airport for loading onto 
the "Super Guppy", a meeting was ijeld, by the "Hove Chief" with 
ali the personnel,respon&ible for the move. A trial run was 
made on the road route to chec:;k overhead obstacles and road 
conditions. At l,east 48 hours pri.or to use, all lifting equip-
,mentto be used at the airport, including the cargo lift trailer, 
had been re inspec ted and proof loaded. 
An MMC team was ass igned to chaperone the MD~-;to St. Louis, 
the team flew on the "Super Guppy" and motlitored the instrumen-
tation and ~ad~ periodic checks of the MDA. Both Air Force 
Quality and ,MMC Quality had representatives on this team. 
M.:MDAC-f,j Operation's - The MD~ Flight Article arrived at 
}1])AC-E in December 1971. Upon arr1vill tlhe MPA was unloaded 
from the "Super Guppy", transported to MDAC"E, and the MDA and 
transporter iolere prepared for entry into the Class 100,000 
Clean Room. . 
Once in the,clean room preparations were made for installing 
the verti'cal' -lifting fixtures, removal of the access cover 
from the aft shipping plate ~ and entry was made into the MDA 
to aSSure that all hardwar.e was intact and that the MDAwas 
ready to go vertical. E~terior damage , inspection was completed 
prior t.O placing the MQA' in the verticaL position. No damage 
ewas in evidence. 
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The MDA was installed on a vertical transportation dolly and 
platforms were installed. Access control was initiated and 
interior damage inspection and component serialization were com-
pleted. The inspections were authorized by inspection plans 
prepared by the MMC, and the inspection was made jointly by MMC, 
MDAC-E and the customer. 
Because of the two contractor interface concept, it was 
necessary for MMC .to uSe MDAC-E forms ·'to: authorize and schedule 
work effort on the MDA at MDAC-E; authorize the documentation of 
anomalies during Acceptance Testing; and document tt;ouble-
shooting instructions that were necessary to determine the cause 
and effect resolution of an anomaly. 
The MMCcomponent MARS was utilized throughout the activity 
atMDAC-E with copies provided to MMC Denver. The Quality 
interface between contractors was very good and the MSFC Resident 
Quality ~upport in conjunction with other ~ASA Centers, was 
outstanding. 
During hl:!rd mate of the MDA/AM several alignment problems 
were identified i.e., holes not dr;i.llec;1, and purge line inter-
ference with wire bundles. All of the problems were considered 
constr~ints to demate. ICDs were verified and applicable 
documents were dispositioned to work the discrepancies. 
All work, modifications, tests and discrepancy rework was 
subjected to strict conformance to applicable procedures, systems, 
and contract requirements. Mandatory inspection points were 
identified to MMe by the customer quality Qrganization and 
incorporated into th~ procedures and advance planning was fur-
nished for customer quality review when possible. 
In October l!:)72, the AM/MDA was loaded into the "Super 
Guppy" for delivery to KSe. Associated GSE: and data were flown 
on a CS-A. No problems were encountered during delivery. 
N. Summary - The Contractor, Customet interface was 
satisfactory during.MDAC/E operations, once agreements were 
reached and implementation plans were issued. Most Quality 
problems were caused by two contractor organizations sharing 
basically the same facilities and responsibilities and both ' 
trying to "Get the Job Done Ii. 
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On future two-contractor programs, interface operating 
procedures should be developed and agreed to by all concerned 
parties prior to starting work. Also, cOlll:l~deration should be 
given to using common forms (e.g., n.onconformance reports, materiAl 
revie"t'l reports, etc.) to the maximum extent practica l. 
4.10.6 Backup MDA 
A. Introduction - The MDA Backup Article Program made 
maximum use of existing Flight Article Documentation, Engineering, 
Procedures,,~tc., with updating and rev:i,sions as required to 
reflect Backup Article peculiar requirements. The team concept 
was used for the Backup program and the same team members wl10 
worked the Dynamic Test Article remained in the factory to work, 
on the Backup MDA. ' 
B. Team,Assignment - Because of the knowledge of the 
experienced personnel, many problem~ encountered on the flight 
article were not, experienced on the Backup Article. Inspection 
was the same as for the Flight MDA whereby each operati.o'n was 
closely monitor-ed and inspect;i.onswere performed prior to 
continuing'to the n~xt step of the ·operation. To prevent 
duplicating a Flight MDA errot.:., copies of all Flight MDA MARS 
were made available in the immediate ,factory area. The MARS 
were reviewed by the mechanics and inspectors prior to the start 
of an event to prevent Flight MDA problems from occurring on 
on the Backup MDA. 
Problems with out-of-tol-2rance holes were greatly reduced. 
Experience in hole drilling, and the provision of new drills, 
adaptors and reamers was responsible for the reduction in out-
of-tolerance holes. 
Motivat~~::.'~ which led to good Quality work was ,8 keynote in 
the operation and a strong program was maintained by: 
(1) Presenting a formal Manned Awareness Program to 
all employees aSSigned to the Backup MDA. 
(2) Providing visible displays in all areps to keep 
personnel alert. 
(3) Counseling by supervisors to keep the employees 
aware -of their role in the program. c 
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(4) Incentives and spot awards. For example: one 
employee was given an award for his proficiency 
in drilling/spotfac;ing 27 "D" holes for the ATM 
feedthru C!0nnectors in the MDA shell, with no 
errors. 
C. Problems - Due to the problems encountered with align-
ment atld position marks on the Flight MDA, MSFC agreed to add 
additional position markings atld measurements to the Backup 
Article. 
MMC Quality and Engineering representatives were present 
during the alignment tests at MSFC and at a Turnqver Review of 
the MDA Backup Shell at ~FQ. At the Turnover Review MMC 
,representatives performed a walk thr,u inspection and reviewed 
all the data'elements, including x-ray films made by a Quality 
Laboratory specialist. 
Two problems occurred on the Backup Article during the 
factory operations., The first was due to the MDA upper 
barrel section being too short by 0.125 inches. The too short 
condition prevented th~lradiator panels from fitting. properly 
because the 'ring had fasteners to which the radiator panels 
were attached. The phenoloc ring around the entire pressure 
vessel had to be relocated 0.125 inches forward by using a 
shim under the ring. The second problem was caused by tooling 
error which allowed the 8190 camera mount fittings to be drilled 
with a 10 minute arc misalignment between the camera axis and 
the MDA X axis. The misalignment condition was accepted "as is", 
but a deviation to the Interrace Control Document was required. 
D. SSB Operations - Operations in the SSB clean room were 
conducted utilizing the same procedures and controls exercised 
on the Flight Article. All Manufacturing and Quality personnel 
were trained and certified prior to per.forming tasks requiring 
certification. Clean room environments were closely monitored 
and personnel ~lscip1ines regarding MDA access were directed 
by the /lHat~hguard System". Problems were encountered with 
humidity control during the m?nths of April, ~y and June and in 
some instances emergency measures such as purging the 8190 
window had to be taken. 0 
. The BackupMDA program utilized the same control/) during 
installation and test as the Flight MDA. ()ne difference was 
that data delivered with GFP hardware'was arrivitlg in a timely 
manner and was, useful for the MDA. Backup operations. 
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E. Test Program- The test program was limited on the 
Backup MIlA because of the unavailability of GFP hardware. The 
plan was to complete the Backup MDA with all available hardware, 
perform the required tests, conduct an acceptance review and 
ship the MDA to MDAC-E. At MDAC-E the missing hardware would 
be installed and tested. 
The Backup Article was also used as a confidence builqer 
for the MDA program and as a general rule, all tests conducted 
.at MDAC-E, except Engineering Tes't Order (ETO) type tests, 
were conducted in such a manner as to qualify as acceptance 
tests. 
F. Pack and Ship Operation - The same procedures which 
were successful for packing, loading and moving the Flight MDA 
were utilized for the Backup. A Quality representative was 
assigned to fly with the MDA, on the "Sup.er GUppyli. The 
Quality representative was responsible for monitoring the 
transportation heaters and performing surveillance on the 
Backup. MDA while in flight and during the ground operations at 
St. Louis. 
G. MDAC-E Operation - A one work package system was 
estabHshed on the Backup MDA. With this system a Missipn 
Preparation Sheet (MPS) was used which authorized all work 
perfo~med on the Backup MDA. MPS·s were ats9 used for receiving 
inspection of incoming hardware. Accountability problems 
experienced on the Flight MDA were greatly reduced with the use 
of the one work package system. Problems did develop, however, 
because GFP was delivered to MDAC-E for accountability and 
later turned over to MMC. Documentation probl/ems resulted, 
particularly with hand carried parts to MDAC-E, which were 
installed with no verificatiqn of part acceptance as flight 
hardware. 
An e&perienced Quality man was, ,,~ssigned to the Backup MDA 
to maintain the .ADP. The Quality man was trllined· in Denver and 
understood the data requirements prior to being assigned to 
St. J..ouis. 
MMC found that Mod Kit revie-ws were necessary prior to 
releaSing instructions to the floqr. Reviews were held with 
Enginefi!ring, Quality, Test Ops and procedure writers at which 
time illstructions, engineering and hardware were reviewed, 
errors corrected and tools/equipment for mod work were accounted 
for. , 
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The Flight MDA made use of a "running recap", similar to 
what was used in Denver. An improved system which utilized a 
daily open ite~ status which was fed into and stored in a 
computer for the Backup MDA status of· scheduled work was main-
tained in a control room. 
During periods of "no work", the MDA was sealed against 
entry. S190 window environmental constraints were controlled 
by a procedure which utilized an alarm and recording system. 
A review was made of the temperature/humidity by MMG personnel 
around-the-clock and personnel >'7ho were assigned to the MDAC-E 
mission support room on 24 hour duty cycles, also were respon-
sible to review the S190 window controls. 
4.10.7 Dynamic Test Article (DTA) 
A~ Task Team - A special task team was assign~d as a 
coordinated group to solve alL problems related to the DTA. 
The tel;lm was composed of members from Engineering, Manufacturing, 
Planning and Quality. A team leader was also assigned, who was 
the Manufacturing representative. All team members were located 
in an area adjacent to the DTA in the factory. AllMMG con-
tr~cted· installations/modifications to. the MDA took place in 
this area. 
B. Engineering Drawings and 'Plans - Engineering for the 
DTAwas released Oil sketch':'type (SK) drawings utilizing flight 
engineering design whenever feasible. Changes to DTA SK 
drawings were made by implementing a "Quick Change DCNJI system 
which utilized the third sheet liaison call answer as. a DCN to 
accomplish all manufacturing work and inspection. A red lined 
drawing with the .. liaison ca 11 third sheet answer was used for 
extensive changes and the changes were incorporated into the 
drawing prior to DTA delivery. The change block on the released 
drawing showed the liaison call numbers that were incorporated 
into t;he dl;'awing. Engineering maintained C\. M.;ister list of 
liaison cal1s, date of drawing incorporation and drawing number 
(where a ~hange was made). Changes to flight engineering 
drawings were made on the next higher installation drawing. 
For example: if a change was required on <cI detail part for 
DTA usage and the part number was ,a flight number, rather than 
issue a special one time. usage DCN,the change to the detail 
was shown on the instal1at;ion SK drawing. Manufacturing and 
Engineering prepared a DTA drawing control point ~hartlwhich 
was utilized as a parts and assemb~y: c.heck list. 
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Quality approved the Ma'nufacturingProcess Plans for 
details, sub-assemblies, assemblies "and installations for the 
DTAo Wherever possible existing process .plans were used 
including the basic seven major control point installation logs 
which were changed to reflect DTA configuration differences. 
C. Normal inspection ground rules and procedures were' 
applied with the" following exceptions: 
(1) Mass simulators required no detail inspections. 
Theengineeriftg drawings reflected this require-
ment and affected thirty-nine assemblies. 
(2) Seve'nmaJor factory log, books conta ined the 
pr6cess plans and ~nspection buy off points for 
each installation. MMC made arrangements with 
Air,Force Qua1ity·to limit their inspections on 
these installations •. , For example, on the Flight 
MDA, Air Force performed mandatory inspections. 
for every installation operation which included 
the following checks: 
• Parts location check. 
• Hole pattern layout. 
• Hole drilling (condition 6: tolerance). 
• Part deburring. 
• Reassembly and attaching hardware check. 
• Torque che'ck. 
(3) ~efore Flight, DTA,or Backup hardware was , 
~'Crapped; a team consisting of Quality, Engineering 
and Manufacturing reviewed the material for 
(4) . 
limited' u~age on the DTA. 
Data· from _ h~rdw.are w~~ch had been d is post t.ioned 
"Use As Is" for DTA oy MRB (item 3) was entered 
irito an open.MARS tha.t was designated-as a 
.Master MARS. Subsequent entries were added via 
MARS Supplemental Data Sheet as necessary. All 
I' 
.1 
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items in this ~ategory were identified for "Test 
Usage". The Master MARS was controlled by the 
MDA Quality supervisors in the factory and SSB 
where various subassemblies were manufactured for 
the DTA. This Master MARS system, eliminated the 
generation of m6ny individual MARS. 
(5) All on-board equipment installed by MSFC which 
was received as GFP was not reverified as to 
location. 
Other differences from the Flight and ~~~kup noted on the 
DTA engineering drawings were: 
'. Internal p~inting of the DTA was not required. 
,. ~arts requiring pain~ing' for corrosion protection 
were patnted with a commercial type paint. 
e Flight article details, used for ,the DTA which were 
previously'painted were"acceptable' as is • 
• Final internal and external cleaning was'requi~ed 
but limited to general type cleaning (i.e., vacuum 
and wipe down). 
D. Controls - Discrepancies noted on GFP were handled the 
same as they were for the Flight unit. The GFP MARS were 
approved by MMC Quality, Engineering, and the local MSFC Quality 
Representative except in those instances where the specific 
approval of the Contracting Officer was required for the rework/ 
modificati-on of defective GFP. 
A stocking and staging area was set up adjacent to the DTA 
assembly £lrea in the factorY-. With., this arrangement Quality was 
able to e,1:fectively control the test usage hardware aSSigned to 
the DTA. 
Manufacturing, in conjunction with Planning, prepared a flow 
plan which tracked t,heneed dates for details and procuremen:. 
against subassemblies and installations to assist team rep-
resent:atives with planning activiti~s and department manpower 
dire¢tion. 
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E. Pack and Ship Operation - Careful at~ention was also 
paid to the many details involved in the packaging and shipment 
of the DTA to the airport as was done on the Flight Article. 
The assigned l'M,ove Chief" coordin~ted the operations and per-
sonally followed the entire ~peration from loading the "Super 
Guppy" in Denver to unloading at Houston. The "Move Chief" 
also assisted NASA in the move from the Houston airport to the 
tes t faci.lity. ',. . . , 
MMC task team representatives (from Quality) Engineering, 
Manufacturing) received the DTA along with NASA at Houst~n.· 
During receiving inspection all items were accounted for and 
were received in good condition with no shortages. The t.ask 
team members later assisted NASA in the installation of loose 
hardware and acted in an advisory capacity during the mating 
operation w;i.th., the AM. 
MMC was requested by NASA Test Engineering, Houston, to 
apply slippage marks (torque stripes) to all the internal 
fastener~. This was required for visual inspections, after 
vibratio~\ tests, to determine if any of the fasteners had 
changed ~:osition. Fut~re test programs should utilize slippage 
mark/? and \\he requirement should be' pl1:lced .' into the engineering 
drawing. . .... . . 
F. Conclusion - The DTA was an ~xa~ple of a well. coordinated 
program which achieved success through the cooperation of all 
team members who did the.ir share to make the program go. In 
addition, it should be noted that the willingness to change and 
make changes but still c.ontrol the entire operation added 
greatly to the success of the unique DTA program. 
4.1Q.8 g§§" 
A. Introduct.ion - The GSE provided. by MMC for the MDA was 
divided into twO categories. The first was mechanical GSE which 
consisted of lifting devices and handling/moving equipment;.. The 
secondcategbry was test equipment, consisting of' breakout boxes 
and test sets. 
B. Engineering Design~ ~ Engineering designs for the. build 
of .mechanicaL GSE was· release,d as', Ske.tch . (Sl<) type engineering. 
Since this waS deliverable GSE, ~C conttblledthe operation with 
process plans for detail parts'and log books for the nrnjor assem-
,blies. The Quality Planning Departmer:t reviewed all process 
, .. 
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plans, and log books. Inspection points we're established and, 
required quality. provisions ~7ere included in the processes and 
logs ,during the planning review. 
One design requirement, 'for ground hand1.ing GSE was to have 
all removable pins and bo'lts either attached with lanyards or 
serialized and identified as to location. The reason for the 
requirement was noted at the Spacecraft Acceptance Review held 
at MOAC-E. KEC required identification and serialization of 
all loose hardware as to location at the time of proof loading. 
If'loose pins or bolts were not attached with lanyards or 
sli!rialized, there was concern that substitute pins or bolts 
could inadvertently be made 6r that pins/bolts could be placed 
in another part of the lifting device that received a different 
load during test. 
The SK drawing system did not accomplish one objective 
which was to cut down On changes and rapidly move details 
through ,the Manufa,cturing/InspeGtion cycle. Whenever a change 
wa~reqliired, in' a' detail part arid it iiaison call was written, 
Engineering was reluctant to release a DCN for the change. 
Engineering felt that red-lined SK drawings were sufficient 
along with an updated d~awing prior to delivery. Unfortunately, 
the Quali~y system~ould n6tpermit'passin~ detail parts from 
one control point to another for additional processing because 
the original folders could not be closed out with unreleased 
engineering. There is no method established to track details 
through the manufacturing cycle once they have been released on 
green engineering. The answer to the problem would be to 
utilize a "Quick Change DCN" system similar to the one described 
in paragraph 4.10.7. 
C. Inspection - Inspections were performed on mechanical 
GSE starting "7ith fabrication. of details and continuing through-
out the assembly process. The manufacturing assembly process 
consisted of precision drillin.g operations, machining operations, 
.welding and proof-loading. Manufacturing operations were inspected 
by MMC and Air Force' Quality and mandatory inspection points 
were established for the Air Force with final acceptance via a 
DD-2S0. . 
In order to be certain that the GSE would satisfy its 
intended design and use r'~quirements, a series of fit checks 
were established. Fit checks wereplanlled into the build and 
test cycle of the MDA and were performed at the earliest 
possi,ble time. A Matrix was prepared by Engineering which 
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showed the location where fit checks were to be performed. The 
th.ree loca t ions where f it check,s were per formed were Denver, 
St. Louis and l~C. Quality witnessed the fit checks and docu-
mented the re~ults on the Matri>t', {lnd in the ADP. 
D. Test Equipment - Test equipment GSE was originally 
manufactured as tooling using a ~rool Design (TD) drawing. Test 
equil?ment was inspected by Quality, but the level of inspection 
fo~ workmanship was 'not the same as required for deliverable 
equipment. Planning,for test toO,ling: was also at a lower l~vel 
with minimum documentation. For example: all components were 
procured, through the test,' tooling department and were not 
inspected upon receipt., Quality permanently identified these 
components "test usage ll and they ~'1el;'e used for' test equipment 
build. A decision was made to USi~ SK type engineering for 
acceptance o~ the test equipment GSE. Test tooling originally 
built was converted from TD to SK~ Problems were encountered 
with the· conversion because additional data and reinspection 
were required. Contract coverage was requested and granted 
for "Test Usage" components. Rather than make the conversion 
it would hav~ been more e.ffective, to use'TD engineering and 
have the contr.sct specify the difference~ in acceptance 
requirements. 
Selected items of test equipment were assigned tO,the 
Engineering La bora tory for build, 'teat arid de 1i very. The 
Data Quick Look Station (DQL!:?) was one of these items. Test 
equipment provided by the Engineering Laboratory was also 
built to SK, drawings. Quality was assigned planning and 
inspection responsibilities for the test equipment and provided 
personnel for the laboratory. A system of inspection points 
was established during the build cycl~ and inspection pOint 
information' was contained in log books. Air Fo~ce inspection was 
provided in a sequence that led to a final acceptance via DD-250. 
The pieces of test equipment, unlike those manufactured originally 
as factory tools, had a planned quality program for deliverable 
hardwar,e. 
, Calibration of test equipment was part of the 'acceptance 
cycle and was 'lerified by QuaUty prior to delivery. Due to 
the uniqueness of some of th~ test equipment, special environ-
mental precautions were taken such as -the use of air ride vans 
for over-the-road-shiproents. 
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E. Delivery - If GSE was to be used within a clean room, 
the GSE was cleaned to required specification levels, sealed 
and identified to show compliance with cleanliness requirements. 
After delivery of GSE, changes were made through th~ formal 
modification program and records were processed through the 
configuration control loop. MMC Quality performed inspections 
for periodic maintenance, calibration ~nd modifications at 
field sites on GSE. Each piece of GSE had its own ADP. The 
ADPs traveled with the GSE to the field sites and were main-
tained by Quality to show the complete history for the GSE. 
4.10.9 Quality Procedure for Review of Manufacturing Process 
P la ns (MPPs) 
',\ 
Process plans for fabrication were initiated at detail, 
sub-assembly and assembly levels by Manufacturing Engineering. 
, They were initiated using the following as authority. 
• New engineering 
• ' DCN release 
• Liaison calls 
• Directive, program assignments 
• MARS 
II Test procedures 
As these plans were released by Manufacturing Engineering 
they were presented to Quali.ty Engineering with the applicable 
authorization attached. Quality Engineering reviewed the 
plans to the requirements of Quality Procedures and check lists 
and inserted the Quality inspection check points. Where Hanu-
facturipg Processes were called out, Quality reviewed 'the 
Process for Quality Inspection points and inserted them where 
r.j'quired, (i.e.; hole sizes, surface preparation, thread ~heck, 
(\\ltc.). . 
~-'II 
If the Process Plan was on the Air Force Quality Assurance 
(AFQA) mandatory inspection list by Control Point, it was 
presented to .A'FQA for the insertion of their .mandatory points. 
Quality Engineering and AFQA stamped the Process Plan approval 
block and the plan was sent back.!to Manufacturing for repro-
duction. and release to the floor. 
If the MPP did not require AFQA approval, Quality Eng'ineering 
would 'return it to Manufact'uring tor reproduction and release 
tOithe flo9r. 
I, 
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4.11 SpBSYSTEM!SYSTEM/INTEGRATION TEST, 
4.11.1 Training and Certification 
A. Introduction - The technical complexity and relatively 
short duration of the MMC Skylab Program precluded reliance on 
the ''Normal Training and Learning Curve" to prepare personnel 
for the manufacture, installation, test and launch program 
goals. Consequentl~ an intensive training and certification 
program was implemen~ed to assure the required qualif:ications. 
To implement the Skylab.Training and Certification Programs, 
plans were established to' insure that personnel required for 
engineering, manufacturing, handling, errecting, inspection, 
test, maintenance, launch and post launch operations were 
adequately trained and certified.' Plans formulated were based 
on M11C Standard Procedures and MMG Per.sonnel Certification Plan 
M-64-69. 
B. Responsibilities - Responsibility and control of the 
Training and Certi.fication programs was vested in the Central 
Standardization Board, with the MMC Director of Quality as 
Chairman. The Certification Board was comprised of representa-
tives from each of the functions/organizations shown in Figure 
4.11.1-1. Specific responsibilities' of the Board included: 
• Establishment of minimum certification requirements 
and approval of the Certification Requirements . 
Summary Charts (CRSCs). 
, 
• Reviewing of personal. records and conducting personal 
interviews to evaluate individual knowledge, safety 
awareness, security consciousness, general attitude, 
and ~nned Flight Awareness. 
• CeJ,:'tification of individual/crews that met all 
requirements identified on the Certification 
Requirements Summary Charts. 
41 Documentation of all activities and actions pertaining 
to the Certification Program. 
/;1 • Submission ofd"ltaon individual/crew status in 
accordance with annex !IF" of l1MC M-64-69 to the 
Denver Training and CertificationOrg;anizationfor 
incorporation into the ~ster Certification Status 
Report. 
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Responsibilities of the individuals participating as 
members on the Certification Boards ~ere as follows: 
(1) Systen~ Safety, Manufacturing, Quality, Test/ 
Operations, and Engineering. 
• Identify employee skills and technical training/ 
certificati9n requirements. 
• Report in writing to the Certification Board 
Chairman any conduct or performance by certi-
fied personnel which may influence status of 
certification. 
• Furnish'technical experts in required areas for 
Certification 'and Standard demonstrations. 
(2) Training and Oertification (Den:ver Division) 
• Serve as lead organizatio~ in development and 
standardhation of, the, Certification Require-
ments Sl1mrnBry Charts.. Coordinate such 
development and employee skills training and 
certification wit4 other members of the Certifi-
'ea't iOn Board. . . 
• Research, prepare and pre~ent familiari~~tion, 
motivational and technical courses as required 
in accordance with the Certification Summary 
Charts. 
• Assist ~n the planning, scheduling, and directing 
Certification Demonstrations/Examinations. 
• Maintain all records for the Certification Board. 
• Maintain and distribute the Master Certification 
Status Repbrt to applicable supervision reflecting 
the accomplished training and certifica'tion of 
personnel· in accordance with the Certification 
R:equirements Summary Charts • 
C. Field Training and Certification - DUe to the various 
phases and location!:! of the MMC Skylab installation, test, and 
operation acti'iiities, an overall' field personnel certification 
plan was formulated by MMC/Denver Trail-ling Division. The 
provl.sl.ons of this plan applied to the various ~ocations and 
activities as follows: 
II 
I 
o MSFC, JSC, KSC/ATM Test and Support Operations. 
I) JSC Medical Support Team Operations. 
o MDA Test Team Activities at MDAC-E. 
• Experiment Test Support at MDAC-W. 
• KSC Test ~nd Launch Support Operations. 
\ To accomplish the training and certification at the various 
locations, Field Certificatioh Conunittees were established to be 
responsible for on-site certification activity subject to audit 
and approval of the Skylab Certification Board. These conunittees 
functioned as an extension of the Skylab C~rtification Board. 
The authority and. re~ponsibi1ity of the F.ield Certification 
Conunittee included: 
• Identification o~ certi~iable positions and submittal 
with supporting rationale to the Skylab Certification 
Board f6r approval. 
• Dev.elopment of Field Certification Requirements 
Summary Charts (FCRSCs) and submittal to the Sky lab 
Certification Board for approval. The FCR,SCs 
included NASA Certification requirements where 
applicable. 
• Coordination. and implementation of necessary class-
room qnd/or experience training to satisfy certifi-
catiolt requirements. 
• Development and/or coordination of certificatioil 
examinations and subsequent administration and 
evaluation. Submittal of examination scores to the 
Skylab Certification Board. 
• Identification of recertification requirements and 
submittal to the Skylab Certificatiqn Board. 
• Application to the Skylab Certification Board for 
certification waivers. 
• On-site maintenance of individual/team cert;i.fication 
tecords as required. 
.. Provide representation to ~SA cert.ification conunittees 
as requ;i.red. 
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The Skylab training prerequisites to field certification 
were identified on the FCRSCs. The Field Cert ifica tion Committees/ 
Representatives insured the implementation and coordination of 
training to satisfy these requirements. In general.training was 
provided as follows: . 
• A scheduled formal training course and certification 
examination. 
• An accelerated training course including certification, 
examination or demonstration. 
• A self-study course and certification examination or 
demonstration. 
Field Certification Cards were issued by Skylab Training to 
each individual who satisfactorily completed those requirements 
specified by his position on the applicable FCRSC. Skylab 
Training did not issue the cards, however, until signature of 
the'Skylab Certification Board Clhairman was obtained. Super" 
visors in each area were resp,q~~ible to assure that personnel 
f( /. 
possessed the appropriate fi~ld certification pards prior to 
assignment. 
, 
Where extenuating circumstances warranted, individual 
waivers were considered by the Skylab CertificCJ,tion Board 
if any of the followingc'onditions were mat: 
• Personpel background/eKperience was comparable to 
FCRSC requirements. 
• Similar training had been completed. 
• frevious certification in Bl;lother company division. 
or program. 
In no case were waivers granted where human reliability 
requirements were iiivolved. 
D. Training COllrses -.Training courses were separated into 
two categories, Systems Training and Specialized Training. Courses 
were clas~ified as Orientation, .Familiarization, ,Operation, 
Mechanization, or Specialization. Courses which required certifi-
catio.n were identified by including the statement "This is a 
Certification Course" underlined il1 the body (;)f the course 
description. Cert:ification requirements were applied to those 
tasks or operations considered critical orpotenttal1y hazardous. 
;./ 
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The following d~fines the classification of the courses: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Orientation Courses - Designed to give a general 
approach to a .series o~ rela,ted subjects. Primarily 
designed for managers and non-technical personnel 
for plannitlg purposes. 
Familiarization Courses - Designed to give necessary 
knowledge to participate or provide reference 
observation in a test operation. Normally provided 
for Sy~tems and Project Eng~neers requiring knowledge 
of a System or Subsystem. 
Operational Courses - Designed to give the necessary 
knowledge to parcicipate in a test operation. Systems 
Engineers Or Technicians requiring'~n_.intimate 
knowledge of such a system or subsyst~rl('1J'aI',t:i,cipated 
in such ,courses. 'if 
l(\1 ~ ',. 
Mechanization .Co'dr)'ses .. Designed to give int:i.mate 
, . /1 I ~nowledge of a nalJjticular System or Subsystem. 
Courses were detailed to the. point at which an 
individual .eouid identj,fy problem ~reas at the 
component level. ~ystem Eng~neers and Technicians 
participated in such cOI,lrses. 
Specialized Courses - Designed to cover the 
techniques, specifications, and procedures for any 
task 1 process, or operation which wQsdetermined 
to require certified personnel for ~ccomplishment. 
A rigidly constructed examination process. was 
appli~d to all courses in this category. 
E. Certif.ication Status - Quality Management, Engineering) 
Technician, and Inspection pl:!rsonnel were r~~uired to be 
certified dependent uvon job cl~ssification ··!and requirements of 
CRSCs. Quality personnel at each location accomplished un-,~ 
scheduled audits of p~rsonnel in various work areas and tasks 
to verify that persoIlrtel involved were certified. These· checks 
were accomplished against the Computerized Certi,fication S.tBtus 
Report published by' MMC D~nver Tr~in,ing and ~rti£ication. 
,'The Certification Status Report provided a sutmnary record" 
of individual, crew, and skills_. certificfltion activities. The 
report was broken down into three maJor tab runs: 
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(1) ''Master Control" - This tab run consisted or a 
listing of company employees training and current 
certifications arranged in badge number order • 
. (2) ''Work Cent~r" - This tab run provided groupings 
of the training and ce~tifications of each 
Certification Board plus groupings of the skill 
certifications for Denver, St. Louis, and KSC. 
Data relative to each function on the Certification 
Requirements Summary Charts was grouped to include 
the requirements for each certification, the type 
of certification, and the personnel awarded the 
certification. Also data was grouped to reflect 
training accomplishments of each individual 
relative to each Certification Board. 
(3) "Control Point" - This tab run was identical to 
that of the HMaster Control" tab run but was 
grouped nume1='ically. Qy. department. 
;r.ndividuals who received copies 'of the Computerized Certifi-
cation Status Reports were responsible for updating the data 
displayed on the tab run. Corrections were made on the then 
current copy. in red pencil. Upon receipt of new tab run, the 
~ed lined copies .were forwarded to Denver Training and Certifi-
cation~or incorporation into the computer. 
In addition to the audits accomplished by the local Quality 
Departments at each location, separate audits were accomplished 
by MMC Quality Audit Department. Fi.ndings of such audits showed 
no major disc1=',epancies in the Training and Certification Progr~ms. 
4.ll~2 Denver & MDAC~E 
Test teams were establish~d which consisted of a test 
conductor, test technicians, a Quality engineer and an inspect~r. 
Prior to the performance of any system tests on the MDA, 
involved personnel were required to be trained and certified 
as' defined in paragraph 4.11.1. S..tandboard certifications 
were required on major system tests and 'in many instances on 
subsyste~ tests because ~f the test complexity. 
The "Offic'ial Testdopy" of the-test procedure~ wer,e in 
the possession of the assigned Ql,1ality representative during 
every phase of the test cycle,.ln some instances more ,than one 
Quality representative was involved. Due to the proximity of 
the test equipment to the a;dt,ual hardware, it was often necessary 
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to place one inspector with the test conductor and another 
inspector with the test equipment. As entries were required in 
procedures, actual recorded values from the test equipment 
verification were obtained from the two inspectors and entered 
into the procedures, stamped and dated. Questions which arose 
concerning procedures or tests were the responsibility of the 
assigned Quality engineer who assisted the inspectors in making 
decisions as to the technical adequacy of the tests. 
When ·errors were not.ed in the procedure, deviations were 
written to correct the errors/differences. All deviations were 
approved by the Quality engineer. If the error/difference was 
of. such a nature that it affected the Systems Test and Checkout 
Requirements Document (STACR), (re fer to paragraph 7.1. 2.2 for 
STACR definition) a Liaison Call was initiated. The STACR ~as 
then chang~d via a formal change route or a permanent contract 
deviation· was obtained which allowed acceptance of the test 
resul.ts. 
IThe MMC practice of conducting pre-test and post-test 
meetings was universally used on the MDA. Prior toa pre-test 
meeti.ng, Quality prepared a "Certificate of R-..:adiness to Test" 
(CORT) which listed all the test cons.'traints noted in the 
historical data. At the pre-test meeting the Quality engineer 
reviewed the CORT and 'test constraint,s. Each constraint was 
revie~ed for its affect on the test ~nd acticihs were assigned 
to work off any constraint if neces~,ary. The review proved to 
be beneficial to the test team memb~)rs because all potential 
problems were discussed and many ar~as of concern were eliminated 
that otherwise would slow down the test. At post-test meetings 
it was possibJe to determine whether test objectives were met 
and all open paper work was completed at one time with customer 
representatives. 
The as-run test procedures were maintained by Quality as 
historical data. Prior to placing the completed procedure in 
the data file, the Quality engineer used the as-run test 
procedures to update the STACR compliance matri~. The STACR 
identi£ied minimum parameters and functions that must be verified 
by t€\sts per:fo~med on t:he MDA. A STACR compliance ~tri:ll; (refer 
to paragraph 7.1.4) 'o1eiS developed and stamped by Quality and the' 
customer for each acceptance'test element which was complied 
with. Areas of non-compliance were noted and required contractual 
cove,:age or changes to the STACR were required before the test 
was accepted. 
!I 
4 .. 66 
Many of the tests perfbrl,led on the Backup MOA at MOAC-E 
were non-acceptance tests performed by an Engineering Test 
Order (ETO). If ETO tests were performed on the MDA Backup 
system in lieu of the acceptance tests, they were also docu-
mented on the matrix. These tests were signed off on the matrix 
by Engineering when only an engineering evaluation was performed 
and stamped by Quality when test results were witnessed and 
recorded. 
It would have been an advantage. to train personnel in the 
use 9f the different procedures and forms they would eventually 
be using when working at. another contractor's facility or NASA 
center, Xt must be remembered, however, that the equipment 
user was the one to satisfy and that the equipment users'. 
methods may be better than the methoqs brought to the new 
facility by MMC. A vanguard of key. personnel should be sent 
to the new facility so that they can report back to MMC on the 
changes that must be made with regard to oper~tional procedures. 
4.11.3 KSC Operations 
A. KSC Interface The MOA arrived at KSC in' October, 1972 
and receiving inspection was initiated. It became evident early 
in the inspection that the hardware and procedure were not 
compatible. Numerous deviations wel;"e made to correct incompati-
bilities,i.e., connector part numbers, mated/not mated, panels 
installed/not installed, and nomenclature errors. Additionel 
problems were encountered in obtaining support equipment such 
as work platforms and stands. Due to the configuration of the 
High Bay Test Cell in the Operations and Checkout (O&C) Building, 
it wae necessary to design, fabricate, and assemble work plat-
forms and stands to permit accees to the total exterior of the 
MDA. Because 9'~ the Operations schedule, Quality was unable to 
obtain .a turnover of the MOA for ,ins.p.ec·tion; therefore, 'the 
Receiying Inspection procedure was not closed out for approxi-
mately three months. 
Since no timf.! was allocated or authorized .to familiarize 
personnel transfe'rred with theMOA with the KSC system, problems 
arose with regard to Discrepancy Reports (DRs), Test Preparation 
Sheets (TPSs), Minor Discrepancy Reporting System Squawks (DRSSs), 
Parts InstaHatibn arll;l Removal Rec.ord. System (PIRRs), 'l\emporary 
Installat:lon Record (TIR), Parts 'tags; and Red Sf;reamer Accounta-
bilitY-Inventory. . 
Difficulties were encountered with interfacing contractor 
personnel mating and demating MDA electrical connectors. MMC 
had a requirement to log all mating/demating of electrical 
components. The problems involved personnel working to authoriz-
ing documentation such as TCPs without coordinating their 
activities. The problem was resolved through contractor Quality 
personnel notification of pending connector activities. 
B • .. KSC Test Team - During the activities in the WITS, the 
operation was centralized araund Lagistics, Engineering, Planning, 
Operations and Quality. Centralization a.Howed the organizations 
to respond ta problems with minimal delay. 
During initial Vertical Assembly Building (VAB) activities, 
the centralization of support organizatians created some delays 
in providing immediate services to the operation. The delays 
were due in part to the distance between the O&C Building and 
the VAB, availability .of transportation, and the r~adjustment 
of personnel. As VAn activities cantinued, the c:e~\tralization 
.of Logistics, Planning, Operations, Engineering and Quality 
was accomplished. Suppart equipment, toals, hardware, clothing, 
records, Material Review Boatd, flight crew equipment, and 
bonded storage were readily available. Withhold area~ were 
identified for control of discrepant hardware which elimina~ed 
some trave 1. 
C. Test Pracedures - TCPs were originated to contraland 
dictate how and when the MDA would be tested at J.(,SC. A number 
of prablems arase when the schedule dictated that the TCP must 
be ready for test performance and be released for publication 
45 days prior to the need date. 
Late information from' other contractors caused the TCP to 
be written with obsolete data which necessitated a rewrite 
prior to testing. The rewrite was made via a Pracedure Change 
Notice (PCN), or a Deviation. Quality Engineering was required 
to cancur with the PCNs prior to release for pubJ,ication. If 
Deviations were written to the TC~ no Quality review was required 
which caused Quality to reviewa.fter the fact and which caused 
some retest because test requii/~tinents were not met. 
':~1,' 
TPSs were utilized to detail the control .of functional tests, 
.hardware movement, and canfiguratian changes when not controlled 
by TCP and DRs. When the MDA first arrived at KSC,MMC Quality 
reviewed and approved theTPS for Quality Contral, Limited 
Operational Life Items Control, and operational handling of 
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components. Subsequently, Quality was ~ in the review and 
approval cycle of TPSs to insure that requirements were met. 
This required that Quality review all as-run TPSs for control 
and tracking of hardware history and to assure that the operation 
set forth in the TPS did not violate hardware integrity. 
D. Corrective Action - Quality Assurance reported hardware 
or software discrepancies on KSC DRs and DRSSs. An Interim 
Discrepancy Record System (IDR) was used to identify and document 
problems ,tha,t occurred during test and to authorize trouble-
shooting." The ,discrepancy would be investigated and dispositioned 
accordingly by Engineering. The Quality Engineering (QE) 
Department reviewed and listed each discrepancy on a sheet which 
was printed and sorted into equipment categories' per KSC 'procedures 
covering Use and Control of Test and' Inspection Records (TAIR) 
nooks. The tab list was kept up-to-date to allow tracking of 
the DR until closure. Unsatisfactory Condition Reports (UCR) , 
Failure Analysis Investigation Reports (FAIR), or Corrective 
Action Problem Summaries (CAPS) were tracked for status. 
MMC QE created probl-em folders and all pertinent data and 
correspondence were inserted into the f61ders. A11 problems 
were coordinated with the MMO (Denver) Corrective Action Control 
Center (CACC). The MMC CACC was utilized for corrective action 
and closure of problems. MMC. QE reviewed all closure actions 
and obtained NASA QE concurrence on the disposition or corrective 
action. 
The DR was also used for the handling and disposition of 
Nonconforming Material. MMC QE was charged with the responsibiiity 
to chair the ~terial Review Board (MRB) and to review non-
conformances, disposition material, determine if Failure Analysis 
(FA) and diagnostic testing or inspection was required and determine 
if a failure had occurred which could cause a system, subsystem, 
or component to not perform properly. One MMC QE, one MMC 
Systems Engineer, and one NASA QE comprised the MRB. 
Eo Summary - The NASA/KSC Quality system, procedures, and 
forms, once personnel became indoctrinated, was found to be 
very efficient. The dual use of one form such as the IDR/DR 
for trouble-shooting and ttoJ: use of TPS fOll modifications or 
normal work is advantageous. 
TCPs at .KBCused in the' integration .testing were too large 
and cumbersome t.oUse and control. More pages of TCP Deviations 
were written in some cases than. the orig'inal TCP contained. 
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There was no review by Quality of Deviations entered into the 
procedures and often PCNs were not written until too late. TCP 
Deviations should have been reviewed by QE Eor compliance with 
the Program Test and Checkout Procedures Standards Policy the 
same as the TCP" 
TPSs used at KSC were a useful tool for control of work or 
movement of hardware. QE did not review the TPS until after it 
was worked. Problems could have been eliminated before they 
happened if QE had a review and concurrence role in .the prepara-
tion of TPSs. 
The IDR was a difficult document to track. When IDRs were 
100 pages long and had been in circulation for several weeks, it 
was difficult to track the IDR for corrective action. The 
incompatibility of procedures and hardwar·e which caused most 
IDRs could have been eliminated by having personnel reviewing 
advance copies of the documents against the actual hardware at 
the hardware·location. 
Sufficient:: time should be allocated to the Quality organiza-
tion for turnover of ~ardware for inspection shakedown activities. 
NorrnBlly~ MDA Receiving Inspection would take eight to twelve 
hours for completion. The provision of adequate time schedules, 
regardless of bhe activity, would assure professional results. 
Time should be authorized and allocated for familiarization 
of personnel when assignments involve two completely different 
Quality systems. Personnel that were assigned to the St. Louis 
Operations moved with the MDA to KSC a completely new method 
of operation. 
Provide familiarization training prior to transferring 
personnel to locations using different systems/prqcedures. 
Consider'establ~shing the requirement at the start of a 
program to utilize the same systems/procedures and forms (Le., 
Taps, DRs, TPSs, etc.) ,throughout at al,l locadons. 
4.12 HARDWARE REVIEW 
4.12.1 Quality Hardware Revie~ 
A. Purpose - The purpose 6f tq.e Quality Hardware Review, 
as performed by Skylab Mission Success,was to provide an 
independent review and analysis of critical hardwar.e as regarding 
its Uflight~ readiness. The scope of the review and analysis 
included all historical entries and test data recorded during 
assembly and test of the hardware. 
B •. Scope - The Skylab Quality Hardware Review concept was 
one in which the manufa~turing and, ~ept history of critical 
hardware and systems were regularly reviewed and certified as a 
requirement of hardware readiness. 
The technique used was to collect and collate in a historical 
manner the documentation wh~ch was generated by the various 
disciplines such as Mam:facturing, Test, Supplier Quality, etc. 
These documents were then assessed for completeness and accuracy, 
and ~ummarized in narrative format. The backup detail, the 
narrative summary, and a certification sheet were made into a 
package. These packages become part of the hardware permanent 
record. 
By maintaining these data packages as official records, a 
valuable source of information was readily available for con-
firmation of compliance to requirements or as research material 
for development purposes. 
In sUmfimry, the Hardware Review activity, by collecting, 
collating, and certifying~took the l,idditional step to provide 
the program with positive factual hardware documentation from 
which readiness and mission confidence could be assessed. 
C. ~rocedure - Skylab ~ission Success,in conjunceion with 
Product Integrity Engine(;1rs (PIEs), insured that components 
requiring Pedigree were identified in the applicable Program 
Critical and Limited Life Component Drawings (CLLCD), 82051000010 
and 84000096100. 
Systems requiring Incremental Summary Review documentation 
were defined by the Program and/or identified in the implementing 
Program CLLeD. 
PIEs authorized to participate in and approve Hardware 
Reviews were' identified by applicable PI;"ogram Directives. 
D. Definitions-
o Pedigree. Special reviews' . conducted at the component 
and/o.r device level to insure flight worthiness of 
the as~bui1t hardware and spares. 
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o Incremental Sununary Revie'\ol' t(ISR} - The review of 
all build/test data pertinent to an item at or 
above system level in increments at selected mile-
stones to determine that item's ~cceptability for 
its intended purpose. 
• Traceability - Serialized components appearing in the 
CLLCD which require identification and historical 
summary for the purpose of Hardware Review either at 
its level or next assembly level within the incremental 
sununary review. 
E: Component Certification (Pedigree) - Upon notification 
and receipt of the data package for an item requiring Pedigree, 
a Hardware Review engineer performed a review of the data. Reviews 
were conducted on each serial number of every item on the CLLCD. 
The review included the.following as applicable: 
• Vendor acceptanc~ test records. 
o MMC Logs and acceptance test records. 
• All MARS against the item. 
• Any Failure Analysis performed. 
o Any Engineering Analysis ·p~rformed. 
• Any DC&Rs applicable against the item. 
• Any other available or pertinent infortustion. 
When the item was found acceptable, the Data Certification 
Sheet was signed by the Hardware Review engineer. This constituted 
Pedigree of the item, and allowed it to be released into the 
production system or inventory. For the first article of a dash 
number, a joint review was made '!lith the Engineering PIE, and his 
signa,ture also appeared on the Data Certification Sheet. 
For ship direct items requiring Pedigree, data was received 
from Procurement Quality, the review performed, and written 
notification·of the item's acceptability provided to the agency 
having the hardware. No hardware· was released to the Flight 
Inventory until satisfactory Pedigree had been accomplished. 
If required, the responsible Hardware Review engineer ;.nitiated 
a Component SllIllIIiary aga.inst each serial number, sununarizing that 
item's history. It included, as applicable: o 
61 Nomenclature, 
c; Manufacturer, 
" Part Number, 
• Dash Number, 
• Serial Number, 
• Maximum allowable operating time or cycles, 
o Maximum allowable vibration time, 
• Cumulative operating time and/or vibration time, 
e Date of build, 
,. The drawing and ATP revision applicable, 
e, Trac,eable components ins ta11ed in the it~m, 
• Applicable history, including MARS, FAs, DC&Rs 
or other pertinent data. 
F. Component Recertification - Whenever a component was 
modified or rejected by Component MARS, th~ Component Pedigree 
was voided. A review was conducted to verify satisfactory 
resolution of the problem, the Component Summary updated to 
include the pertinent information, and the item re-Pedigreed 
on a Data Certification Sheet. 
To support re-P~digree) Skylab Mission Success received 
or obtained a copy of the MARS (or computerized output suitable 
to support re-Pedigree), DC&R reports and closure data, Failure 
Analysis reports pnd Stress Analysis from appropriate organizations. 
G. Incremental Summary Reviews ~ In' order to reduce the 
magnitude of the final acceptance review for the MDA, ISRs were 
scheduled at major milestones during the fabrication and test 
cycle. These ISRs were conducted by MMC and NASA and mutuai 
agreement was reached that the work covered by the ISR had been 
satisfactorily completed. As a result, the final MDA acceptance 
review had to deal with only the work since the last ISR. ' 
.~ ISR No. 1 - This ISR was held at the completion of 
Factory operations prior to transfer to SSB. 
• ISR No. 2 -Thi~ ISR was held at the completion of 
all external structural and electrical instal1ations/ 
modifications prior to the installation of super-
insulation and meteroid shields. 
-·-=;=~In£orriun :mRS were held prior to the start of systems 
t.esting for the purpose of sign off of Certificates 
of Readiness to Test (CORTs). 
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4.12.2 MDA Acceptance Data Package (ADP) Requirements 
A. MDA ADP Background - 'MMC experience in the aerospace 
industry provided the knowledge: of what a standard ADP should 
consist of. Using that experic:mce as baseline, an attempt was 
made very early in the program to determine how that baseline 
should be changed to satisfy the NASA program needs for Skylab. 
Negotiations with MSFC Skylab (SL) Quality representatives and 
IGr. Quality representatives resulted in little change to that 
baseline. The then fina~ agreed to, ADP was incorporated to the 
contract. However, as time progressed, a multitude of last 
minute ADP changes in the form of additional reqpirements were 
identified by KSC. This action more or less negated all 
previous negotiations. It is believed the final version of the 
ADP could have been ide'i:ltified in very early stages of the 
program. 
B. Government Furnished Property (GFP) ApP - Most GFP 
hardware de1iver~d to MMC for use on or with the MDA failed to 
meet minimum requirements of the original baseline ADP. Property 
in many cases was unserviceable as a result of no data delivered 
with the hardware. MMC developed the GFP ADP data matrix and 
published it to bring to light the deficiencies and to provide 
a tool to the NASA Program Office to obtain the required data 
from suppliers. As the program progressed, the MDA stowage 
hardware was added to the matrix. The GFP ADP matrix was not 
closed out until COFW Endorsement 1;5 pre-FRR at KSC. The final 
close out was accomplished by NASA waiver of unsupplied GFP data. 
C. MPD 8040.14 MSFC SL Program ADP - During the MDA 
acceptance review at MMC Denver facility December 1971, NASA 
KSC made known several additional ADP elements of data both in 
flight hardwar~ and GSE. A Review Item Discrepancy (RID) 
r~sulted in a joint team effort consisting of representatives 
from MSFC, KS C and MMC Program Office making a "fina l" de ter .. 
mination of the ADP requirements for the total SLprogram. The 
result of this effort was MPD 8040.14 dated 1 February 1972, 
which was publ.ished as a guide line document for ADPs furnished 
by suppliers of SL hardware and imposed the same requirements 
on GFP hardware. This document had little effect on MMC since 
most of the required elements were supplied and the remainder 
was available. The area of greatest impact was in the MMC 
furnished GSE~ Forma1ADPs were not originally planned for this 
type hardware. Asa result of the impact, MMC SL Quality Project 
negotiated directly witJl"NASA/KSC Quality .and reached agreement 
'C;, 
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on the GSE ADP format. It became necessary to build formal GSE 
ADPs during the time frame that the MDA was at St. Louis and 
prior to delivery of the GSE to KSC. 
Afte'r all SL hardware suppliers had an oppol:tunity to impact 
the guidf~ lines document, MPD 8040.14A was issued as a requ:irements 
document July 10, 1972 and put on the MDA contract. The GFJ? ADP 
matrix was aligned accordingly. 
D. ADP in Mission Support - MMC Quality Project recognized 
the need to have the Flight MDA ADP at Denver during the Mission 
Support time frame of the SL program and began negotiations with 
the MSFC Program Office for custodial responsibility of the ADP 
i~nediate1y after launch. 
The ADP was delivered to MMC Denver. in July 1973. Subsequent 
to final splash the MDA ADP will be delivered to MSFC archives. 
E. Sununary - The lesson learned in this pi.ece of the whole, 
is that an ADP baseline has to be established prior to the start 
of hardware delivery. A problem inherent to a program like 
Sky1ab is tha.t requirements such liS ADPs' are usually found on the 
bottom of the priority list .in early stage,s of the program. 
People, customer and contractor alike, put most emphasis on getting 
started, and getting' finished is too far down stream for serious 
attention. 
Retrieval of data after the fact is a serious cost impact 
and usually results in compromises that somehow "meet the intent 
of the requirement" but never really satisfy the requirement. 
'l!he problem is compound(,:~tiEl,~ down-stream reviews, either 
progranuned or in a continger'~oy·;'mO~e, are inconclusive because 
of lack of bMic 'data that (;'ouid have been available in the 
form J:'equired had the. need been identified ii' 
As a result of the lack of ADP definition earlier in the 
program, theGFP ADPs received by MMO at KSC were inconsistent 
in format, contained obsolete data, and utilized several 
different forms/methods for recording historical events and 
time/cycle data. This resulted in the expenditure of a large 
number of man':hours by MMC, MSFC, JSC, and KSO Quality and 
Engineering personnel to perform detailed reviews of the ADPs 
to understand the format, remove obsolete data, and summarize 
the histoT;icaJ, data. . . 
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F. Reconnnendation - Establish a program ADP that is 
realistic and insist that all hardware suppliers comply. 
4.12.3 Hardware Integrity &~ 
Quality participated in this review conducted by NASA/MSFC. 
This consisted of an in-depth review of the build documentation 
on selected critical MDA Systems. A complete review was made on 
these systems to establish the qualification hardware configuration 
compatibility with flight hardware. A detail review was also 
made to verify that flight hardware had all engineering require-
ments incorporated. 
A review was also made of the failure history for these 
systems to verify thaI.: Material Review decisions made throughout 
the build and test p~ogra~ were still valid. 
4.13 ACCEPTANCE MANAGER 
The Quality Program Management and Mission Success Program 
Management fell under the office of the Acceptance Manager. 
Mission Success is covered in detail in sections 4.7 Nonconfor-
mance/FA Evaluation and 4.12.1 Hardware Review and will not be 
restated here. 
4.13.1 Quality Program Management 
This discipline related specifically to hardware acceptance 
and module acceptance for the MMCat Denver, MDAC-E and KSC. 
A. Denver Acceptance - The MDA acceptance at Denver in 
December 1971 was the first S1. Module delivered. This resulted 
in many additional "firsts". 
(1) As stated earlier (4~12.2 MIlA ADP) MPD8040.14A, 
resulted from the MIlA Acceptance Review, and 
became the guidel:i.ne document for ADPs to the 
suppliers of SL hardware including flight, GSE, 
trainer, spares and GFP hardware. 
(2) Certificate of Flig'ht Worthiness (COFW) 
o During prep for MDA Acceptance, MMC was 
required to produce a COFW that certified 
completion (or incompletion) of contractual 
responsibility in Configuration Control, 
Manufacturing, and Test/Checkout of the Module.J 
4 .. 76 
t 
~ ... ' i 'AlIi ~ '\l~. 
% ~.~'"~ 
• Skylab Program had no released or guideline 
document for the COFW. MMC negotiated for a 
COFW to the contractor's format. This format 
was used for each endorsement from MDA Acceptance 
(endorsement 1 through pre-FRR (endorsement 5). 
• MSFC issued a COFW gUildline/document, prelimin~ry 
dated 20 April 1972 (and not officially released 
to date). The guideline document and attached 
letters provided enough latitude so that no 
change was required in subsequent ~IDA COFW, 
endorsements. 
• The COFW Log of Exceptions (LOE), attachment to 
the COFW, iterated exceptions to the certification 
statements on the cover sheet and served as a 
contractual status document that provided for 
documented acceptance of these exc&ptions wheh 
accomplished~ . 
(3) Movement to MDAC-E - The MDA when accepted at 
Denver by NASA was transferred to MDAC-E for mate 
and integrated testing with the Airlock Module. 
This was unique in as much as the other SL Modules 
were delivered directly to KSC after acceptance. 
B. Integration Activities at MDAC-E - COFW 1F2, AM/MDA 
Systems Integration ~ SAR Phase l, was completed to certify 
status of the module at completion of modification and programmed 
integration activities at MDAC-E. . . 
During the nine months the MDAC-E program enveloped, other 
SL Modules had been delivered to 1<.8C. At the AM/MDA acceptance 
review at MDAC-E, KSC demanded that the var}.~~:us status documents 
i.e., COFW, Pack & Ship Instructions, Deferred Work, ],Jrogrammed 
Modifications be collected into one document to give 8 complete 
picture of required pre-launch work items. KSC e~perience with 
other modules was less than deaireable in that open work items 
kept eroping up in various forms within the delivered module 
assoc~ated paper work, MMO geve~opep an Open/Deferred Wo~k 
Document ED2002-2045 for the Flight MDA that satisfied KSC 
requirements and bec'ame one of the status tracking documents at 
KSC. 
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C. KSC Activities - Acceptance Manager activities at KSC 
were adlJ":nistered by the MMC Quality Manager in residence at KSC. 
Activities were limited to contractor hardware responsibilities 
and a prominent role in "Readiness to Test" approval activities 
during pre~launch checkout. 
'D. Summary - SL experience in the various phases of acceptance 
reviews showed a'definite lack of detailed planning and direction 
to hardware suppliers. As a contractor, the requirements for the 
most part had been met or, exceeded to: the contra<;:ting center and 
then without warning a new set of requirements or variations to 
original requirements were imposed when hardware was moved to KSC 
for pre-launch checkout. 
Examples of the above are: 
(1) MMtS\System used throughout th:e life of MDA program, 
at D~nver and MDAC-E, but shifted to DR at KSC. This 
was costly since the contractor's data bank could not 
recognize DRs and they had to be transcribed to MARS 
for input to the flight data bank for CACC data 
retrieval. . 
(2) Delivered GSE & ADPs were determined to be uriacceptable 
toKSC.A multitude 'of data elements had to be 
retrieved and assembled into a formal regemented data 
package that for the most part was never used at KSC. 
(3) The Open/Deferred work document had to be developed 
at the last minute to satisfy KSC requirement. This 
was probably the most legitimate request of any, but 
the requirement surfaced at a moSt inopportune time, 
E. Recommendations - Contracting agencies should recognize 
the requirements of the program to conclusion and impose these 
requirements on hardware suppliers in the contracting stage rather 
than post delivery stages. 
4.13.2 NASA and MMC Program Management Interface 
The NASA centers (both MSFC and JSC) established Resident 
Manager Offices at Denver to provide management of the Skylab 
Program. NASA delegated to the resident AFPROQuality Assurance 
branch the responsibility for inspection, pr,ocess control, MRB, 
and acceptance. 
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The MHC interface with NASA and the AFPRO was clearly defined 
and for the most part resulted in a smooth and expeditious operation. 
One exception was the processing of MRB dispositions. Although 
the AFPRO had the delegation to sign as the Customer MRB Representa-
tive, an excessive amount of time was occasionally required due 
to the requirement for obtaining signatures of concurrence from 
the following listed individuals prior tq the AFPRO MRB signature: 
• MHC PIE ~ AF~RO Quality Engineer 
• NASA Center 
o Supplier Technical Representative (GFP Major Items) 
• ru:-lO 
4.14 MISSION SUPPORT 
A reference library was 
MDA ADP as returned from KSC 
supplied build records. In 
were included as available. 
purpose of Mission Support. 
established that included the Flight 
after launch and the contractor 
addition, contractor supplier records 
The library existed for the sole 
Hission anomaly investigation was supported by the ready 
availability of historical records. . 
A separate and distinct element of available historical records 
was the Mission Success file of all anomaly documentation compiled 
throughout the program on all hardware supplied or procured by 
the contractor. 
Quality played an important role in contingency operations 
both in contingency hardware production and delivery and historical 
data retrieval for evaluation and analysis. 
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5. LOGISTICS PROGRAM 
5.1 LOGISTICS PLANNING 
'. 
The first task L1ssigned to the MDA Logistics Unit WLIS the 
preparation of a logistics plan to support the MDA through the 
test program und launch. This plan encompassed the necessary 
disciplines to provide essential support for contractor main-
tained deliverable hardware. The plan was prepared compatible 
with the requirements of NASA headquarters AAP Logistics Require-
ments Plan NHB7500.3 and the MSFC AAP Logistics Plan MM7500.6. 
The MDA Logistics plan established policies and concepts through 
the performance of analyses and establishing support requirements 
to implementation of the logistics program. The plan was sub-
mitted as line item 3 of the DRL Annex I to Exhibit A to SOW 
Contract NAS8-24000. The Logistics SOW for the MDA contract 
included this plan by stipulnting thDt MMC would implement II 
logistics program in general agreement with the plan. An inter-
nal MMC procedure was prepared to implement the Logistics Plan 
to e'stablish the methods and provide the ground rules for accom-
plishing the complete logistics effort. 
5.2 MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS 
A maintenance analysis was performed on each system of the 
MDA to determine items subject to maintenance (scheduled and 
unscheduled) and the necessary spare parts, tools, equipment, 
documentation and personnel required. This analysis was done 
wi.th the ground rule that MMC would perform all prelaunch mainte-
nance tasks with MDA trained and certified personnel. This 
ground rule permitted the simplification of documentation and 
actual deletion of specific maintenance proce'dures. EllCh system 
was examined to determine what items were subject to failure or 
damage. Wearout was not a consideration because of the limited 
operating time expected during prelaunch activities and during 
the mission. EDch item subject to failure or damnge was 
examined to determine what method was to be used to detect a 
failure ot malfunction and toi'solate that failure to a replace.., 
able or repairable item. The accessibility requirements and the 
spares, tools and documentation required for the replacement or 
repair in place of the failed item were then identified. 
The, results of the maintenance analysis were documented in 
the MDA Maintenance Re,quirements Document (MRD) SL-8841-70-2. 
This document was prepared for the use of MMC field tecbnic~ans 
and was not submitted formally to NAS'A, .although information"-
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copies were provided to MSFC. The MRD consisted of two pilrts; 
Part I contained the mnintennnce concepts and constrnints, nnd 
Part II contClined specific logistics requirements lind mainte-
nance activities such as maintenance tasks, list of spares, 
transportation requirements, accessibility, specinl tools, re-
test requirements, etc. 
The sc~eduled maintenance requirements identified in the 
MRD were extrncted and mnde a part of the test procedures to 
insure that the tasks were accomplished in a timely manner on 
a non-interference basis with scheduled test activities. The 
MRD was used by technicinns and test personnel to indicate what 
equipment and documentation was required when a malfunction was 
discovered. A completed nonconformance report form described 
the malfunction and disposition including the action taken and 
the retest requirements. The recommended disposition of failed 
items reflected in the MRD was accomplished by component noncon-
formance report disposition. All repairable items were subjected 
to failure analysis prior to rep0ir. Because of this require-
ment and the cost of setting up depot repair capabilities, the 
MRD called for reparable items to be returned to the supplier 
for maintenance and refurbishment. 
5.3 SPARES PROVISIONING/MANAGEMENT 
Spare parts were identified during the maintenance analysis 
process with minimum quantities established based on probability 
of failure or damage. Initially, the flight article and its 
associated GSE were the only items requiring spares support, 
since the backup article was .to be stored at Denver inde-finitely. 
Under these conditions the planned availability of spares for 
certain high cost items with a low probability of failure, such 
as the S190 window, was from the backup article. 
The funding for procurement of spares was accomplished 
based on an estimate of the initial establishment of a spares 
inventory plus factors for replenishment of items utilized and 
for repair of failed c6mponents. This fund was established and 
it was left to MMC to provide adequate spares for the program 
within the fund limitations. ThJs method eliminated a great 
deal of spares documentation and resulted in a considerable cost 
savings to the contractor and NASA. The spare parts inventory 
was established at Denver and the custody of that inventory 
remained with MMC throughout the program. The fact thatMMC had 
custody of the inventory expedited the repair and modification 
activity and allowed the movement of parts with a minimum of 
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paper work and formality. 
When the capability to launch the backup nrticle in accor.d-
ance with the 10 month turnaround requirement was imposed by 
contract, the spares philosophy changed. Instend of supporting 
the flight nrticle only, with contingency cnnnibnlizntion of the 
backup, spares were required to support 2 articles and associated 
equipment at 2 different locations, simultaneously. This 
required procurement of those high cost items not previously pro-
grnmmed and incrensed quantities of those items in minimum stock 
balance. 
The flight and backup articles, while at St. Louis, were 
supported from the Denver inventory. When the flight article 
was shipped to KSC se~ected spare parts were shipped to M}lC 
stores at that site to preclude a delay in maintenance. Other 
items required at KSC were, many times, hand cnrried by M}1C per-
sonnel who were traveling to KSC for other purposes. Total 
accountability records were maintained at Denver with close co-
ordination with KSC. Through this coordination, failed items 
were returned to Denver without delay for failure analysis and 
disposition. In several cases failure analysis indicated a modi-
fication was more desirable than repair. When this occurred the 
modification was applicable to the flight, backup [lnd sp':lres. 
The failed unit was the first item" modified and when ,wailable, 
it replaced the spare unit which had been installed in the flight 
article at the time of failure. The second modified item, nor-
mally a spare item, replaced the unit in the backup article and 
then the spare units removed from the flight and backup articles 
were modified and placed in spares inventory •. Thus the availa-
bility of spare units facilitated the modification program with-
out interference with the test activtty. 
Very few GSE spares were provisioned due to the nature of 
the GSE and its limited planned usage. There we.re occasions 
when a failure, damage, or loss required expeditious actiont;o 
procure or build a part for GSE maintenance. On all such occa-
sions, the required action was accomplished in a timely manner 
without impact to the field schedule. 
After the launch of the flight article, the residual spares 
at KSCwere returned to Denver for support of the backup' article, 
which was in test at St • Louls • At this point-, in accordance 
with the contract, no replenishment of spares inventory wns made. 
The items in inventory which were obsolete were declDred excess 
and disposed of. The .rest of the, inventory was listed in the 
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MDA Backup Article Storage Plnn and shipped to MSFC for storage 
with the backup nrticle. t'. 
5.4 OPERATION, MAIN'l'ENANCE AND HANDLING (OM&ll) PROCEDURES 
In consonance with the guide line o[ producing only thnt 
documentation required to enable trnined nnd certified contrac-
tor ~ersonnel familiar with the equipment to operate and main-
tain it, there wns originnlly no formnl OM&l1 documentntion 
plnnned. However, ns the GSE list grew and more complicLlted 
equipment was added to the list, the MDA Program Office directed 
MMC to prepare OM&n procedures for all delivernble items of GSE. 
MSFC-SPEC-10M01776R was provided as a guide in preparation of 
these procedures. Rather thnn having many small manuals, it was 
decided to include procedures for each piece of equipment into 
one document covering all deliverable GSE. This was accomplished 
with one exception. The Television Ground Support Equipment was 
to be utilized by other than MMC personnel and a separate manual 
was prepared for it. This was published as document SL-884l-70-4, 
entitled "Skylab Program Television Ground Support Equipment Oper-
ation, Maintenance and Handling Procedure." The bnlance of 
deliverable GSE was covered in publication SL-8841-70-3, which 
bore the tHle of "Multiple Docking Adapter Ground Support Equip-
ment Operation, Maintenance and Handling Procedure." All of 
these procedures were validated in the field and maintained cur-
rent with engineering requirements. Eighty-four end items were 
covered in SL-884l-70-3. 
5.5 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 
The MDA test program required the movement of the MDA from 
Denver to St. Louis for mating with the AM, further testing and 
delivery to KSC for prelaunch tests, and launch. MMCwas respon-
sible for the move from Denver to St. Louis and for technical 
support to MDAC for the movement of the mated AM/MDA from St. 
Louis to KSC. Transportation plans were written and published 
for the flight and backup articles covering the move from Denver 
/to St. Louis. These plans encompassed MDA movement sequence, 
j/ tran'sportation mode and route, GSE required and re lated insta 1-
lation procedures, loading and off-loading procedures and prepa-
ration for receipt and inspection. The plan also served as a 
source document for preparation of the mated AM/MDA transporta-
tion plan furnished by MDAC-E., In addition to these two plans, 
other plans were prepared for the oneG trainer move to MSC, the 
DTA to MSFC and the EMU to St. Louis alld return. Specia'l studies 
were also performed on the MDA/EREPtransportation environments 
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and an alternate mode for the backup article tranHportation when 
it appeared NASA might not be able to provide the Super Guppy 
aircraft for that shipment. Transportation of MDA experiments, 
supplied to the MDA program <1S GFP, when transported separ.ately 
was accomplished in ,Jccordance with the instructions provided in 
the OM&H Procedure and other data provided by the experiment 
deve loper. 
5.6 DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL AND LIMITED LIFE COMPONENT DRAWING 
CCLLCD) 
During the maintenance analysis effort, it was found that 
certain items would require special attention and special con-
trols. The items and associated controls were identified in the 
"Critical and Limited Life Component Drawing" - 82051000010. 
This was a released engineering drawing which defined the cri-
teria for selection of a critical and limited life component, 
the requirements/limitations placed on the hardware to achieve 
fl i ght re liability, and the disciplines and controls utilized 
to assure that the requirements/limitations were complied wit~ 
and implemented. A separate sheet was prepared for each item 
which included, as applicable, the operating limitation (time 
or cycle), calendar life, shelf life, vibration limitation, 
special packaging or handling requirements, special storage 
requirements and disposition if limitations were reached or ex-
ceeded. Implementation of the controls for this hardware was by 
Standard Procedure with Quality Control enforcing the procedure. 
5.7 MODIFICATION (MOD) INSTRUCTIONS 
Subsequ~nt to the delivery of the MDA to KSC, engineering 
changes were accomplished by mod kit incorporation. Mod Instruc-
tions were prepared for each kit listing the kit components and 
materials, "the tools required to accomplish the modification, 
GSE requirements and detailed instructions for incorporating the 
mod kit. These mod instructions were utilized at KSC by MMC per-
sonnel when attached to a TPS wnich authorized the work involved 
and made the incorporation mandatory. Included as a part on the 
mod instructions was an INC which was completed by MMC and NASA 
KSC Quality Control, following incorporation of the kit. This 
notification was forwarded to MSFC as a part of the configura-
tion management effort. There were 40 Mod Instructions prepared 
,by the Logistics organiza~ion. 
I( . 
5.8 TRAINING OF CONTRACT)DR PERSONNEL 
MDA training was developed and pI."esented for both the flight 
5'-.5 
and backup articles in support of the Skylab Program. Flight 
article training included contractor training and personnel cer-
tification at Denver prior to delivery of the flight article, 
field training and certification at St. Louis during the inte-
grated test program, and field training and certification at 
KSC prior to final test. This latter training was covered under 
separate NASA/KSC contract. Training on the backup article was 
provided at Denver and St. Louis. 
Flight article training at Denver was implemented under the 
Denver Sky lab Contractor Training Plan and Syllabus, December 
1970 (revised June 1971) and covered MDA orientation under course 
SL-100, Skylab Familiarization; MDA structures and systems under 
course SL-20l; MDA-GSE under course SL-202; and the Volumetric 
Leak Detector under Course SL-VLD. In the aggregate, this 
training provided overview of MDA configuration, and interface 
relationships; detailed description of construction features, 
functional operation, electrical sequencing and control, telem-
etry interface and experiment interfaces; and detailed familiar-
ization with MDA GSE including the pneumatic checkout console, 
handling, access, transportation equipment and electrical check-
out simulations. 
Training for MDA test team activities at MDAC-E and per-
sonnel certification of test team members was implemented under 
the Sky lab Field Personnel Certification Plan, December 1971, 
which extended the basic requirements of M-64-69, MMC Personnel 
Certification Plan, to cover field test activities. Existing 
MDA courses used for Denver training were updated, additional 
courses were developed, and training was presented .for pro-
ficiency update and certification of selected MMC/MDA test team 
personnel. This technical training covered: 
• MDA Systems and Structure 
• MDA GSE and Tools 
• M512 Materials Processing and Associated GSE 
• ATM C&JJ{ GSE 
• CEe Leak Detector 
• Volumetric Leak DeteHor 
/', 
• Functional Test Se,t 
\11 
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Skills training and certification was provided for connector 
mate and demate 1 so1dering fabrication nnd inspection, nncl pln:-;tics 
potting. MMC successfully coordinnted with MDAC-E for trllining 
of MMC team personne 1 in the are,)s of acces:-; nnd control and en-
vironmental control area disciplines. The program used Video-
tape that had been developed for crew/controller training at JSC, 
Operations and M<lintenance lInndbooks developed by Skyl<1b Logistics, 
and instruction by test and checkout personnel to reduce the re-
quirement for instructor personnel. 
The Denver based MMC Skylnb Certific<ltion Board, in unison 
with the MDAC-E Fie Id Certificntion Conunittee, operated within 
the guidelines estnblished by M-64-69 to implement the Field 
Certificntion Program. Ccrtificntion requirements were estnb-
lished, cert~finble personnel positions and Field Certification 
Requirements Sununary Charts were developed and approved. Approved 
certificntion cards were issued for individuals/teams which met 
position requirements. Board action and relevant certification 
activity was documented, and requirements for and approval of re-
certification was implemented. KSC test and checkout personnel 
took adva~tage of MDA training through participation in formal 
and an the job training offered at St. Louis. A hfgh percentage 
of those personnel supporting the MDA area were drawn from the 
St. Louis team, having been trained and certified as part of the 
test operation. This highly effective program provided signifi-
cant reductions in MDA training requirements at KSC. Three pre-
sentations of MDA training courses were presented at KSC t.o 
cover remaining resident personnel. 
MDA Backup Article training and certification was conducted 
at Denver and at St. Louis. Existing MDA/Experiment courses were 
updated as required to reflect hardware and procedure changes. 
Applicable video tapes were used to the maximum extent. A 
reduced cadre of Denver instructors presented the training and 
supported the Certificntion Bonrd. 
5.9 INFLIGlIT MAINTENANCE (IFM)", 
Initial design concepts excluded IFM asa requirement for 
Skylab and incorporated the use of highly reliable hardware and 
redundancy to insure mission success and provide for minimum 
utilization of crew time. This philosophy gradually changed 
throughout the program evolving into one of extensive planning 
and prOVisioning of IFM support. This change in philosophy 
initiated extensive qesign and hardware analyses to determine 
the maintenance' capability necessary to su~port the hardwar,e most 
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critical to the mission during flight. 
Each task identified during the maintenance onalYKiR was 
examined to determine if it was feasible for inflight occomplish-
mente The guidelines set forth for inflight mainLen:mce clmdi-
dates by MSFC/MSC precluded tnsks involving: 
• opening pressurized or fluid systems, 
• working on live electricnl systems, 
• extrn-vehicular activity, 
• placing the crew in a hazardous position or environment. 
Other considerations applied to the IFM candidates were accessi-
bility of components, crew capability, fault isolation capability, 
tools required, spare parts and materials required Dnd disposi-
tion of removed failed items. As the program progressed, more 
consideration was required for stowage of maintenance hardware, 
since the cluster weight and volume became limiting .. factors. 
Close coordination with stowage personnel at MSFC and MSC became 
mandatory. Scheduled activities were held to a minimum in order 
to conserve crew time. Requirements were established only when 
periodic cleaning, replacement of consumables or maintenance of 
cycle sensitive or time sensitive items was necessary. The re-
quirements were included in the checklists as part of the normal 
housekeeping tasks. Performance of the tasks was controlled by 
the flight plan and scheduled to accommodate the crew vlorkload. 
Each MDA IFM candidate task was recommended by means of 
Engineering Change Request (ECR) to a level II Configuration 
Change Board (CCE). The recommendation provided a brief descrip-
tion of the task and included the tools and spare requirements 
together with their weights and volume and a recommended stowage 
location. Attached to the ECR was a Stowage List Change Notice 
(SLCN). Following CCB approval contractual act/ion was initiated 
by the applicable centers to provide thenecesrpary hardware and 
crew training. Some IFM tasks required SL-l o~-board support, 
while other tasks required the hardware to be avaIlable at KSC 
for stowage in the next CSM scheduled for launch. The approved 
MDA IFM tasks were reflected in SL-884l-70-6 "MDA Inflight Main-
tenance Data." This publication also listed the Skylab Tool 
Inventory and task/tool list and cross reference to flight check-
list. 
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The c;rew was represented in each IFM. revie\-1 [lnd were later 
; trained on each approved task. This training included perform-
ance of the tasks on trnining h<lrd\-1are or during C2F2 nctivities. 
Real time contingencies were corrected by the development o( 
tools, hardware and procedures as needed. Crew capabilities in 
accomplishing maintenance nnd utilizing contingency Lools WM; 
drAmatically demonstrated on the first manned mission when 
Conrad and Weitz freed the solar arrny boom on the OWS. 
There was no corrective maintenance performed on M.DA hard-
wnre during the SL-2 mission, but utilization of M.DA tools was 
mnde in performance of corrective maintenance elsewhere in the 
cluster. 
During the SL-3 mission there were two scheduled M.DA IFM. 
tnsks accomplished which involved replacement of S-190 desiccants 
and cleaning the tape recorder heads. The SL-3 commander com-
mented "Tape cleaning has been [I piece of cake." 
Corrective maintenance accomplished during SL-3 included 
replacement of the Video Tape Record~r (V'1'R) e lectron,ics unit 
and removal of the failed circuit boards for return in the CM.. 
The spare VTR electronics unit was stowed in the OWS on SL-2 
and the required tools and procedures were on board. During the 
replacement oper<ltion a faulty 3/16" Allen ~it was found but was 
replaced with a bit from the spare tools onboard~ Replacement 
circuit boards for the failed VTR were launched on SL-4. 
1be Rate Gyro 6-Pack carried .up on SL-3 to supplement the 
faulty rate gyros of the ATM was assembled and installed in the 
HDA. Installation of the 6"pack involved mounting the package 
and control unit on the HDA wall and, by EVA, connecting the 
cables with the~luster rate gyro system. The gyro package was 
then aligned to :.\the cl,uster axes and checked out electrically 
and thermally, using a digital multimeter. 
The 5192 attenuator installed during SL-2 required adjust-
ment during the SL-3 mission. To accomplish this a 3/32" screw 
driver blade was filed down to engage the adjustment screw. 
This was accomplished using the file blade of the Swiss army 
pocket knife. A spare 3/32" screw driver was available on orbit 
so the loss of the tool modified did not affect their capability. 
Just prior to SL-3 dE!activation the crew "~~ttempted to re-
move thE! kick plate from the ATM C&D Console in preparation for 
installation of the S0828 Auxiliary Timer. Removal of the plate 
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was discontinued when Commnnder Bean reported it took twenty-two 
minutes and 30 seconds to remove five screws. The kick plate is 
held in place by 60 hi-torque screws and 18 hex head bolts. Al-
though hi-torque bits were utilized, they were ineffective and 
the Commander resorted to the vise grip pliers. Development of 
a more suitable tool was initiated immediately and provided in 
time fo'r flight on 8L-4. The new tool had been approved by 
Commander Bean during the 8L-3 crew debriefing. 
The 8L-4 C8M carried more items for accomplishing correc-
tive maintenance than any of the previous CSM's. Included among 
these were replacement tools for those rendered unusable on 
previous flightR such as dull scissors and knives, broken diagonal 
cutters, etc., ana new tools required for specific tusks. Re-
placement circuit boards for the failed VTR were carried with the 
intent of repairing the failed unit if the VTR in operation 
failed. l~e second failure did not occur so the repair was not 
required. 
Crystal Thermometers were installed on SL-4 mission day 6 
to monitor the 6 pack rate gyros installed during 8L:-3. These 
were monitored every 2 days. 
Installation of the replacement auxiliary timer for 8082 
was accomplished without the removal of the A'IM C&D console kick 
plates for which a special hi-torque screw removal tool was 
developed. The connector which was thought to be difficult to 
locate without kick plate removal was located and reached with 
connector pliers from beneath the console. 
The inoperative TV monitor in the ATM C&D console was re-
placed on mission day 10 with no reported difficulty. The 
replacement monitor was a resupply item for 8L-4. 
The spare 8009 motor provided for 8L-3 was installed on 
mission day 11 of 8L-4. Failure of a speaker intercom assembly 
necessitated replacement with an onboard spare on mission day 
15. Two spares were provided on 8L-l. Both of these were 
required to replace failed units., The other replacement occurred 
in the OW8 during 8L-3. 
An on-board spare 8190 magazine drive was utilized for 
replacement. of a malfunctioning drive mechanism on mission~ay 57. 
Vacuum cleaning of the fan inlet screens WqS accomplished 
on a scheduled basis. However, the :frequency of cleaning was 
5-10 o 
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increased from 7 days during SL-2 to 3 days on SL-3 to 2 days on 
SL-4. 
5.10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The logistics program for the MDA, although 'lustere, 
proved to be successful, economical and met the b;lsic needs of 
the program. The latitude offered the contractor by H,\SA 
directing the contractor to be completely responsible for sparcA 
support throughollt the program, within the funds limitation, \o1aS 
unique and economically advantageous to the progrnm. The selec-
tion, procurement and management of spares by MMC provided ade-
quate nnd timely support. The utilization of trained contractor 
personnel, familiar with the MDA, for all test, operntion, 
maintenance and transportation activities minimized the amount 
of formal logistics documentation required. 
The inflight maintenance planning and provisioning gave the 
crew adequate support. It is recommended that future manned 
space programs initiate inflight maintenance activities earlier 
in the program and that maintainability in flight .be a greater 
influence in design. It is further recommended that tnflight 
maintenance spares be furnished from residual ground spares, 
where practicable, rather than procured as designated inflight 
spares. 
The capabilities for maintenance shown by the Skylab crews 
indicate that future programs should broaden the scope of candi-
date inflight maintenance tasks. 
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6.0 SAFETY PROGRAM 
6.1 General 
This section of the MDA Final Report is :.lchronological 
presentation of the MDA Safety program from 1nitia1 MSFC/MMC 
MDA contract negotiations through design, ~nanufacture, test 
and mif~sion support. Every attempt has 'been made to avoid 
duplic,ating information that is contain~d in other documents; 
howev91;', certain activities and functions whicn are specified 
in MDAassociated documents will be identified in this section. 
These 'Lnclude design safety analyses, MDA test operations, crew 
and system safety requirements and the Manned Flight AWareness 
program. The fin~l portion of this section will specify con-
clusions and recommendations which, if implemented, would assure 
improved safety performance on future programs. 
MMe System Safety participation in the MDA S~fety program 
began with MDA contract negotiations at MSFC. During these 
activities the MSFC MDA Project Office directed MMC to initiate 
au MDA System Safety plan to establish the requir~ments, pro-
cedures, controls and methods which would be utilized in meeting 
NASA/MSFC manned spacecraft system safety requirements. This 
document is entitled The MDA System Safety Plan and is identified 
as document number ED-2002-l008. Contract negotiations for 
this pIau were completed during the first quarter of 1970 and 
the plan was implemented shortly thereaftet. 
This plan was structured to meet the requir("lnents of OMSF, 
AAP Program Directive No. 31, dated October 196~, for the 
implementation of system safety requirements and OMSF Safety 
Program Directive No.1, Revision A, dated December 1969, for 
manned space flight system safety requirements. These docu-
ments and the MDA System Safety Plan stipulate System Safety 
responsibilities and address the safety function to MDA, Design, 
Manufacturing, 'fest and on-orbit operations. Where possible, 
the plan provided safety surveillance and control for all MDA 
articles, i.e., the Flight, Backup, Neutral auoyancy, Zero-G 
and One-G Trainer. ' 
The plan also specifj"ed the accomplishment of safety 
analyses for all Flight A~ticleMDA hardware. These analyses 
were conducted concurrent with MDA design activities and assured 
that hazards were identified early enough during the design 
phase to effect timely resolution. In addition to these 
activities, the plan also specified MMO System Safety partici-
pation in ,all MDA manufacturing and test operations. It should 
\ 
,I 
be noted that Safety representatives from the NASA/MSFC MDA 
Project Office performed audits to assure that the MDA System 
Safety program was being conducted via the re quirements of 
ED2002-l008. 
Other safety functions accomplished during the MDA program 
included test facility and procedure review, on-site safety 
monit~ring and serving as a member of the test validation teams 
at Denver, MDAC-E and at KSC. Associated safety functions in-
cluded an evaluation of the safety impact anyone modification 
may have on existing hardware and the need for safety train:tng. 
Other functions included safety participation in mission support 
activities and the transfer of useful Skylab safety experience 
(in writing) for use on future programs. 
6.2 Crew/System Safety 
6.2.1 General 
Crew/System safety as provided for in the MDA System Safety 
Plan considers that crew safety is safety during crew interface 
with controls and other on-board equipment, such as freedom 
from electroshock, cuts and bruises caused by sharp, edges and 
protrusions, pinch points, etc. System safety as provided for 
in the MDA System Safety Plan is that safety which is inherent 
to anyone or combination of systems. Some of the functions/ 
activities accomplished during the MDA Project which provided 
for the assurance of crew/system safety were: 
(1) Design safety analyses - these analyses addressed 
each MDA subsystem and included the MDA structure, 
mechanical, electrical, MDA experiments interface 
and associated GSE. These analyses were submitted 
in accordance with the requiremen.ts of line item 127 
and 128 of the MDA Data Requirements Lists, Annex II 
to Exhibit A of contract NAS8-24000. These analyses 
were'documented in ED-2002-20l7 which was later 
revised to a change 5 configuration, ,dated 21 December 
1971. (AllEDCS and drawing changes issued beyond 
this date were assessed for safety impact by Systems 
Safety). These analyses were conducted concurrent 
with MDA design and were utilized at MDA program/ 
design reviews. A total of fifty-six potentially 
hazardous items were jointly identified by respective 
MDA design elements and MMC System Safety. Some of 
these hazards could n.ot be removed or sufficiently 
reduced by design; as such, appropriate_ operational 
constraints were identified. Some of the more signifi-
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cant hazards identified in these analyses and corres-
ponding design provisions were: 
o Contingency docking/crew isolation -. MDA hatch 
launch lock was redesigned to permit launch lock 
dis-able from both sides of hatch. 
o Short circuits/arcs/possible electrical fire -
additional fuses were provided at several power 
feeders in the ATM C&D Panel. 
o Spacecraft depressurization due to M5l2 vacuum 
.vent line failure - a redundant vacuum vent line 
shut off valve was added at the MDA skin line. 
o Spacecraft depressurization/cabin pressure leaks -
S190, 8191 and 8192 window installations were 
designed to incorporate dual pan~s/pressure seals. 
(2) On-going Safety participation - System Safety partici-
pated in all potentially hazardous IDA handling, . 
shipping and test operations. 
(3) Sharp edge/protrusion/pinch point inspections - MDA 
crew operations an4 MMC System Safety conducted 
progressive inspections both inside and outside of 
the MDA in order to minimize the potential for crew 
injury. 
~ (4) Manned Flight Awareness - MMC System Safety conducted 
a Manned Flight Awareness Program throughout the MDA 
Project per the requirements of NASA Management In-
struction 1700.3 •. This program applied to the total 
MMC Skylab Project and consisted of personnel recog-
nition, awards, honoree dinners and other motivational 
functions. 
6.2.2 Test Phase 
MDA tests as discussed in this section will address a 
broad spectrum of activities, e.g., manufacturing operations 
involving the MDA and its associated ground equipment; however, 
these functions are test related aQd warrant discussion at this 
time. System Safety participation in these activities through .. 
out the MIlA Project included test operations at MMC Denver, 
MDAC-E and KSC. S2rne of the major tflsks. accomplished by System 
Safety during this time were:" '. 
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(1) System Safety review and approval of procedures. 
These procedures were used to move/handle the MDA 
as well as to accomplish acceptance tests. 
(2) Critical test activities such as the manned altitude 
tests at MDAC-E and the inverted docking tests at 
KGC dictated that System Safety initiate test 
operations hazards analyses. These analyses were 
not required for delivery by DRL; however, they are 
on file at the MMC System Safety office. These 
analyses, plus daily System Safety participation in 
on-going activities were instrumental in' assuring 
that these important activities were incident free. 
(3) System Safety maintained a continuous monitor of all 
test operations and served as a member of the test 
validation team. 
(4) During the period of time when the MDAwas at the 
Denver Division the MMC Industrial Safety Department 
provided an on-going coverage of all activities to 
assure that a safe working environment existed for 
all personnel. MMC System Safety provided this cover-
age at MDAC-E and KSC. 
6.2.3 Safety Training 
Safety training on the MDA Project was a portion of a 
certification program which requi~ed that all personnel per-
forming contract functions, including System Safety engineer, 
attend a training course for each applicable MDA subsystem. 
These courses also covered those experi'ments which interfac:ed 
wi.th the MDA. Upon completion of these courses, a written 
examination with passing grades was required. In addition to 
these courses, special personnel safety classes were held to 
assure all personnel were qualified in the use of emergency 
equipment (breathing air bottles, oxygen, sensors, etc.) and 
that they understood and could safely use emergency escape 
'~I devices such as the exit chute at KSC. 
6.3 Concl:usions 
It is concluded that the safety program for the MDA met 
the requirements of the overall Sky lab Program. The require-
ments of ED2002-1008 (MIlA System Safety Plan) were complied 
with throughout the MDA Project and there were no significant 
incidents. Areas·where improvement is indicated for future 
programs is included in Section 6.4 (below). 
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6.4 Recommendations 
Safety hazards analyses as specified in Section 5.2 of 
ED-2002-1008 should not stipulate two different analyses 
(design safety analysis and test operations hazards analysis). 
Instead, safety plans should require a hazards analysis which 
begins at design and flows through manufacture, test and on 
orbit operations. This approach would more effectively accomp-
lish the hazard reduction precedence sequence requirements 
specified in OMSF Safety Program Directive No.1, Rev. A, 
dated December 1969. 
Platforms used inside of the spacecraft during ground 
operations should be firmly secured to effect a rigid work 
sta~ion. All platform sections should incorporate bolts or 
pins to assur.e a solid attachment. 
Platforms used inside of spacecraft during ground bperations 
should incorporate debris shields (nets) around platform openings 
to catch any object which maybe dropped. Also tethers should 
be used (where possible) to prevent anyone individual from 
dropping objects. This requirement is especially applicable to 
the use of hand tools. 
Removing/lifting handling tools/alignment frames, etc. 
from spacecraft - if the crane operator is remote from the item 
being lifted, an observer shall always be near the flight 
hardware/lifting tool interface to assure all flight attaching 
bolts are removed and the handling device is clear and free 
prior to effecting the lift. 
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7. TESTING PROGRAM 
7. I TEST REQUI HEMENTS 
7.1.1 Tntroduction 
The purpose of this sect ion of the documen"t is to present 
the planning and definition of the total systems test ncceptance 
program for the Sky lab MDA. lncluded will be a discussion of 
the systems test requirements definition and associated soutce 
documentation, an overview of systems acceptance test implementa-
tion by formal procedures, a review of test requirements comple-
tion and oVer,all verificatio,n by test compliance matrices, and a 
presentatio~ of the techniques used for definition and control 
of special engineering tests. 
7.1.2 Systems Test Requirements Definition 
7.1.2.1 Approach 
The basic approach for defining the MDA Flight Article 
SystemS-Level ATP ~asthe bUilding-block technique. Starting at 
Denver, this method employed the following: 
• Verificalion that component level atceptance tests were 
complete prior to component installation on the MDA. 
• Verifieation that component qualification was complete 
at time of c;:omponentinstalla ti on on the MDA or would be 
completed prior to conclusion of KSC prelaunch testing. 
• On-board MDA verif:i cation of coulponent power and function-
al interfaces and performance. 
• Subsystem and system level per~ormance verification for 
the MDA systems only using CSM and AM simulators. 
This te.sting was followed at St. Louis by mated AM/MDA testing 
where individual system pe.rformance was verified by power across 
the AM/MDA interface from the AM, simulated flight testing in-
cluding EMC moni,toring with all systems performing in accordance 
with a simulated orbital timeline, and selected MDA system per-
formance during altitude chamber run's at simulated altitude. 
These te!3ts inclUded an unmanned outgassing test for toxicity 
determination and unmanned and maimed tests at altitude for sys-
tems performance and crew interface testing. Testing at KSC 
"continued the building block approach. In the O&C, the AM/MDA 
7-1 ' 
'E 
t' 
systems were functionally verified with experiments a\,\.1 inter-
facing modules. A docking test was performed by physically 
mating the AM/MDA to the CSM. This test functionally verified 
the AM/MDA-CSM electrical and mechanical interfaces and the 
operation and compatibility of the vehicles dutlng a mission 
simulation. __ "Further intermodule testing was performed with the 
DA prior to transporting the AM/MDA to the VAB. 
In the VAB, the AM/MDA was tested in overall cluster end-to-
end systems and experiment verification. The SWS was also veri-
fied to be compatible with the launch vehicle. 
7.1.2.2 Test Requirements Definition 
Test requirements for the MDA Flight and Backup Articles 
wer~ identified in four Test Checkout Requirements and Specifi-
catiOrlB Documents (TCRSDs). Discussion of the preparation and 
use of these documents in the total test program follows. 
A. Denver and St. Louis Test Requirements - Formal MDA 
Systems Acceptance Test Requirements for Denver and St. Louis 
activities were defined in two documents for the Flight and Back-
up Articles: MDA Systems Test and Checkout Requirements (STACR), 
ED-2002-2020, and ED-2002-2032 respectively. These STACR docu-
ments identified the tests to be satisfied as defined in the 
acceptance test procedures with subsequent Martin Marietta and 
customer Quality Department acceptance. In addition to the 
Denver and St. Louis formal requirements, the documents also con-
tained sections for KSC requirements as a guide. KSC test re-
quirements will be discussed in 7.1.2.2.B. 
Contents of the Flight Article STACR included: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Scope of document. 
Applicable Documents. 
Overall Test Program description including program objec-
tives and test descriptions, documentation control, test 
crew training and certificatior requirements, and spe-
cific MDA test policy rules. 
Identification ,of test locations for satisfying the test 
requirements to the subsystem test level. 
Subsystem, system, and multi-module test descriptions. 
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• Specific test requirements with criteria and specifica-
tions, considerations and constraints, and reference 
documents identification. 
• Appendices including: 
Measurements identification 
Ground test limHations for critical and limited life 
components 
Inflight Maintenance Spares Test Requirements 
Detailed success criteria for experiments and sub-
systems and EMC testing 
The Backup Article STACR was similar to the Flight Article 
STACR except for changes to the test program per contract direc-
tion, test location format identification simplification, and 
deletion of EMC testing (EMC tests are normally performed only 
on the first of a series of articles). 
Sources of test requirements and their relationship with 
the STACR documents are identified in Figure 7.1-1. A.brief 
description of these relationships follows: 
• Cluster Requirements Specification (RS003M00003) - identi-
fied overall Skylab Cluster requirements and those im-
posed on the MDA were detailed in the MDA Contract End 
Item Specification. 
• MDA Contract End Item Specification (CP1l4Al000026) -
identified perform~nce, design, test, and qualification 
specifications of the MDA. Section 4 of the document 
presented the verification method of satisfying each of 
the specifications whether by test (development, qualifi-
cation or systems level acceptance) or assessment (simi-
larity, analysis, inspection or validation of records). 
Systems level acceptance tests resulting from the CEI 
were defined in the STACR documents. 
• MDA General Test Plan, Volume I (ED-2002-l005) - top 
level test plan which identified overall program tests 
on a general basis including those for the Flight and 
Backup Articles, the various development articles (One-G 
Trainer, Neutral Buoyancy Article, Static and Dynamic 
StructuFal Test Articles, etc.) and other development 
tests.'p. 
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• Interface Control Drawings (ICDs) - all ICDs and their 
associated changes were reviewed and test requirements 
resulting therefrom were inc luded in the STACRs" 
• Experiment Integration Test ReLluirements and Specifica-
tion Document (TM-014-00l-2H.) - MDA associated experi-
ments test requirements from this document were included 
in the STACRs. 
• Engineering Inputs - engineering drawings were reviewed 
for test requirements and these as well as Product 
Integrity Engineer inputs were included in the STACRs. 
• MDA System Electromagnetic Control Plan (ED-2002-2025) -
specific requirements of this document relating to the 
MDA Flight Article EMC tests were included in the STACR. 
• Test Practices and Polici~s - these were included in the 
STACRs based on historically proven te,st techniques as 
well as those resulting from applicable portions of the 
MDA Safety Plan (ED-2002-l008) and the MDA Quality Pro-
gram Plan (ED-2002-l003). 
• Critical and Limited Life Component Drawing (82051000010) -
This drawing was reviewed as part of the test program 
definition. to ensure allowable ground test component 
cycles and times were not exceeded. 
Change control of the STACR documents was performed by 
initially establishing the Denver and St. Louis section of each 
document as a baseline prior to start of tests at these locations. 
Changes subsequent to base lining were implemented by preparation, 
in-house, of an Engineering Design Change Summary (EDCS), sub-
mittal of a Preliminary Change Notice (PCN) to the customer, and 
following approval of the PCN by issuance of a STACR Change 
Notice (CN) . 
.E. KSC Test Requirements - Test requirements for the MDA 
at KSC were defined in two TCRSD's as identified in Figure 7.1-2. 
• 
• 
Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications and Cri-
teria at KSC for AM/MDA, .MDAC-E, MDC E0122. 
Skylab Integrated Systems TCRSD, MSFC, TM012-003-2H. 
The AM/MDA TCRSD considered the AM/MDA as one cluster module -
MDA inputs to this document used the KSC section of the Flight 
7-5 
TEST REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT I 
MMC 
SYSTEMS TEST & 
CHECKOUT 
REQUIREMENTS 
WCUMENT (STACR 
ED-2002-2020 FL~ 
ED-2002-2032 BU 
I 
I 
I 
, GUIDELINES 
FLIGHT ARTICLE ONLY 
I 
I 
I 
1--' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
L_ 
. 
MDAC-E 
~AND CHECK-
OUT REQUIREMENT 
SPEIliFICATIONS 
AND CRITERIA Nr 
1{SC FOR AM/MDA 
MDC EOl22 
MSFC 
SKYLAB INTEGRA-
TED SYSTEMS TE 
CHECKOUT REQUlt<q:~_--i'" 
, MENTS AND SPEC-
IFICNrIONS 
TM012-003-2H 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I TESTS IMPLEMENTED BY 
MMC 
OPERATIONAL 
CHECKOUT 
PROCEDURES 
(OCPs) 
MMC 
OPERATIONAL 
CHECKOUT 
PROCEDURES 
(MDA ONLY) 
MDAC-E 
SERVICE ENGR. 
DEPT. REPORTS 
(SEDRs) 
(COMBINED AM/MDA 
KSC 
TEST AND CHECK 
OUT PLAN 1---_ ... 
(TCOP) 
TESTING) . 
KSC 
TEST AND CHECK-. 
OUT PROCEDURES 
(TCPs) 
-'-- -
Figure 7.1-2 MDA Test Requirements Implementation Tree 
LOCATION 
T 
DENVER 
ST. LOUIS 
KSC 
Article STACR as a guide plus analysis of the total KSC program 
for other inputs. The Integrated TCRSD addressed multi-module 
testing and MDA test requirements were provided as direct inputs. 
Change control for both of these documents involved initial 
establishment of baselines with subsequent changes provided by 
preparation of preliminary Test Change Notices (TCN's) submitted 
to the KSC Test Control Board and issuance of approved TCNs 
after approval. 
7.1.3 Test Implementation 
All systems-level acceptance test requirements at all MDA 
test locations were performed in accordance with formal, approved 
test procedures. The names (and format) of these procedures were 
different based on sta~dard usage for tests performed at Denver, 
St. . Louis, or KSC. Figure 7.1-2 identifies the various procedures 
used on the program. The test locations and procedure types were 
as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
Denver - MarUn Marietta prep,ared Operational Checkout 
Procedures (OCPs) 
St. Louis - MDA only testing (OCPs). Combined AM/MDA' 
testing - MDAC-E pr\~pared Service Engineering Department 
Repo~ts (SEDRs). 
KSC - KSC Contract'or prepared and NASA/KSC approved Test· 
and Checkout Procedures (TCPs). The top level document 
which specified the procedure in which each of the TCRSD 
test requirement.s would be satisfied was the KSC Test 
and Checkout Ptan (TCOP). 
Formal procedure change control was used for each type of 
procedure and conformed to the standard practice of the issuing 
organization. 
7.1.4 Test Comp1iahce Verification 
All procedures were performed with Martin Marietta and 
respective NASA center Quality Department surveillance and veri-
fication. To 'provide test program control and visibility, sum-
maries of test completion compliance with the applicable TCRSD 
requirements were prepared in the form of compliance matrices 
for the MDA articles. These were: 
A. Flight Article Compliance MaLrices -
• Denver, STACR/OCP Compliance Matrix 
~ St. Louis, STACR/OCP/SEDR Test Requirements Compliance 
Matrix 
" KSC, 1) MDA Open/Deferred Work Compliance Matrix, 
2) E0122 Matrix, and 3) MDA/Integrated TCRSD TM-012-
003-2H Compliance Matrix 
B. Backup Article Compliance Matrices -
G Denver, Backup Article STACR/OCP Compliance Matrix 
~ St. Louis - STACR/OCP/SEDR Compliance Matrix 
These matrices identified the TCRSD test requirement title, 
paragraph number, and the applicable acceptance test procedure 
sequence which satisfied the requirement. 
For those cases where a test requirement could not be satis-
fied as a result of hardware shortage, schedule considerations, 
etc., the compliance matrix identified the particular Deviation 
Approval Request (DAR) which dispositioned the test requirement. 
Prior to Flight Article Testing at KSC, a summary document was 
prepared which identified all .open work and tests remaining from 
the St. Louis test program. This document was "ED-2002-204S 
Rev.S, MDAPlanned Work at KSC." By these means, total test pro-
gram'control was provided to ensure completion of all tests prior 
to launch. 
7.1. S Special Engineering Tests 
Special non-acceptance type t~sts were performed to provide 
data for resolution of various hardware problems. These tests 
were defined, including test requirements and associated pro-
cedural steps, in MDA program management approved "Engineering 
Test Orders (ETOs)." Various bench tests as well as tests on 
the Flight and Backup articles were pet:formed at Denver and 
St. Louis (ETOs were not required at KSC). These ETOs were 
generally prepared in Denver but a special fast response loop 
was also established for Martin Marietta prepared ETOs at 
St. Louis to be performed on the Backup Article in sURPort of 
the Sltylab mission. In all cases, ETOs were pre.p!'Ieed in accord-
ance with proven test practices and performed with QlJality 
Department surveillance. Data obtained from the tests was 
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provided to the appropriate design sections for analysis. 
7.1.6 Systems Test Procedures 
7.1.6.1 Introduction 
The previous portions of this section identified the estab-
lishment of test requirements and their relationships to the 
implementing test procedures through final compliance. This 
section defines in detail the operation and implementation of 
the MDA Acceptance Test and KSC Systems Test Procedures that 
directed MDA testing at Denver, St. Louis, and KSC. Discussion 
of SEDR preparation at St. Louis is not included. 
7.1.6 .. 2 Denver and St. Louis Operational Checkout Procedures 
A. OCP Form and Format - A new procedure form and format, 
referred to as Operational Checkout Procedure (OCP) was created 
for the MDA test program. Source information for this document 
consisted of the "Apollo Documentation Procedure No. 2 - Standard 
for the Preparation of OCP, MSC, April 1965." Selected portions 
of the OCP were derived from the Systems Assembly and Test Oper-
ating Manual TOM-2/l, "Manufacturing Test Engineering Convention-
al Test Procedures Implementing Instructions Manua1." A new 
section devoted to MDA Operational Checkout Procedures (TOM 2-2) 
was added to the Operiating Manual for MDA applications. 
B. Draft Copy - The test engineer responsible for any 
givenOCP, utilized the STACR, appropriate system schematics, 
MDA wiring lists, vendor drawings where applicable, information 
obtained from the PIE and information obtained from the customer 
to prepare the draft copy of the OCP. The final draft was re-
viewed with the lead test engineer, and the PIE prior to typing. 
The typewritten copy was checked for accuracy and turned over to 
the Test Support group for limited reproduction. These copies 
were used for the in-house approval signatures. 
C. OCP Approval Loop- OCP approval activity was a two-
stage function. The first stage consisted of the MMC departmen-
tal approvals. This group consiRted of the lead test engineer, 
the responsible engineer (usually the PIE), the quality engineer, 
and the safety engineer. Copies of the OCP were given to each 
individual for their review. Comments and criticisms were red-
lined in these copies, coordinated with the other departments in 
the event of conflict, and all changes were made in the master 
copy. Signatures of the depa.rtmental representatives were then 
obts'ined. The approved master copy was then sent to Test Support 
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for customer reproduction and copies were forwarded to MSFC. 
Customer conunents were worked off in a meeting with their repre-
sentatives and the appropriate signature obtained after any 
necessary changes had been incorporated in the master copy. The 
customer approved master copy was then submitted to the Test Sup-
port group for release, reproduction and distribution of the 
fully approved OCP. 
D. Performance and Validation - Procedure performance was 
accomplished in a slightly different manner for OCPs as compared 
with a conventional test procedure. A pre-test meeting was con-
vened prior to the scheduled test start date. The attendees 
consisted of the customer's representative(s), quality, engineer-
ing (PIE), safety, manufacturing, test conductor, test engineer, 
and AFPRO (Denver). The purpose of this meeting was to verify 
vehicle configuration compatible with test requirements, presence 
of all required test equipment and calibration requirements sat-
isfied, procedure status compatible with latest enginaering and 
STACR change level, and availability of all personnel required 
to perform, witness and sign-off for acceptance. Upon agreement 
of the att~ndees that all requirements had been satisfied, a 
Certificate of Readiness to Test (CORT) was issued. This docu-
ment was a prerequisite to the start of any test operations. 
During the performance of the test, red lined changes were 
made to the procedure as required. FollOWing completion of the 
operation, the redlines were incorporated by a validation Proce-
dure Change Notice (PCN). The master copy of the OCP was signed 
off for validation by the same departments that approved the 
original issue. 
Information from the released OCPs was utilized for input 
into an automated configuration control system. This in "orma-' 
tiotl consisted of specification and/or drawing release leve ls in 
effect at the time of procedure release. With this system, a 
change to the requirements document precipitated a series of 
events which required action by the responsible test engineering 
(procedure preparation) group. When a Drawing Change Notice (DCN) 
was released into the MMC system, the computer automatically 
searched for any related procedure(s) affected by the drawing 
change. This search resulted in an open item tab run which was 
required to be investigated by the responsible test engineer. 
After receipt of the open item, the test engineer reviewed the 
drawing change for procedure impact: If procedural changes were 
required, a Procedure Change Notice (PCN) was prepared and the 
item was cleared. If no change was in order, then the engineer 
cleared the item by a no action (NA) ·input to the automated system. 
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7.1.6.3 KSC Test Procedures 
A. Test Procedure Types - Martin Marietta inputs for KSC 
Test and Checkout Procedures (TCPs) were derived from TCRSD and 
TCOP requirements as previously ct.iscussed. These consisted of 
four established types of TCPs: 
'-
e Type A - A TCP which combined two or more flight 
hardware or GSE system tests or integrated an AM/MDA 
,System Test. 
• Type B - A TCP which tested a single MDA Flight or 
GSE System or a standard operating procedure for 
these systems. 
• Type C -
(1) A TCP which supplied specific information to de-
fine MDA and GSE electrical interface connec-
tions. 
(2) A TCP designed to provide test set··up informa-
tion for GSE in a test area to establish a stand-
ard pre-test configuration. 
(3) A TCP designed to provide detailed steps for the 
moving and hoisting of major pieces of flight 
hardware. 
(4) A TCP designed to accomplish receiving and shake-
down inspection. 
(5) A TCP whose prime purpose was the assembly of 
flight hardware. 
o ' Type D - A TCP covering the laboratory operation of 
GSE. 
B. TCP Preparatidn 
(1) AM/MDA TCP Prepa~ation - MDAC prepared and released 
all AM./MDA Integrated TCPs. MMC prepared and/or 
coordinated MlJ~o\ inputs to AM./MDA p.!:acedures for 
submittal tc! MDAC. Connnent>e .l'md changes were co-
ordin'~ted f.ihd resolved between MDAC and MMC prior 
to incorporation into the integrated TCP. The MMC 
,1 
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systems engineer signed the TCP. 
(2) MDA Experiments (On-Module) TCP Preparation - MMC 
prepared and coordinated inputs for MDA installed 
experiments with ~mAC engineering. These inputs 
were provided to MDAC for incorporation as written. 
MDAC change of the MMC input required prior approv-
al from MMC. The MMC Lead Experiment Engineer 
approved the TCP. 
(3) MDA Experiments (Off-Module) TCP Preparation - MMC 
prepared and released all TCPs for MDA experiments 
for off-module testing. 
(4) 
(5) 
Experiments Installation and Removal TCP Prepara-
tion - MMC prepared and coordinated inputs for in-
stallation and removal of experiments mounted on 
or in the MDA with MDAC. These inputs were incor-
porated as written and were not changed without 
prior approval from the MMC Lead Experiments Engi-
neer. 
TCP Change Control - TCP changes were accomplished 
by a means of a Procedure Change Request (PCR). 
PCRs originated by MMC were approved by KSC ele-
ments. MMC, as the originator, was responsible 
for determining the impact, if any, on other o~gan­
izations and performed the necessary coordination. 
7.2 COMPONENT TESTING 
7.2.1 Introduction 
The MDA component test program was established and defined 
by ED2002-l005, MDA General Test Plan, Volume II, Component Qual-
ification Plan. This plan defined the requirements for qualifi-
cation by test for all Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) com-
ponents and a system for review of te~t results for all MDA 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) components. The MDA sub-
systems that required component qualification testing were Instru-
mentations, Structure, Environmental Control and ELectrical. All 
components in these subsy~;tems were investigated to determine 
which could be verified by similarity and those requiring test to 
meet overall program performance and environmental requirements. 
The qualification test plan did incorporate the environmental 
technical requirements necessary to accomplish a complet;e quali-
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fication (development, acceptance and qualification) program. 
Each tested component and its individual qualification test pro-
gram is described within the Program Plan and a summary matrix of 
those individual programs is shown on Figure 7.2-1 herein. 
7.2.2 CFE Component Test 
The MDA component test program consisted of three (3) phases 
that were integrated to meet the rigid component requirements of 
the Sky1ab mission. These three phases were development, accept-
ance and qualification testing. The environmental criteria re-
quired for these three test programs was derived from the Cluster 
Requirements Specification (RS003M00003) and tpe Vibration, Acous-
tics and Shock Specification for Components on Sky1ab (IN-ASTN-
AD-70-1) • 
7.2.2.1 Development Testing 
Development testing was defined in the individual component 
specifications. These test programs and specifications were 
reviewed and approved by the MDA Test Integration organization 
in order to provide consistent test philosophy with the qualifi-
cation requirements. All components that required testing were 
tested at full qualification levels. The test programs were con-
ducted on an informal basis. This approach provided the flexi-
bility necessary for a cost effective engineering development 
program. This component development approach met all program 
constraints and was completed in a time span that assured a well 
run qualification program. 
7.2.2.2 Acceptance Testing 
This phase of the integrated test program was performed on 
all components as defined in the individual specifications that 
were reviewed and approved by MDA Test Integration in order to 
maintain an integrated test philOSophy. Acceptance testing con-
sisted of performance and/or environmental (temperature cycling 
and/or vibration) tests that would verify and give assurance of 
the components integrity and flight worthiness. Performance 
tests were conducted at nominal flight requirements and environ-
mental tests at the predicted flight level requirements. Detail, 
test definition and control was provided by the individual Accept-' 
ance Test Procedure (ATP). ATP's were prepared for each compo-
nent requiring test and these procedures written by the vendor or 
MMC·test operations. These test procedures were then reviewed 
and approved by the Product Integrity Engineer (PIE) and Quality 
Control. ~11 ATP testing on flight hardware was conducted with 
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LIGlIT SWITCH ASSEMBLY-INTERlDR M ... ... ... ... ... A ...... .1 ... 
POWER DISTRIBUTOR ASSEMBLY (9000) M ... ... ... ... A ...... ... 
VIOEO SWITCH V ... ... ... ... ... ... A ... ... 
GAGE ASSEHBLY-PIiEUMATIC V ...... ...... ... A'" ...... 
ECS flEX OUCT V ... ... ... ... ...... ......... 
FAIl DIFfUSCR H A ... ... ... 
FLEX LINE (ATH C&O CONSOLE) V ... ...... ...... 
MUFFLER ASSEMBLY-OUTLET M A ...... ... ... ... A ... 
HUfFLER ASSEMDLY-INLET H ... ...... ...... A ... ... 
T.V. INPUT STATION H A ... ... ... J. ... ...... J. ... ... ...... 
TRAilSDUCER. PRESSURE, ABSOLUTE V ... ... ... J. ...... 
TRAilSDUCER, TENPERATURE, SURFACE V ... ... ... ... ... ...... 
SIGNAL CONDITIONER ASSEMBLY H A ... A ...... ... 
CONNECTOR, ELEC. HERMETIC FEED THRU M ... A J. ......... 
CONNECTOR, ELEC, CIRCULAR, SCREW TYPE COUP. M ... ... ... ...... 
CONNECTOR, ELECTRICAL, ZERO-G M ... ... ... ......... 
CONNECTOR, ELEC, CIRCULAR, SCREW TYPE M ... ... ...... 
CDtINECTOR, COAXIAL, FEEDT!lRU H J. ... ... ... ... 
HEATER SYSTEM DOCKING TUNNEL V ... ...... ... ... ...... ... 
HIGH POWER ACCESSORY OUTLET ASSY H J. 
THERMOSTAT ASSEMBLY V ... ... ...... A ... ... ...... ... 
OUTLET BOX ASSEMBLY M J. ... ... ... A ... ... A 
WINDOW ASSEMBLY V ... ... ... ......... ... ...... A ... ... ... ...... ...... ...... ... ... ... 
COIiNECTOR, COAXIAL, RF (N SERIES) H A ... ... ...... 
SPEAKER, IfITERCOM VIBI\ISOLATION SYS M ... ... ...... 
FILTER ASSEMBLY M ...... ...... ... ... ... ...... 
BELLOWS, VEilT LIIIE V A'" ......... ...... 
MAli. OP VACUUM SHUT-OFF VALVE ASSY M ... ... ... ... ...... ... ...... ...... ... 
SAFETY SHIELO, 5190 WINDOW M "'A ...... 
INSTL SUPPORT F1TTIIIG IR SPECTROMETER H ... ....... ... ... 
INSTL 10-BAilO SCAIlIIER WIJIDOW & SEALS H ... ......... ... ... 
COOLANT VALVE, MANU,L, 4 PORT SELECTOR V ... ......... ... ... ... ... ... 
MOA PRESSURE HATC~ & SEAL M ... A ...... ... ... A ... ... 
WINDOW COVER I<ECHANISM M ... ... A ... ... A 
FLEXIBLE COOLAilT LINE (EREP) V ... ...... ...... ... ...... AA ... 
HEATER CONTROLLER & CABLE V ... ... ... ... A ...... ... ... ... 
POWER DISTRIBUTOR ASSY (9100) M ... A 
EREP TR COOLAilT SELECTOR VALVE V ... ... ... ... ... S· ST.LOUIS TEST 
L-BAilO TRU.SS ELEMENT M ... li'MSFC TEST 
PAilEL TESTS H ...... 
INSULATION (BASIC) H A ...... H· tiMe 
MATERIALS M ... 
(IN HOUSE) 
TEST 
ArM C&O COOLAilT LOOP S ... V • VENDOR TEST 
INSULATION BLANKET H ... ... ... 
Figure 7.2-1 Test Requirements Matrix 
approved test procedures and 100% Quality Control test surveil-
lance; this type of control was required for both MMC (in-house) 
and vendor (off-site) testing. 
7.2.2.3 Qualification Testing 
The qualification test program was conducted in accordance 
with the contractual program plan ED-2002-l005, Volume II. This 
testing was performed on flight type hardware to formally demon-
strate that the developed design would perform according to spec-
ification under conditions that simulated the most severe mission 
conditions predicted plus a margin. All qualification test units 
were subjected to and successfully passed all performance/environ-
mental acceptance test requirements prior to entering the quali-
fication test program. 
This test program was conducted in accordance with approved 
test procedures that implemented the Qualification plan. Once 
the test began, MDA Test Integration and NASA personnel provided 
100% surveillance for all performance and environmental testing. 
Figure 7.2-2 depicts the Qualification Test Program Sequence and 
Figure 7.2-3 depicts the overall Qualification Test Span times. 
The MSFC MBA Program Office had final approval on test procedures, 
test reports and Qualification Test Summary Sheets (QTSS). 
Qualification certification was required on all CFE compo-
nents. This certification was accomplished by submitting a'QTSS 
for customer approval. The QTSS was the final requirement of 
the program and contained the following information: 
• Component name, component number, mounting locations, 
specimen serial numbers, subsystem, vendor/manufacturer, 
test laboratory and data report number. Qualification 
summary sheet serial number, date, program deSignation, 
and appropriate approval blocks. 
• Component usage/functional summary. 
• List of applicable tests. 
• Test conducted per specification (statement) 
• Brief description of problems including failure analysis 
and failure report numbers. 
A minimum of two test units were subjected to the complete quali-
fication program (all performance and environmental tests) with 
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Qualification 
Test Plan 
NASA Review 
and Approval 
MMC Review 
and Approval 
Requirements 
Imposed in the 
Component Spec 
Specification 
released for 
MMC Build 
Specification 
released for 
vendor build 
Test Report 
written 
and released 
MMC wri te and 
submit QTSS 
wit proved 
Figure 7.2-2 Qualification Test Program Sequence 
COMPONENTS QUALIFIED BY SIMILIARlTY OR TEST 
Test Procedure 
Written 
and Released 
NASA final 
approval 
TEST 'RASING 
SYSTEM QUALIFIED BY DELTA COMPLETE 1970 1971 1972 1973 SIMlLIARlTY QUALIFICATION RUALIFICATION 
Environmental Control 
Subsystem 9 
Electrical Subsystem 2 6 7 
Instrumentation 
Subsystem 2 2 
Structural 
-• 
Subsystem 1 6 
NOTE: There are 35 CFE Components; two by Similiarity, nine by Partial 
(Delta) Qualification Testing and twenty-four by Full Qualification 
Testing before delivery to Contractor. 
Figure 7.2-3 Component/Subassembly Qualification 
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the exception of very large units, i.e., S190 Window Assembly. 
Where only one test unit was utilized, the test program was sub-
jected to the same program constraints, however, in all programs, 
destructive testing was conducted at the end of the test sequence. 
The qualification program consisted of Vendor (subcontractor) and 
MMC built and tested hardware. Test locations did not influence 
the way in which the programs were managed, all program rigors 
were invoked on both types of hardware. 
7.2.3 Government Furnished Eguipment (GFE) Testing 
The MDA GFE component test program was conducted and con-
trolled by the responsible NASA organization, i.e., S&E Qualifi-
cation Laboratory and the S&E-ASTN Laboratory at MSFC Huntsville. 
All program environmental criteria and design requirements were 
imposed by these same organizations in order to maintain one 
overall Skylab test philosophy. The GFP component tests were 
monitored by each individual Martin Marietta PIE through his 
counterpart engineer in the MSFC laboratories at Huntsville, 
Alabama. Although no formal control or review system was set up, 
MMC d1.d maintain cognizance over the design and test of the MDA 
GFE components. 
Ml~C received a Certificate of Component Qualification on all 
MDA Experiments and functional type components for review and 
retention. These certification sheets gave complete historical 
data on all aspects of the hardware test program. 
7.2.4 Component Documentation/Test Program Flow (Seguencel 
All performance tests were conducted in accordance with the 
component test procedure that implemented the test requirements 
of its detail design specification. Environmental tests were de-
rived from the Qualification Plan and the EMI Plan. All testing 
in the component specifications was supplemented by the M-67-45 
Test Methods and Control Document. Figure 7.2-4 depicts the MDA 
Component Test Documentation/Test Program Sequence Flow. 
7.2.5 Summary 
The Martin Marietta Corporation conducted an efficient and 
effective CFE Component Qualification Test Program. 
This program was completed as schepuled and was not a con-
straint to the flight program., i r - >~~: 
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Test Methods 
and Control l----__ ~ 
Test Plannin~9-__________ ~~ 
~ Requirements 
, 
,.L.. ___ ~ 
[ Test and 
I ,Assessment 
L Document 
MDA SOW & 
CEl 
MDA Plan 
Qualification!-- ...... 
Test .................. , .................... 
-.--------. 
Figure 7.2-4 Test Documentation/Test Program Sequence 
7-18 
'" r 
r 
~ 
~ !: 
}1 
All component failures, refurbishment and/or replacements 
that occurred during the duration of the test program are docu-
mented in the respective system design sections of this document. 
(Ref. para. 2.2) 
7.3 OFF MODULE TESTING 
7.3.1 Introduction 
This section discusses several major EREP tests performed 
off module or tests performed in support of module testing. 
7.3.2 Pre-Installation Tests - Denver 
7.3.2.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this 'section is to describe Pre-Installation 
Testing (PIT) performed prior to on-module testing at Denver. 
7.3.2.2 Scope 
The Denver PIT test program consisted of the follOWing test 
segments: 
• Verification of the S190 experiment operation and inter-
faces using a S190 Electrical. Test Set (ETS). 
• Verification of the 8192 experiment operation and inter-
faces. 
• Verification of the S193 experiment operation and inter-
faces and the ETS required for experiment checkout and 
on-module operation. 
7.3.2.3 8unnnary 
• S190 operation was verified. A malfunction. light prob-
lem was eventually traced to an ET8 failure. 
• Proper S192 operation could not be obtained,. 
, 
• Lack of hardware familiarity and hardware problems were 
encountered during the 8193 PIT. Correct gimbal inter-
face voltages could not be obtained with the C&D Panel 
uncla~p'ed and power surges were noted on the power bus. 
Operating procedures were a prob~em due to complexity of 
the ETS and S193 operation. 
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7.3.2.4 Conclusions 
The PIT testing uncovered many problems with S192 and S193 
that would have greatly encumbered on-module testing. Problems 
with these experiments did continue on-module but the operating 
procedures were enhanced by haVing operated on the bench. 
7.3.3 EREP Integrated Systems Bench Test - St. Louis 
7.3.3.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this section is to describe the EREP Bench 
Test Program where the on-module testing was performed on a bench. 
It includes the test operations and problems which were encoun-
tered and resolved or dispositioned during the testing at MDAC-E, 
Building 66. The test Data Analysis Report EREP Systems Bench 
Test MSC-03l73 covers the evaluation of the processed data. 
7.3.:3.2 Scope 
The St. Louis EREP Integrated Systems Bench Test Program 
consisted of the following test segments: 
• Initial Experiment Support System checkout of the 
bench I:.est hardware, at MDAC-E, Building 66, consisting 
of the development Control and Display Panel, the develop-
ment Tape Recorder (T/R), Interface Functional Test Units 
(IFTU's) for the S192/Sl93 Experiments and flight con-
figured development cabling for the IFTU's power, con-
trol, and timing interfaces. 
• Verification of the S193 Flight Hardware operations 
during standby modes, warm up and interlock checks with 
the .Experiment SUPI?ort Equipment (ESE). 
• Checkout of the ESE bench test hardware consisting of 
the flight hardware for the C&D Panel, T/R, S192 IFTU 
and flight configured development cabling for all EREP 
sensors. 
• S193 Functional Interface Verification (FIV) Test with 
C&D Panel, T/R, and flight hardware. 
• S192 FIV Test with C&D Panel, T/R, and flight hardware. 
• Systems Functional Interface Verification (SFIV) Test 
with all Sensor and ESE fligbt hardware. 
7-20 
.."",,1 
~~ 
" F 
In addition, the test tooling and IFTU's were assembled and 
tested in the engineering laboratory at MMC-Denver and Building 
103 at MDAC-E, to verify the configuration prior to interfacing 
with the flight hardware. This testing was conducted in accord-
ance with the Skylab Program EREP Support Equipment Field Sup-
port Test procedure, MSC-031S0. 
7.3.3.3 Summary 
As a result of the detailed evaluation of the EREP T/R data 
from the St. Louis testing, most of the EREP/MDA interfaces were 
verified. Additionally, several EREP problems were corrected 
and EREP was compatible a8 a system within limits imposed by the 
test hardwar~ configuration. Although system performance was of 
primary concern, the results of the evaluation related to indi-
vidual experiment performance. 
Problems encountered during the performance of the testing 
at MDAC-E created numerous procedure deviations and Anomaly 
Reports (AR's). The ARs, which identified flight hardware and/ 
or test tooling discrepancies, resulted in Martin Automatic Re-
porting System (MARS) being written for the rejection of the 
item and subsequent corrective action. These items are tabu-
lated on Table 7.3-1 along with their final status. 
7.3.3.4 Conclusions 
The EREP Bench Test Program verified the compatibility of 
the EREP Sensors Flight Hardware and ESE when operated independ-
ently or simultaneously. Satisfactory disposition or corrective 
action was completed on all ARs prior to the disassembly of the 
test configuration. The Procedure Deviations were incorporated 
into the official test procedures and the information they con-
tained was utilized to correct later test procedures for on-
module testing 
7.3.3.5 Documents 
The follOWing documents were utilized in the conduct of the 
MDAC-E, Building 66, EREP Bench Test Program: 
• OMT-OCP-S-30036 
I 
e OMT-OCP-S-20032 
• OMT~OCP-S-30046 
EREP Support Equipment Field Support 
Test Procedure 
OMT-S193 Off Module Test Procedure 
I 
EREP Support Equipment Bench Functional 
Interface Verification 
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1. EREP Support Equipment Field Support Test - OMT-OCP-S-30036 
Anomaly Reference Impact Status 
a. No significant anomalies occurred during this test. 
2. S193 Interlock Verification (Mini-Bench) O}IT-OCP-S-30032 
Anomaly Reference Impact Status 
a. C&D Countdown B880n Test tool change Closed 
readout intermittent only 
b. RCVR .MALF 1 ;gh t did B88115 S193 experiment Closed - after 
not come on as rejected. Okay to next successful test 
required test. 
3. EREP Support Equipment Bench Functional Interface Verification - OMT-OCP-S-30046 
-...J Anomaly, Reference Impact , Status 
'" N No data on track B88082 Test tool-change a. Closed 
24 of data tape only 
b. GMt error at B88l86 Troubleshoot C&D and Closed 
20:00:00 and Timing Station 
19:57:40 
c. Lack "of contin~ity B88080 Test tool cable change Closed" 
in the Tape Recorder only 
Load Box 
d. Tape Remaining B88083 Reject T/R Closed 
indicator reading 
incorrectly 
Table 7.3-1 EREP Bench Test Anomaly Summary (St. Louis) 
-.~~ ~- --'-" > . __."', ___ I _ 
4. S193 Functional Interface Verification OMT-OCP-S-30042 
i 
-I 
Anomaly 
a. RCVR MALF light did not 
come on as required 
b. Transmitter overheat 
on C&D Panel lighted. 
c. The Pitch and Roll 
Gimbal angle monitor 
meters on C&D didn't 
indicate the commanded 
Xadir Align offset at the 
completion of programmed 
Align Mode. 
d. The lack of a return 
pulse caused the Alt. 
Ready light to go out. 
e. The Altimeter didn't 
lock-up at low power 
lev.:! 1 (-88 dbm) 
Reference 
Same as item 
2.b, MARS B88llS 
MARS B87993 
written during 
on-module FIV. 
MARS B8808S 
MARS BS8087 
MARS B88090 
Impact 
S193 experiment rejected. 
Okay to tes t. 
C&D Panel rejected. 
Nadir Align operated 
without tolerance require-· 
ment for St. Louis 
testing. 
Special procedu~~1 
sequence required to 
set up the ETS for S193 
testing. 
~mrginal operation of 
Altimeter during test. 
5. 5192 Functional Interface Verification - OMT-OCP-S-30041 
a. Intermittent loss of 
sig:lal due to damaged 
< 
cable 807W2l 
MARS B88l44 Loss of data on track 
21. .The A/B cable assem-
bly was substituted. for 
tooling cable for MDAC-E 
testing. 
Table 7.3-1 (Continued) 
Status 
Closed - next successful 
test. 
Closed 
Known discrepancy 
at G.E. to be TCO'd 
during retrofit. 
Closed:-next successful 
test. 
G.E. To resolve s193/ 
ETS compatibility 
during retrofit accep-
tance testing. Closed-
next successful test 
Closed - next successful 
test 
Closed - the tooling 
cable was reworked. 
5. S192 Functional Interface Verification - OMT-OCP-S-3004l (cont'd) 
b. Detector 3 ACC out of MARS B88084 S192 rejected - okay to 
spec. continue test. 
c. Detector 8 ACC out of MARS B88096 S192 rejected - okay to 
spec. continue test. 
6. EREP System Functional Interface Verification - OMT-OCP-S-30044 
-./ 
Anomaly 
a. AUX Drive motor connector 
broken off 
b. Tape Reel rubbing against 
Tape Recorder case 
causing capstan tension 
c. S19l Camera light didn't 
light-when camera was 
turned on. 
Reference 
MARS B88lSl 
MARS B88l52 
MARS B88lS3 
MARS B88l40 
Impact 
Repaired by splicing 
prior to continuing 
test. 
Tape Notion light 
flickered on and off 
New tape reel installed. 
The test film magazine 
was not spooled properly 
and the film jammed. No 
camera pulses were on the 
test data. 
Table 7.3-1 (Cuncluded) 
Closed during next success-
full test. 
Closed after next success-
ful test. 
Status 
Connector was 
repaired by Honeywell 
during rework. Closed 
during later test 
Closed during later test 
Closed 
• ~IT-OCP-S-30042 
G OMT-OCP-S-30044 
7.4 STRUCTURAL TESTING 
7.4.1 Introduction 
OMT-S193 Off Module Test Verification 
OMT-Sl92 Functional Interface Veri-
fication 
EREP System Bench Functional Inter-
face Verification 
The purpose of this section is to provide a synopsis of the 
MDA Structural Test Program. A more detailed description of 
this Test Program is documented in Section 2.2.1 of this report. 
7.4.2 Static Test Article 
7.4.2.1 Test Objective 
The objective of the static test program was the structural 
verification of the MDA to the critical loading conditions en-
countered in boost, flight, and docking/latching. These tests 
were also used to verify analytical techniques used to predict 
stress levels and deflections. 
7.4.2.2 Test Location 
The testing was accomplished at the Structural T£st Labora-
tory, Marshall Space Flight Center, during January &nd February, 
1971. 
7.4.2.3 Documents 
• "Test Data Evaluation (MDA)" May 1971, MMC Denver, CO., 
ED-2002-1264. 
7.4.2.4 Test Configuration 
The Static Test Article consisted of the MDA shell structure 
including docking port, window and IR Spectrometer Backup Struc-
ture. 
7.4.2.5 Test Summary 
Nine sepr~ate loading conditions were simulated. The first 
three tests vt-rified the structural integrity for local loading 
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cond:l.tions. Three package/3 were separately loaded with statical-
ly equivalent loads obtained from the vibration, acoustic and 
shock specification docume:nt (IN-ASTN-AD-70-1). The remaining 
six tests verified the integrity of the shell structure and con-
sisted of various combinations of pressure and docking loads. A 
safety factor of 1.4 was applied to design limit, ahear, moment, 
axial loads and 2.0 to pressure loads. Details of the static 
test are contained in ED-2002-l264. 
7.4.3 Dynamic Test Arti~ 
7.4.3.1 Test Ob1ec~! 
The objectives of these tests were as follows: 
® Dynamic Veri£i(!ation of the Structural Assemb; y 
~ Verification of dynamic criteria 
" Verification lof Modal response data for structural model 
~ Dynamic structural qua11~ication of flight hardware com-
ponents 
7.4.3.2 Test Location 
The testing was accomplished at the Johnson Space Center 
between September 1971 and June 1972. 
7.4.3.3 Document£ 
I!!I "Skylab Vibro(dcoust1c 'rest Program Phase II, Paylbad 
Assembly ACOUL'tics Test Summary Report," MSFC, Huntsville, 
Alabama, S&E-ASTN-ADD-72-29~ 
)'.4,,3.4 Test Configu,:cation 
l'h~ Dynamic Test Article consisted of the Static Test shell 
with Mass ,Bnd Center of Gravity simulators added for componen,M 
which weighed more than 5 lbe. 
7.4.3.5 Test Summary' 
The first phase consisted of aC~!l~t.ic,t,~,~.t~ eimulating lift-
off and boundary layer acoustic environments outSide the Payload 
Assembly. The second phase consisted of sinusoidal excitation 
simulating launch vehicle cutoff and separation transients. The 
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third phase consisted of modal survey tests to verify mathemati-
cal models for the structural configurations. 
The Payload Assembly vibroacoustic tests indicated no pri-
mary or secondary structural failures. This fact, considered in 
conjunction with the low stress levels indicated by the strain 
gages, resulted in the conclusion that the MDA structure was 
capable of sustaining the lift-off, boundary layer, and tran-
sient flight environments. 
Details of the vibroacoustic tests are contained in S&E-
ASTN-ADD-72-29. 
7.5 MODULE TESTING - DENVER 
7.5.1 Introduction 
This section is primarily ,applicable to the MDA Flight Arti-
cle with a Backup Article Summary included to present significant 
differences in their respective Test Programs •. 
A test flow, with general test description, is presented in 
the sequence in which the major teats were performed. Detailed 
test information may be found in the MDA Systems Test and Check-
out Requirements Document (ED-2002-2020). 
An overall Chronological Summary is presented in Section 2.1 
of this Document. 
There were no In-Flight Maintenance Spares tested on the MDA 
in Denver. Typical test activity for each of the OCp's consisted 
of the following major events: 
• Pre-test meeting in which a general briefing on test ac-
tivities was presented. Additionally, a Certificate of 
Readiness to Test (CORT) ~as obta~.ned. 
• Table-top review in which the test conductor and opera-
ting personnel discussed test methods and ground rules 
to be employed. 
• Test Performance. 
• Post test briefing to discuss anomaly resolution and to 
present test results. 
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7.5.2 Test Flow 
A test flow is presented in Figure 7.5-1 including test 
event and Operational Checkout Procedure (OCP) Number. 
7.5.3 Test Description 
The following section presents the test descriptions by 
major test event in sequential order as indicated on the flow 
chart (Figure 7.5-1). See Figure 7.5-2 for the test schedule. 
7.5.4 MDA Proof Pressure and Leak Test (MDA-8Jl1-LT) 
7.5.4.1 Test Ob1ective 
Verify the shell integrity by performing a proof pressure 
test and leak check on the MDA Shell after penetrations and par-
tial outfitting was performed in the factory. 
7.5.4.2 Test Location - Leak Test Facility 
7.5.4.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• MDA Systems Test and Checkout Requirements Document 
(STACR) ED-2002-2020 
7.5.4.4 Test Configuration 
The MDA was tested in the horizontal position in the MDA 
transporter. Blank off plates were used to seal the shell pene-
trations where the flight hardware was not installed. The dock-
ing port tunnels were included in the test of the pressure ves-
sel by installing sealing platesl!'t the docking interfaceS. 
7.5.4.5 Test Summary 
A proof pressure test was performed on the shell with no 
problems encountered and a visual inspection revealed no struc-
tural degradation. A leak test was performed using a detector 
solution. Leaks were noted in the docking tunnels and near a 
barrel 10ngeron; these were documented and repaired after the 
MDA was moved to the factory. 
7.5.5 MDA Electrical Systems Tests 
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7.5.5.1 Test Objectives 
These tests were designed to p'rovide a complete check of the 
MDA electrical systems. They were intended to verify electrical 
system performance to the design and acceptance criteria speci-
fied in the STACR. 
7.5.5.2 Test Location 
SSB - Hi-Bay 
7.5.5.3 Documents Used to Develop Electrical Systems OCp's 
• MDA Systems Test and Checkout Requirements Document ED-
2002-2020 
7.5.5.4 Test Configuration 
The MDA was tested in the vertical position, with work stands 
and platforms utilized. Power was supplied by an AM simulator to 
all AM/MDA electrical interface points. A CSM simulator was uti-
lized for access to CSM/MDA electrical interfaces. 
7.5.5.5 Test Summary 
The electrical systems test program consisted ofa total of 
eight OCP's. Prior to the performance of these, a complete 
wiring test was performed to verify cabling integrity. These 
tests were pe,rfOrmed utilizing a Functional Automatic Circuit 
Tester (Hughes Analyzer). The eight OCp's were performed in con-
junction with final assembly efforts which necessitated a con-
siderable "Ad Hoc" scheduling effort. A system was tested as 
installation of system hardware was completed. 
A. Ground Isolation and Power Transfer Test (MDA-OCP-D-
60001) - The purpose of this test was to verify the ground iso-
lation and the power transfer circuit operation of the MDA. 
This test was performed utilizing the AM and CSM simulators. 
Two problem areas were encountered prior to and during perform-
ance of the test. Hardware shortages dictated removal of some 
items from the ground isolation test portion of this procedure. 
These items were subsequently tested during individual systems 
performance testing. First usage of both the AM and CSM simu-
lators uncovered wiring errors in these tools. After correction 
of these tool problems, the test was performed with no flight 
hardware anomalies encountered, and all testiobjectives were 
accomplished. 
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B. Electrical System Test OMDA-OCP-D-60002) - The purpose 
of this test was to verify the operation of all internal and ex-
ternal lights, outlet assemblies, heaters and thermostats, over-
temp switches, and the S190 window heater control system. This 
test was performed utilizing the AM simulator for power and con-
trol inputs. Four problem areas (tooling, procedural, criteria 
and flight hardware) were encountered during performance of the 
test. 
(1) First usage of the MDA checkout tool for utility 
outlet tests disclosed improper load settings, 
thereby creating an excessive voltage drop. Re-
calibration of the tool was accomplished and sub-
sequent retest revealed no flight hardware anoma-
lies. 
(2) Several procedural errors were encountered, how-
ever, utilization of the validation team concept 
provided prompt action and resolution of the dif-
ficulties. 
(3) Three interior lights failed the test criteria and 
were replaced. The test disclosed excessive power 
consumption whenever lights were powered up in the 
'high' mode. Subsequent evaluation of this problem 
led to the modification of all interior lights to 
preclude fur'ther failures in this operating mode,. 
(4) The remaining problem area was concerned with 
apparent criteria violations. Utilizing the MMC 
'L'iaison Call' system, temporary specification 
changes were obtained. These changes were then 
incorporated into the STACR. 
All test objectives were met with the exception of criteria 
violations of illumination levels which were approved by Devia-
tion Approval Request (DAR) action. 
C. Instrumentation System Test O1DA-OCP-D-7000l) - The pur-
pose of this test was to verify the operation of the signal con-
ditioners, temperature transducers and pressure transducers. 
The instrumentation system was initially tested with a total of 
seven transducers not installed. Partial Retests (PRT) were per-
formed as these installations were completed. One tool wiring 
error was detected and corrected during the test. Two trans-
ducers failed to meet the test criteria and were replaced. This 
problem was later isolated to improper installation. All 
problems were corrected and retests performed with All test 
objectives nccomplished. 
D. Wall lIe{lters Thermal Test (MDA-OCP-D-60003) - 'l'he MDA 
wall heaters were tested to verify proper thermal bonding to the 
MDA. All hent:er.s except wnll henter number ] 0 pnssed origin:!1 
STACR criteria. The mounting of henter number 10 was determined 
to be different from the others and a criteria change W{lS re-
quested. The request was approved and all test objectives {Iccom-
p lished. 
E. Caution and Warning System (MDA-OCP-D-10001) - The C&W 
system test was performed to verify system operation and surveil-
lance .of the proper areas of the MDA. The test consisted of two 
complete runs with run one conducted utilizing non-flight detec-
tor units. A burned out lamp was found in the Fire sensor con-
trol panel during run 2. 'l'he test was concluded after lamp 
replacement with all test objectives accomplished. 
F. Communications Systems (MDA-OCP-D-40001).-: The communi-
clltions systems test was performed to verify speaker intercom 
performance and system cpmpatibility. During perfo~mance of the 
test, it was found that the background noise seriously affected 
cross-talk testing whenever n live microphone on either SIA was 
required. Th~ procedure was ~odified tq utilize a 1000 Hz band-
pas$ filter to eliminate the background interference. The t'est 
was successfully completed with no hardware anomalies detected. 
G. Light F,ilter Illumination Verification (MDA-OCP-D-60004)-
This test was performed with the light filters installed on the 
NDA general illumination light assemblies. Illumination levels 
were reduced by 85.7 percent, while the filter factor allowed by 
the STACR was 40 ± 10 percent. A criteria change, permitting a 
90 percent maximum reduction, was requested and approved. 
H. Television System (MDA-OCP-D-40002) - The TV system was 
tested to verify the NDA TV system performance and to evaluate 
cabling integrity (impedance and Voltage Standing Wave Ratio). 
Initially a TV input station was utilized which was later rejected 
following disapproval of a requested deviation. l'he input sta-
tion was reworked and retested to the original criteria. Severnl 
problems were encountered and corrected during first time usage 
of the TV system ground support equipment. STACR change requests 
were submitted and approved and the o:v'.erall test was concluded 
with all objectives accomplished. 
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7.5.6 MDA Mechanical Systems Tests 
7.5.6.1 Test Objectives 
. 
The mechanical systems tests were designed to provide a com-
plete check of the MDA mechanical systems. These tests verified 
mechanical system performance to design and acceptance criteria 
ss specified in the STACR. . 
7.5.6.2 Test Location 
SSB - Hi-Bay 
7.5.6.3 Documents Used to Develop Mechanical System OCp's 
• MDA Systems Test and Checkout Requirements Document 
ED-2002-2020. 
7.5.6.4 Test Configuration 
The MDA was tested in the horizontal and vertical positions 
with the appropriate work stsnds and platforms installed. 
7.5.6.5 Test Summary 
The following summarizes the various Mechanical System tests 
performed on the MDA. 
A. Insulation Purge System Test (MDA-OCP-D-20001) - The 
purpose of this test was to verify the insulation purge system 
functional operation and the fl'ow through the distribution lines. 
The only problem encountered during the performance of this test 
was in obtaining the dewpoint on the test gas p~r the MIL speci-
fication. This problem was cleared by means of a liaison call 
and the actual test operations were performed satisfactorily. 
All test objectives were accomplished. 
B. MDA Leak and Decay Test (MDA-OCP-D-50002) - The purpose 
of this test was to verify compliance of the following; pressure 
equalization valve operation, pneumatic gage assembly operation, 
vent valve plug manifold leak rate, MDA shell leak 'rate, docking 
port hatch leak rate, battery vent line and S191 window leakage 
rate. Several problems were encountered during the performance 
of this test with three of these problems identified as test 
tooling items and corrected by tool rework action and subsequent 
retests •. Leakage was found at a number of O-rings and bolt seals; 
these items were replaced and retested satisfactorily. The axial 
hatch leakage rnte was excessive Dnd investigation revenled the 
lllUnch lock "T" hand le was not fully closed. The procedure was 
modified to verify full closure and retest verified compliilnce 
with test objectives. '~e volumetric leak test system was found 
to be incapable of verifying leaks in the 10-5 SCC/SEC range. 
The procedure was changed to utilize a CEC mass spectrometer for 
these measurements and the test was successfully completed. 
C. I~nvironmental Control Dnd Vent System Test (MDA-OCP-D-
20002) - The purpose of ~lis test was to verify the operation of 
the pressure equalization valve, removal of the cabin fan ond the 
CSM port fan, fan diffuser adjustment, vent valve operation and 
vent valve le~k rate verification. The problems encountered 
during this test tnvolved methods and criteria rather than flight 
hardware malfunctions. The STACR had to be modified to revise 
fan power consumption data. The work platforms prevented a check 
of the pressure equalization valve on the radial hatch and the 
platforms were removed. The CSM port fan would not operate until a 
larger fuse was installed in the test tool. The procedure was 
modified to perform a leak decay test on the vent valves instead 
of a media collection test. All objectives were met upon the 
conclusion of the test. 
D •. MOA Mechanical Devices Functional Test (MDA-OCP-D-5000l) -
The purpOSe of this test was to verify the operation of the dock-
ing port hatch, docking target base, film vault, flight data file, 
CO 2 absorber container and the miscellaneous stowage container. 
The mechanical systems test was performed in both the horizontal 
and vertical posi tions. Problems 'were enco'untered wi th the axial 
and radial docking port hatches with regard to axial hatch ball 
detent engagement and opening force, and hinge adjustment for 
both hatches, but these were cleared by rework and retest. The 
remaining anomalies dealt with the flight data file and the film 
vault doors and these were also cleared by rework. The test was 
performed successfully and all objectives were met. 
E. S190 Window Cover Test (MOA-OCP-D-50004) - The purpose 
of this test was to verify operation of the window cover mech-
anism. One flag item was ide~tified during the performance of 
this test, i.e., the running torque of the actuator mechanism 
was out of tolerance due to detent bracket interference. The 
detent bracket was reworked and retest was satisfactorily accom-
plished. 
F. Final Insulation Purge System Test (~IDA-OCP-D-20003) -
This test was performed to verify flow through the insulation 
purge system was within specifications after the insulation 
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blankets were installed. The test was performed with no problems. 
G. MDA Final Leak Test (MDA-OCP-D-50006) - The purpose of 
this test was to verify the leak rate of the MDA following instal-
lation and test of the flight hardware. Problems encountered 
during performance of this test were confined to the axial dock-
ing port tunnel. Eight wire support bracket mounting bolts were 
replaced with new hardware and seals. All bolts in the tunnel 
were reworked using M671A sealant. The final leak test satisfied 
all test objectives. 
H. MDA Shipping Cover Leak Test (MDA-OCP-D-50003) - The 
purpose of this test was to verify the leakage rate of the ship-
ping cover. The MDA shipping cover leak test was performed with 
the MDA on the transportation fixture, and the shipping cover 
installed. No problems were encountered during the performance 
of this test. 
7.5.7 MDA Experiments 
7.5.7.1 Test Oblectiv.es 
The MDA experiment tests were designed to provide individual 
experiment installation verifications. The original test pro-
gram for Denver included the M512/M479 and all EREP hardware 
checkout. Due to hardware shortages and the receipt of nonflight 
units, acceptance tests of these units were deferred to St. Louis. 
7.5.7.2 Test Location 
SSB - Hi-Bay 
7.5.7.3 Documents Used to Develop Experiment OCP~ 
C MDA Systems Test and Checkout Requirements Document 
(ED-2002-2020) 
7.5.7.4 Test Configuration 
Experiment checkout ow'as conducte~ with the MDA in the verti-
cal position. Experiment power was provided by the AM simulator~ 
7.5.7.5 S009 Functional T4~st (MPA-OCP-D-30003>' 
The S009 test. was conducted to: verify, expf~riment per1=orm-
ance when installed within the MDA. Three problems were 'encoun-
tered during the test. ThE! experiment carrier frame was found 
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to be defective and was replaced. Two criteria violations were 
found, i.e., an out-of-tolerance reading for input impedance and 
the detector package opened at 93.17 minutes (limit was 93.1). 
STACR change requests were submitted and approved. All test 
obj~ctives were accomplished. 
7.5.7.6 Radio Noise Burst Monitor (RNBM) Functional Test (MDA-
OCP-D-3002l) 
The purpose of this test was to verify input voltage and 
RNBM functioJ:l.al operation. RNBM checkout consisted of two iden-
tical tests, one for the primary unit and one for the backup. 
Both units performed within specifi.ed values, however, SiN 002 
was determined to be performing marginally. RNBM SiN 002 was 
removed and returned to the supplier. Retest of SiN 002 was 
accomplished at St. Louis. 
7.5.7.7 Proton Spectrometer Test (MDA-OCP-D-30qOl~ 
The purpose of this test was to verify the power input, 
clock signal, temperature transducer operation and the functional 
capability of the proton spectrometer. Ground isolation failures 
were detected at the start of this test. Investigation revealed 
the ground return paths were caused by the connection of the GSE. 
The procedure was red lined to disconnect the GSE during ground 
isolation verification and reconnect after conclusion of this 
operation. PRT #1 satisfied these requirements. The clock sig-
nal interface verification requirements of 20 ± 2 VPP failed -
actual voltage measured was 5 volts peak-to-peak (VPP). Investi-
gation required a change to the STACR with respect to the volt-
age specified. A liaison call was written requesting the volt-
age be changed to 5 VPP. The L/c was approved and PCN AP to the 
STACR changed the voltage value. No retests were required. An 
out-of-tolerance voltage reading was obtained during the experi-
ment functional test. This was identified as a procedure error 
with respect to time constant of the coarse delay setting~ A 
change to 100 milliseconds on the delay factor produced the de-
sired results on PRT 112. The temperature transducer verification 
test failed to produce the required current differential foll.ow-
ing the application of dry ice to the mounting surface. Investi-
gation of this failure revealed the specified surface area was 
too small to produce a current change. The procedure was changed 
to provide a larger surface area for 'dry ice stimulation and PRT 
#3 satisfied this requirement. 
7.5.8 Crew Systems 
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7.5.8.1 Test Objectives 
The Crew Compartment Fit and Functional (C2F2) test, MDA-
OCP-D-SOOOl, was performed to verify crew to MDA compu_l~ility. 
7.5.8.2 Test Location 
SSB - Hi-Bay 
7.5.8.3 Documents Used to Develop C2F2 Systems OCp's 
o MDA Systems Test and Checkout Requirements Document 
ED-2002-2020 
7.5.8.4 Test Configuration 
The MDA was positioned in the vertical and horizontal posi-
tions for this test. The AM si~ulator was used to provide power 
for the interior general illumination lights and 'cabin fans. All 
existing flight hardware was installed or stored in the vehicle 
prior to the start of the test. 
7.5.8.5 Test Summary 
The C2F? test was originally intended to checkout the 
vehicle completely outfitted with flight hardware. Due to equip-
ment shortages and shipping delays the MDA was not in a flight 
ready configuration at the time the test was scheduled. The test 
was performed with astronaut participation and numberous flag 
items were obtained. The majority of these flags were due to non-
flight hardware items or the absence thereof. The C2F2 effort 
therefore became a continuing one with additional tests planned 
at Sto Louis and KSC. Open items generated against Denver in-
stalled flight hardware were cleared during the St. Louis and 
KSC retests. 
7.5.9 Back-up Article Test Program Summary 
All acceptance test requirements scheduled to be completed 
on the Blu MDA in Denver were successfully accomplished (see 
schedule in Figure 7.5-3) with the following exceptions: 
• Emergency Illuminaticn Verification - illumination level 
exceeded specifications 
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Figure 7.5-3 MDA Backup Article Denver Schedule 
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• S190 Window Heater Control System Verification Control 
box removed by flight article'rob'order prior to test 
• 
• 
ATM Video Signal Verification - Frequency response at 
4 MHz exceeded specifications 
C02 Container Verification - GFP canister not available 
for test 
All of the above items were covered on wdivers. 
The Backup MDA test program proceeded with no major prob-
lems encountered. Although the magnitude of the task was 
comparable to the effort required on the Flight Article the 
test operations were conducted with a 40% reduction in per-
sonnel. Even with this reduction in the work force the Backup 
article was shipped. on schedule with non-conformance work items 
equivalent to 10% of the Flight Article status and storage 
shortages approximately 20% of those of the Flight Article. 
7.6 SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS TESTING - ST. LOUIS 
7.6.1 Introduction 
The Flight and Backup MDAs were shipped to the MDAC-E in 
St. Louis, Mo., where they were mated to the corresponding Air-
lock Modules for further testing. 
MMC established a Field Test Operations office in MDAC-E 
facilities that included all di~ciplines necessary to conduct 
and support acceptance testing .. Acceptance testing of MDA 
hardware in St. Louis could be classified as "MDA only" testing 
which did not fnvolve AM hardware or require direct MDAC-E par-
ticipation and AM/MDA Integrated Testing. MDA only testing was 
performed by MMC personnel per MMC Operational Checkout Proce-
dures (OCPs) and did not require MDAC-E participation. Inte-
grated systems testing was conducted by MDAC-E personnel to 
their test procedures, Service Engineering Department Reports 
(SEDRs). MMC reviewed and approved SEDRs and participated in 
all testing that involved MDA hardware. 
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There were some differences in Flight hardware testing and 
Backup hardware testing. Differences were due to hnrdware avail-
ability, the stage of hardwnre development, and contrnct direc-
tion. Had the Mackup hardware been scheduled to fly, it would 
have been subjected to testing nearly identical to that of the 
Flight Article. 
1~1ight and Backup Article test differences (deltas) are 
identified and explained in the body of this section. 
7.6.2 Test Requirements 
All MDA acceptance testing was controlled by specific test 
requirements that were identified in two Systems Test and Check-
out Requirements Document (STACR). STACR ED-2002-2020 identified 
test requirements for the Flight MDA and STACR ED 2002-2032 
identified test requirements for the Backup Article. The require-
ments identif~ed in the STACR documents were extracted from per-
tinent End Item Specifications, ICDs, engineering drawings, 
specifications nnd related documentation as applicable. The 
STACR documents were generated by MMC Test Planning and Require-
ments section and were approved by MSFC. 1hey were continuously 
updated throughout the life of the MDA test program and included 
the specified test location where each requirement should be 
satisfied, i.e., Denver, St. Louis, or KSC. 
After testing was complete, matrices were constructed that 
identified STACR requirements planned to be satisfied in St. 
Louis, and the test procedure that satisfied each requirement. 
If a requirement was not satisfied by test, an explanation was 
given and/or it was identified as a requirement to be satisfied 
at KSC. (Flight only) 
7.6.3 MDA Flight Article Acceptance Testing 
7.6.3.1 Scope 
Thi,s section summarizes the Significant test programs con-
ducted at St. Louis involving the MDA Flight article. The pro-
grams are discussed in chronological sequence. 
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7.6.3.2 MDA Flight Article Testing 
Test Flow - Tests performed on the MDA Flight Article nrc 
shown on the flow diagram in Figure 7.6-1. The flow diclgrmn 
identifies tests by title and procedure number. Dates the tests 
were performed nre included. 
7.6.3.3 MDA Radint~r Leak & Flow (SEDR D-H41-1) 
A. Test Objectives - To verify the leakage in the MUA rndi-
ator nnd to verify the pressure and flow chnracteristics prior 
to mating with the AM ECS system. 
B. Test Locntion - MDAC-E Building 66. 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed on radiators 
installed on the MDA with the MDA in the vertical position. 
D. Test Summary - All test objectives were met. 
7.6.3.4 Crew Compartment Fit & Function (C2F2) (Vertical), 
(MDA-OCP-S-800Q1) 
A. Test Objectives - C2F2 tests were performed by the crew 
to verify equipment stowage and installation so that crew mem-
bers could readily and safely us~ it to accomplish mission objec-
tives. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 66. 
C. Test Configuration - Testing was performed with flight 
hardware (nnd some "flight type" hardware) installec,l in flight 
locations. The MDA was in the vertical position. 
D. Test Summnry - C2F2 testing with the MDA in a vertical 
position was done incrementally as flight hardware. became avail-
able on January 28, February 9, nnd February 25, 1973. Some non-
flight hardware was also used to verify stowage procedures. The 
only major problems encountered were caused by the use of non-
flight hardware. The recommended solutions were to perform the 
tests again when flight hardware h.ecame available. 
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ALTITUDE CHAMBER TEST (SEDR-D3-E73-1) 
DRAIN & DRY ATM/EREP COOLANT LOOP (OCP-S-30010) .. 
EREP GNO ISOLATION VERIF (OCP-S-30050) 
•• 
ILCA CHECKOUT (OCP-S-30025) 
ATM C&D INSTL VERIF (OCP-S-30026) 
ATM C&D/ILCA CKOUT (OCP-S-30027) 
• 
EREP SUPER SYS FIV (OCP-S-30054) • 
TV/VTR SYS CKOUT (OCP-S-40002) • 
HORIZONTAL C2F2 (OCP-S-80001) 
• SIM FLT TEST & EREP SIM 
DATA PASS • ORAIN & ORY ATM/EREP 
COOLANT LOOP (OCP-S-30015) • 
ATM C&O RETEST (OCP-S-30027) 
• 
AM/MOA ON DOCK KSC 
Figure 7.6-1 Flight Article-AM/MDA Integrated Test Activities at St. Louis 
, ... 
7.6.3.5 Radio Noise Burst Monitor (RNBM) (MDA-OCP-D-3002l) 
A. Test Objective - The test was performed to revalidate 
RNBM SN002 that had been returned to the vendor for rework. 
B. Test Locati~n - MDAC-E Building 66. 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with RNBM 
SN002 installed in its flight position. The MDA was in the 
vertical position. 
D. Test Summary - All test objectives were met. 
7.6.3.6 S009 Functional Test (MDA-OCP-D-30003) 
A. Test Objective - The test was run to satisfy re-test 
requirements following Denver testing. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 66. 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with the S009 
installed in the MDA in its flight position. The MDA was in the 
vertical position. 
D. Test Summary - The detector package latch was not fully 
open and stowed. It caught and tore the protective screen and 
stopped detector package movement. The test was re-run with the 
latch in the proper position and the test objectives were met. 
Screen damage was documented. 
7.6.3.7 TV System Test (MDA-OCP-D-40002) 
A. Test Objective - Reverification of a Video Switch that 
did not satisfactorily pass tests in Denver. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 66 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with hard-
ware installed in the MDA. The MDA was in the vertical position. 
D. Test Summary - Several problems were encountered, but 
were all identified as test equipment or test set-up errors. 
Errors were corrected and test objectives were met. 
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7.6.3.8 AM/MDA Interface Leak T~st (SEDR-D3-E56-l) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the flow rate through branches 
of the insulation purge system and verify the leak rate of the 
mated AM/MDA. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 66. 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed on the 
mated AM/MDA and was in the vertical position. Blank off kits 
were installed in place of S19l and S192 experiments. 
D. Test Summary ~ The insulation purge system was success-
fully tested. Spacecraft leakage at the AM/MDA interface was 
excessive. MDAC reworked the interface, re-ran the test and the 
leak rate at the AM/MDA interface was brought ~ithin limits; 
however, since flight S19l and S192 hardware was not installed, 
the overall leak test requirements were deferred to KSC. 
7.6.3.9 AM/MDA Systems Assurance Test (SEDR-D3-E72-l) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify all integrated AM/MDA functions. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - This test was performed on the 
mated AM/MDA in a horizontal position. 
D. Test Summary - All MDA test objectives and all require-
ments were satisfied as planned except those listed below: 
(1) MDA Window Heater - The S190 window heater control 
box was not available for this test. Requirements 
were satisfied during the Simulated Flight Test, 
SEDR D3·'·E75:-l Vol. 1. (Ref. para. 7.6.3.16) 
(2) Proton Spectrometer - The Proton Spectrometer 
failed to operate properly and was returned to the 
vendor for evaluation and modification. It was 
later tested and requirements were satisfied during 
the AM/MDA Electrical Interface Verification Test, 
SEDR D3-E76-1. (Ref. para. 7.6.3.13) 
(3) RNBM - GSE available at the time of test could not 
generate usable inpuF signals to the RNBM antenna. 
The requirements were later satisfied in the Simu~ 
lated Flight Test, SEDR D3-E75-l Vol. II (Ref. 
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para 7.6.3.16) and the ATM C&D Functional Verifica-
tion Test, MDA-OCP-S-30027 (Ref. para. 7.6.3.22). 
(4) ATM C&D Panel Light Intensity - Light levels were 
lower than specification values. It was decided 
that the flight crew would evaluate the lighting 
during the AM/MDA Electrical Interface Test, 
SEDR D3-E76-l (Ref. para. 7.6.3.13). 
7.6.3.10 EREP Checkout 
EREP Support Equipment (ESE), S190, S19l and S194 were all 
tested, in their flight installed positions, as identified on 
the flow diagram, Figure 7.6-1. However, the EREP hardware was 
later Femoved from the MDA invalidating these on-module tests, 
and put through an integrated bench test. The bench test is 
discussed in section 7.3 of this report. EREP hardware was 
later reinstalled in the MDA and a SSFIV test was performed to 
satisfy test requirements. That test will be discussed later in 
this section. 
7.6.3.11 M5l2 Functional Test (MDA-OCP-S-30002) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify ground isolation, instrumenta-
tion, voltage and power, and leakage of the installed M5l2 facil-
ityand functionally verify the experiment's ability to perform 
assigned function.s. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - This test was performed with the 
M5l2 installed and the AM/MDA horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - Most test objectives were met. Flight 
film for the 16mb camera was not available and the flight crys-
tal growth container was not available. >Requirements involving 
those items were satisfied during the Simulated Flight Test (Ref. 
para. 7.6.3.16). The view mirror became coated when the Electron 
Beam (EB) Gun was fired. Recommendation wa~ to elean the mirror 
for test and change before flight. 
7.6.3.12 Crew Compartment Fit and Function (C2F2)(Horizontal) 
MDA-OCP-S-S0001) 
A. Test Objectives -Verify equipment stowed or installed 
so that crew members can readily and safely use it to accomplish 
mission objectives. 
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B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - Testing was performed with flight 
hardware (and "flight type" hardware) installed in flight loca-
tions. The AM/MDA was horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - C2F2 testing with the AM/MDA horizontal 
was done incrementally as flight hardware became available on 
May 9, June 6, and September 7, 1972. Some non-flight hardware 
was used to verify stowage procedures. The only major problems 
encountered were caused by the use of non-flight hardware. The 
recommended solution was to perform the tests again when flight 
hardware became available (at KSC). 
7.6.3.13 AM/MDA Electrical Interface Test (D3-E76-1) 
A. Test Objectives - Validate AM/MDA systems that were not 
validated during the Systems Assurance Test. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with flight 
hardware installed and the AM/MDA horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - The Proton Spectrometer data revealed 
that all digital outputs were high, and no tag bits were received. 
Investigation revealed an uncompatibility existed between the 
exper:J.ment and the spacecraft. The method of coupling the timing 
signal from the AM PCM interface to the Proton Spectrometer was 
corrected and the Proton Spectrometer was retested successfully. 
Caution and Warning trip points were out of specification. 
The problem was traced to high frequency noise between structural 
and power returns to the instrumentation packages. Jumper plugs 
with capacitors were installed and t~e problem was resolved. 
Other MDA test and retest objectives w'ere satisfied without 
significant problems. 
7.6.3.14 Flight Crew Equipment (FeE) Stowage and Configuration 
MDA-OCP-S-80003} 
A. Test Objectives - Assure that FCE was stowed properly 
prior to Simulated Flight and Altitude Chamber Tests. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
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C. Test Configuration - This test was performed with the 
AM/MDA horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - Equipment was stowed and all test objec- • 
tives were met. 
7.6.3.15 Performance Test of MDA Fan Assemblies (MDA-OCP-S-6000S) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the performance of the MDA Cabin 
Fan and the CSM Port Fan. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - Fans installed in flight configura-
tion. The AM/MDA was horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - All test objectives were met. The fans 
performed as required. 
7.6.3.16 Simulated Flight Test (SEDR-D3-E7S-l, Vol. 1) 
A. Test Objectives - Review and perform actual flight and 
mission operations to evaluate the adequacy of equipment and 
procedures and determine the EMI between installed systems. 
(EREP hardware was not available for this test.) 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The AM/MDA was horizontal and 
equipment was installed in its flight configuration. 
D. Test Summary - All MDA test objectives were met. Some 
problems were encountered that were of a deSign or manufacturing 
nature, i.e., missing nomenclatures, misalignment of film vault 
doors, and loose connectors. All discrepancies of this kind were 
properly documented,and dispositioned. 
The RNBM Test Objectives were met; however, the calibration 
potentiometer had to be rotated through its full travel to get 
readouts. The RNBM was returned to the vendor for failure analy-
sis. Section 2.2.10 discusses the failure and refurbishment in 
more detail. 
7.6.3.17 Altitude Chamber Test (SEDR-D3-E73-l) 
A. Test Objective - Evaluate the AM/MDA design and function 
and the crew/hardware interface under simulated altitude condi-
tions. Obtain leak test data for conversion factors. 
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B. Test Locntion - Altitude Chamber in MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed on the 
MDA inside of the MDAC-E 30 foot diameter altitude chamber. 
experiments were not installed. S009 and the M5l2 fncility 
tbe o~'lly experiments installed in the MDA. 
A~I/ 
EREP 
were 
D~ Test Summnry - The AM/MDA was first subjected to an un-
manned cabin leak test at a simulated nltitude of 150,000 feet. 
Leakage at n1titude was 345 seCM. The leak test was followed by 
an 84 hour outgnssing test at altitude. An initial quick look 
nnd analysis of the gas sample data indicated that the level of 
contaminants was l.ow, and the AM/MDA atmosphere was acceptable 
for human habitation. 
Before the manned altitude test was conducted, n simulated 
manned altitude test (with the flight crew performing test 
functions) at nmbient pressure wns performed. This test at 
ambient pressure was performed to verify snfety nnd emergency 
procedures, nnd to get a "crew evnlulltion" of test procedures. 
The test w~s satisfnctoriiy completed, and crew recommended 
changes were made to the procedures. 
The final test was at altitude (150,000 feet). Only two 
problems worth noting were detected in the MDA. 
9 Several MDA instrumentation parameters experienced up 
to 15 counts of noise at random intervals. The prob-
lem was documented and the system was considered 
satisfactory fqr flight. 
e Mosites foam used in stowage containers expanded more 
than was expected and stowed items could not be easi-
ly removed. Stowage containers were redesigned and 
the problem was eliminat~d. All test objectives were 
met. 
7.6.3.18 Leak Check of the ATM C&D/EREP Coolant Loop (MDA-OCP-S-
30010, Applicable Portions) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify that the Coolant Loop leak rate 
was within specification limits. 
" B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
c. 'rest Configuration - The ATM C&D/EREP Coolant loop wns 
installed in the MDA. The AM/MDA was horizontal. 
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D. Test Sununllry - Some fittings {IUd connection::; had to be 
retorqued to bring the leak rate within specifications. All test 
objectives were met. 
7.6.3.19 EREP Ground Isolation Verification (MDA-OCP-S-300S0) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify ground isolation and bonding of 
the EREP hnrdware, and perform S-l91 cflble confidence l.oop checks. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with all 
EREP hardware except the S193 installed in its flight locfltion. 
S193 was installed on a GSE support structure and electrically 
connected to the horizontal AM/MDA. 
D. Test Sununllry - All test objectives were met except the 
ground.isolation of the S193 experiment. The out-of-tolerance con-
dition was determined to be internal to the S193. The S193 was 
reje~te~ for flight, but it was determined to be OK to use for 
additional testing at St. Louis. 
7.6.3.20 I/LCA Functional Verification (MDA-OCP-S-30025.1 
~ 
'!!' 
A. Test Objectives - Verify functional interfaces and con-
figure the ATM C&D/I/LCA for "down stream" testing (The I/LCA 
was not flight hardware, the refore, there was no intention to 
satisfy I/LCA acceptance test requirements.). 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 106 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with the 
I-LCA Qualification Unit installed in the MDA. The AM/MDA was 
horizonta 1. 
D. Test Sununary - The "qual" r/LCA test objectives were 
accomplished. The unit was installed and functionally tested, 
and made reCldy to support "down stream" testing. I/IJCA flight 
unit acceptance testing was deferred to KSC. 
7.6.3.21 ATM C&D Installation Verification Test (MDA-OCP-S-30026l 
A. Test Objective - Verify the in$tallation of the ATM C&D 
in the MDA. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E BJilding 103 
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C. Test Configurntion - The test was performed with the ATM 
C&D in its flight location and the AM/MDA horizontnl. 
D. T~!>t Summ:u:y - All test objectives were met; however, 
some problems ws~c encountered and resolved during the test. 
Problems of note wer~: 
(1) An open circuit ~as discovered in the ATM C&D con-
sole. It was traced to a pin in the J2 connector 
of the Intensity Counter. The pin was strnightened 
and the problem resolved. 
(2) TV Monitor #2 did not operate satisfactorily and 
was return~d to the vendor. The unit was returned 
to St. Louis, reinstalled, and successfully retested. 
NASA and MMC agreed that the unit was flight worthy, 
and it remained installed in the ATM C&D. 
7.6.3.22 ATM C&D Functional Verification (MDA-OCP-S-30027) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify ATM C&D functional interfaces 
with associated hardware, i.e., I/LCA & RNBM. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with the 
flight ATM C&D panels, flight RNBM and the qualification unit I/LCA 
installed in the horizontal spacecraft. 
D. Test Summary - Problems encountered were all determined 
to be procedural. All test objectives were met. 
7.6.3.23 EREP Super System Functional Interface Verification 
Test (SSFIV)(MDA-OCP-S-30054) 
A. Test Objective - Verify all EREP experiments and support 
equipment were ready for flight. 
B~ Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test ·Configuration - The test was run with EREP flight 
hardware installed in flight positions with the following excep-
tions: Tape Recorder 412 was a "qual" unit and the S193 was 
mounted on a GSE Support Structure. 
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D. Test Summary - The system was prepared for test. Delta 
temperature measurements were made across the C&D und tape recorci-
ers. Pyrotechnic and S193 switching circuits were tested. 
Several out of tolerance conditions were noted and dispositioned 
as OK for test with engineering evnluation to follo\<7. The crew 
participated in the sy~tem preparation activities nnd mnde one 
signific~nt comment. They found the S192 focus control difficult 
to adjust and lacking in accessibility. 
After the system was prepared for test, three simulated data 
runs were made. Problems encountered during the data runs were 
caused by faulty GSE. The faulty GSE was either repaired at the 
time, substituted or dispositioned as OK to use'~s-i~1 if repaired 
after test at St. Louis. 
7.6.:L24 Simulated Flight Test (SEDR D3-E7S-l, Vol. II & MDA-
OCP-S-3001S) 
A. Test Objective - Verify functional compatibility bet'veen 
MDA systems; monitor conducted EMI on critical circuits during 
simulated flight and simulated EREP data pass operations, and 
evaluate system performance during a simulated EREP data pass 
with EMI measuring equipment removed and with the syst~m subjected 
to radiated energy during test. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - This test was performed with EREP 
flight hardware installed in/on the MDA except S193 which was 
installed on a GSE fixture electrically mated to the AM/MDA. Two 
simulated date passes were run. EMI monitoring devices were in-
stalled in critical circuits for one data pass and were removed 
for the other. 
D. Test Summary - Basic MDA system, i.e., EC8, ~lectrical, 
etc., functioned normally. The following anomalies were experi-
enced with EREP flight hardware: 
(1) The 8192 cooler motor would not change speed. The 
cooler was rejected, and run #1 proceeded without 
the cooler.' 
(2) An audible decrease in S190 shutter speed was de-
tected.Test was continued without resolving the 
problem. Engineering evaluation was started. 
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(3) Data could not be stripped from track 1 of tape 
P122 from tape recorder :fH. Trouble shooting 
revealed a defective cable. The cable was later 
reworked and tested at KSC. 
(4) The S192 External Scanner Baffle Assembly became 
loose. Investigation disclosed that the assembly 
was broken and could not be repaired at St. Louis. 
The S192 experiment could continue with power on, 
but without the scanner motor running. Under 
these conditions, only S192 housekeeping data could 
be obtained. The S192 external scanner assembly 
was returned to the vendor. 
(5) 8193 data revealed anomalies in the Rad/8cat and 
altimeter modes. The problems were determined to 
be internal to the 8193 and were referred to the 
vendor for further ~ngineering evaluation. 
(6) 8everal times during both runs, -Status word flAil 
deviated from the normal pattern. Investigation 
revealed a problem in the EREP C&D panel. The 
problem was referred to the C&D panel vendor for 
evaluation. 
Other problems encountered were caused by procedural errors 
or G8E inadequacie's. _ There were no problems caused by EM!. 
7.6.4 MDA Backup Article Acceptance Test.ln,s. 
7.6.4.1 Test Flow 
Tests performed on the MDA Backup Article are shown on the 
flow diagram in Figure 7.6-2. The flow diagram identifies tests 
by title and procedure number. Dates the tests 'Here performed 
are included. 
7.6.4.2 AM/MDA Interface Leak Check Test (8EDR D3-E56-2) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the flow rate through branches 
of the insulation purge system and the leak rate of the mated 
AM/MDA. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 66 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed on the 
mated M!!/MDA in the vertical position. Blank··off kits were in-
stalled in place of the 8191 and 8192 EREP experiments. 
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1972 1973 
.... 
u NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APRIL MAY JUNE JULY 0 
WEEK ENDING 25 5 12 19 26 3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 2229 6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 1 8 15 22 29 
MDA ON DOCK MDAC-E I .... 
AM/MDA I/F LEAK CHECK (SEDR-D3-E56-2) I. 
AM/11DA ELEC CONH VERIF (SEDR) 
AM/MDA SVS ASSURANCE (SEDR D3-E72-2) 
B-I/LCA FUNCT CKOUT (OCP-S-30004) 
• 
fiDA VENT VALVE FUNCT OPS (OCP-S-20002) 
• 
) 
MS12 ELEC CKOUT (OCP-S.-30D02) I •• 
ATM C&D INSTL. VERIF (COP-S-30026) .. 
SIMULATED Ft.T TEST (SEDR-D3-E7S-2 VOL I) 
-FLT ARTICLE B-I/LCA RETEST (ETO) : I 
FLT ART B-I/LCA/ATM C&D CKOUT (ETa) I 
I/LCA CKOUT (OCP-S-3002S) I 
ATM C&D/I/LCA CKOUT (OCP-S-30027) 
B-I/LCA RETEST (OCP-S-30004) l. 
ATM C&D/B-I/LCA CKOUT (ETa) 
• LEAK CK & SERVICE ATM/EREP 
COOLANT LOOP (OCP-S-30010) l.iIL 
EREP ESE CKOUT (OCP-S-30006) 
• RNBM RETEST I 
TV /VTR SYS CKOUT (OCP-S-40002) I-
IFM TV CABLES CKOUT (ETO) I. 
S193 FIV (OCP-S-30012) 
• DRAIN & DRV ATM/EREP COOLANT 
LOOP (OCP-S-30015) I 
VERIFY KSC CLOSEOUT PROCEDURE (SEDR) 
LEAK CK & SERVICE ATM/EREP 
COOLANT LOOP (OCP-S-30010) II 
EREP SYS FIV({)CP-S-300S4) 
"'"r-:' 
,. 
SIMULP.TED FLT TEST & EREP I. 
SIMULATED DATA PASS (SEDR D3-E7S-2 VOL II) Iii 
VERIFY KSC CLOSEOUT PROCEDURE (SEDR) 
DRAIN & DRY ATfI/EREP COOLANT I 
LOOP (OCP-S-3001S) I-
PURGE & FLUSH ATM COOLANT LOOP (ETa 93) 
SIMULATED FLT TEST (SEDR D3-E75-2 VOL III) .. 
S190 WINDOW HTR CONTROLLER 
CHfCKOUT (OCP-S-60002) 
• 11512 VACUUM CKOUT (OCP-S-30002) .. 
MS12 FUNCTIONAL CKOUT (OCP-S-30002) ... 
Figure 7.6-2 Backup Article-AM/MDA Integrated Test Activities at St. Louis 
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D. Test Summary - All test objectives were met. However, 
the combined leak rate was reverified after flight experiments 
S19l and S193 were installed. 
7.6.4.3 AN/MOA Systems Assurance Test (SEDR-D3-E72-2) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify integrated AM/MDA functions and 
functionally verify the Proton Spectrometer and RNBM equipment. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
1 
C. Test Configuration - This test was performed on the 
mated AM/MDA in the horizontal position. 
D. Test Summary - The test verified MDA electrical, com-
munication, cau,tion and warning, and instrumentation systems of 
the functional operation of the RNBM, Proton Spectrometer and 
S009 experiments in the mated AM/MDA configuration. Most test 
objectives were met; however, the Proton Spectrometer Acceptance 
Test requirements were not satisfied due to GSE problems and 
interfacing the RNBM with the ATM C&D qualification panels. Also 
, the RNBM functional test was not acceptable. 
7.6.4.4 BI/LCA Functional Test (MDA-OCP-S-30004) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the installation and output of 
the BI/LCA. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with the 
BI-LCA installed in its flight location. The AM/MDA was horizon-
tal. 
D. Test Summary - All test objectiv~s were met. 
7.6.4.5 Vellt Valve Operation and Leak Rate Verification Test 
(Mn'A-OCP-S-2 0002) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the functional operation and 
leak rate of the MDA Vent Valves. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with the 
Vent Valves installed. The lill./MDA was horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - All test objectives were met. 
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7.6.4.6 M512 Functional Tests (MDA-OCP-S-30002) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the installation of the M512 
facility and functionally verify related experiment tasks. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with the 
M512 equipment installed. The AM/MDA was horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - Because all M5l2 GSE was not available 
in St. Louis until after SL-l was launched, this test was per-
formed in three stages on 2/7-13, 6/25-29, and "2'/9-7/13, 1973. 
All 'but one problem encountered during test were due to procedur-
al or test "hook-up" errors. The 75nnn lens used with the DAC was 
broken, however, it was used to support testing and was then sent 
back to the vendor for rework. This di.d not affect test results 
and all test objectives were met. 
7.6.4.7 ATM C&D Installation Verification (MDA-OCP-S-30026) 
Ap Test Objectives - Evaluate the readiness of the Qual 
hardware to support other tests (No acceptance test requirements 
were intended to be satisfied.) 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - This test was performed on ATM C&D 
Qualification Test Panels installed in the ATM C&D structure in 
the MDA. The AM/MDA was horizontal. 
D. Test SUlIunary - Test objectives were met and the ATM C&D 
with Qual panels installed was determined to be ready to support 
downstream testing. The following hardwhre discrepancies were 
noted and dispositioned "OK to use 'as-is'." 
• A faulty intensity counter gave random readouts. 
o A faulty image modu1ation assembly gave wrong voltage 
output. 
7.6.4.8 Simulated Flight Test (SEDR-D3-E75-2. Vol I) 
A. Test Objectives - Review and perform actual flight and 
mission operations, to evaluate the. adequacy of installetl equip-
ment, procedures and to determine the functional compatibility of 
flight hardware. EREP hardware was not installed for this test. 
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B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Config,uration - The S009 experiment, M512 facility, 
BI/LCA, ATM C&D (wit~i. IIQualification" panels), and Proton Spec-
trometer were installed in the AM/~mA. The M512 GSE Vacuum Source 
was not available. No EREP hardware was available. 
D. Test Summary - The test verified functional interfaces 
of systems tested. Several MDA electrical system test require-
ments were satisfied and the MDA vent valve closing time was 
verified. All test objectives were met. 
7.6.4.9 I/LCA Functional Test (MDA-OCP-S··30025) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the installation and functional 
operation of ·the I-LCA. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Te.at Configuration - The test was performed with the 
I/LCA installed on the horizontal fJ.vI./MDA. 
D. Test Summary - The test progressed as planned. All test 
objectives were met. 
7.6.4.10 ATMC&D Functional Verification (MDA-OCP-S-30027) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify ATM C&D functional interfaces 
with associated hardware, i.e., I/LCA and RNBM ("system readiness" 
to support downstream MDA Backup and Mission Support testing). 
Bo Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
·C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with "Qual" 
ATM C&D panels installed in the MDA. ThE! AM/MDA was horizont'al. 
D. Test Summary - All test objectives were met. One hard-
ware discrepancy was noted, i.eo, a bad relay in the ATM C&D 
panel prevent~d the RNBM Solar flare alert audible signal from 
reaching the speaker. 
7.6.4.11 Leak Check Delta Pressure and Flow Test of the ATM C&D/ 
~ Coolant QMDA-OCP-S-300l0) 
A. Te$t Objective - Verify that the coolant loop leak rate, 
delta pressure and flow rate were within specification limits. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed with the 
ATM C&D panels and EREP hardware installed in the MDA. GSE tool-
ing was used to substitute for Tape Recorder #2 and S192. 
D. Test Summary - The method used for testing S192 and T/R 
#2 joints and T/R #1 flex lines was temporarily changed from 
vacuum to pressu.re because the simulator hoses were too permeable 
for vacuum testing. Coolant had to be changed and the system 
flushed because water initially introduced into the system was 
contaminated. The system was suitable for EREP testing but accep-
tance test requirements were not satisfied. 
7.6.4.12 TV(VTR System Functional Test (MDA-OCP-S-40002) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the installation of the VTR 
and the functioning of the TV & VTR systems. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed on flight 
hardware installed in the MDA. The AM/MDA was horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - All test objectives were met. Anomalies 
experienced during test were mainly due to procedural or opera-
tional errors. One anomaly was due to a faulty video switch. 
The switch was replaced and the test was successfully completed. 
7.6.4.13 EREP Testtng; EREP ESE Checkout (ETO MDA/SL/BU/81); 
S193 Experiment Checkout (ETO MDA/8L/BU/82). and EREP Expanded 
Systems Test (ETO MDA!SL/BU/83) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify the functional capability of 
EREP hal~ware installed in the MDA prior to the Simulated Flight 
Test. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The S190, 8191, 8192 and 8194 
experiments, T/R #1, and C&D panel were installed in the MDA. 
S193 was installed on a GSE support fixtute and electrically 
mated to the MDA. . T/R 412 was not available for test. EREP 
hardware 'was installed to facilitate later removal, i.e., seals 
were omitted, windows were not mapped, only enough mounting bolts 
were used to assure personnel safety. 
D. Test Summary - The EREP ESE checkout proved that the 
support equipment was ready to support experiment testing. No 
equipment anomalies were detected. 
The S193 experiment was tested separately because of its 
complexity. The test was run to verify installation and to evalu-
ate the capability of the experiment ~o function during Expanded 
Systems Tests. The test was performed without major problems. 
Procedural errors were corrected, and equipment adjustments were 
made. Test objectives were met. 
The Expanded EREP Systems Test was performed to verify EREP 
functional interfaces. All experiments were functionally tested 
and met test objectives with the exception that C-2 and C-3 S192 
monitors were out of tolerance (dispositioned OK for test). The 
EREP Hardware was ready to support Sim Flight Test. 
7.6.4.14 Simulated Flight Test & EREP Simulated Data Pass (SEDR-
D3-E74-2 Vol. II~ 
A. Test Objectives - Evaluate the functional compatibility 
of installed systems during an abbreviated mission time line and 
an EREP data pass. NOTE: There was no intention to satisfy EREP 
test requirements. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
, ' 
C. Test Configuration - The teat was performed on hardware 
installed in the AM/MDA. ,'EREP hardware that was installed and 
tested per paragraph 7.6.4.13 remained installed for this test. 
D. Test Summary - This test was a sequel to SIMULATED 
FLIGHT TEST, VOLUME I. It wa~ used to validate hardware that 
was not installed or validated in S1M FLT VOL. I. The primary 
reason for running this test was to perform an EREP Simulated 
Data Pass and to evaluate funct;onal compatibility of installed 
hardware. No EREP acceptance test requirements were satisfied. 
The EREP Data Pass procedure was performed per MMC procedure 
MDA-OCP-S-300l8 whlch was made a part of E75-2, Vol. U. The 
Sim Data pass w.as run and data were recorded. The data tape was 
reviewed in St.Louis only to the extent necessary to verify that 
data were on the tapes. The tapes,were then sent to KSC for data 
reduction. Reduced data were evaluated by EREP experiment PIEs. 
The data were not evaluated to accept the hardware for flight, 
but to verify that the EREP hardware could be u~ed to support SL 
missions. Immediately after this test was complete, and before 
reduced data were evaluated, EREP hardware was removed from the 
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MDA and shipped to MMC-Denver, where it was set up in a bench 
configuration to support SL missions. 
All test objectives were accomplished. 
7.6.4.15 Simulated Flight Test (SEDR-D3-E75-2 Vol. III) 
A. Test Objectives - Revalidate remaining AM/MDA systems 
after removal of EREP hardware. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed on the AM/ 
MDA. EREP hardware was not installed. 
D. Test Summary - Test objectives were met. 
7.6.4.16 S190 Window Heater Controller System Verification (MDA-
OCP-S-60002) 
A. Test Objectives - Verify that the S190 Window Heater 
Controller would satisfy functional requirements after .installa-
tion in the MDA. 
B. Test Location - MDAC-E Building 103 
C. Test Configuration - The test was performed on the 
flight S190 Window Heater Controller installed in the MDA. The 
AM/MDA was horizontal. 
D. Test Summary - All test objectives were met. 
7.6.5 Testing on the Backup MDA at St. Louis to Support the MDA 
Flight Article at KSC Prior to Launch 
7.6.5.1 TV Contingency Cable Test(ETO MDA/SL/BU/78) 
This test was performed to verify fit and function of con-
tingency cables in their operating locations and to verify pro-
posed stowage procedures and location in the MDA. All test 
objectives were met. 
7.6.5.2 BI/L~/ATM C&D Console Functional Verificatian(ETOs __ 
MDA/SL/BU/79. 80!_84. 89. and 90-) 
The tests w~re performed to verify proper BI/LCA function-
ing with a modified auto-transformer and modified "over-voltage" 
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protection patch plugs to keep over-voltage spikes from destroying 
ATM C&D panel lights. 
A. ETO 79 verified BI/LCA functions with the new auto-
transformer and plugs for 8L-1 flight hardware. 
B. ETO 80 was a re-run of ETO 79 with a new auto-trans-
former and patch plugs for the Backup MDA. 
C. ETO 84 was a re·run of ETO 80 to verify another set of 
plugs for the Backup MDA when the set verified in ETO 80 was 
assigned to 8L-l as flight spares. 
D. ETO 89 was run to gather engineering data for design of 
"over-voltage" patch plugs because the design verified by ETOs 
79 and 80 was not adequate when installed in SL-l at K8C. 
E. ETO 90 verified the new design that was accepted for 
flight. 
7.6.5.3 EREP Diagnostic Downlink Unit (EDDU) Functional Verifi-
cation Test (ETO MDA/SL/BU/85) 
The EDDU, which provided a'means of downlinking EREP data 
to the ground over the S-Band link, was introduced into the SL 
program and two units were built. One was .intended as a primary 
flight unit and one as a spare. Both units were functionally 
tested in the Backup MDA and then sent to KSC for installation 
in SL-1. The test was successfully completed and all objectives 
were met. 
7.6.5.4 S190 Window Frame Screws Torgue (ETO MDA/8L/BU/86 
Vendor engineering drawings did not specify torque values 
for two screws that retainan S190 heater and sensor feed through 
wires sealing plate. This test was run to determine if standard 
shop practices that require all screws to be tight were adhered 
to, and to establish a procedure for performing a similar test at 
KSC on the Flight Article without invalidating system integrity. 
The test successfully established a procedure for testing at KSC 
and proved that the easily reached screw was torqued to at least 
20 inch-pounds which was above the 17 inch-pounds that was con-
sidered adequate. 
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7.6.5.5 EREP Coolant Loop Evaluation Tests (ETO's MDA/SL/nu/92 
cmd 93) 
This test was performed to nssist KSC in evaluating a 
coolant loop contamination problem that was detected on the 
Flight MDA. Wnter was gravity fed through the EREP 'fIR per ETO 
92 and through the complete ATM G&D/EREP Coolant Loop per ETO 93. 
PH data was gathered and sent to KSC for evaluation. 
7.7 INTEGRATED VEHICLE TESTING - KSC 
7.7.1 Introduction 
The intent of this section is to present a test flow for 
the MDA through the KSC test program including a genernl test 
description of the major tests which were performed. Detailed 
test information may be found in the SWS Test and Checkout Plan 
(KSC-KS-2001). Specific test requirements for the MDA KSC test-
ing are contained in the Test and Checkout Requirements, Speci-
fications and Criteria at KSC (TCRSD) for AM/MDA (MDC E0122), 
and Skylab Integrated systems Test Checkout Requirements and 
Specifications (TM-012-003-2H). An Overall Chronological Sum-
mary is presented in Section 2.1 of this document. 
The Inflight Maintenance Spares were tested to the same 
specifications and criteria as the flight unit. Test and Check-
out Procedure (TCP) KS-2009 defined the spares test program for 
KSC. 
Specific test requirements that were planned for a particular 
TCP and deferred to a subsequent TCP will not be identified in 
this report. This information is available in KSC-KS-200l. 
7.7.2 Test F10'".v 
Test flow operations for each location is detailed in the 
following: 
o Figure 7.7 -1 depicts the flow at the Operatio~s and 
Checkout (O&C) Building • 
• Figure 7.7 -2 depicts th.e activity in the Vehicle Assem-
bly Building (VAB). 
The$e figures identify only those tests involving the AMI 
MDA modules. A flow for the Launch Pad is not included in that 
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Figure 7.7-1 KSC-AM/MDA Test Flow (O&C) 
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this activity contained only the Countdmyo Demonstration Test 
(CDDT) and the Count (CD). 
7.7.3 Test Description 
The following pageli present the test descriptions by Test 
and Checkout Procedure Number in sequential order as indicated 
in the flO\07 charts, Figures 7.7.-1 and 7.7.-2. These descrip-
tions are written only for those TCPs that satisfy test require-
ments as stated in the AM/MDA TCRSD (E0122) and the Integrated 
TCRSD (TM-012-003-2H). See Figure 7.7-3 for AM/~IDA KSC Schedule. 
7.7.4 AH/MDA Receiving Inspection (KM 19000) 
7.7.4.1 Test Objectives 
Receive and inspect all visible surfaces to verify that the 
MDA and its equipment installed, or shipped loose, was free from 
damage. 
7.7.4.2 Test Location 
Q&C Build ing 
7.7.4.3 Documents Usee to Develop this TCP 
• Skylab Operations Handbook, Volume I and II, MSC 04727 
• Experiment Operations Handbook, Volume I and II, MSC 
'00924 
7.7.4.4 Test Configuration 
The AM/~IDA was installed in the West Integrated Test Stand 
(WITS), and configured to permit the required inspection. 
7.7.4.5 Test Summary 
The receiving and inspection was performed in all desig-
nated areas and zones of the }IDA with no major problems. The 
IIship loose" items were also inspected with no problems. The 
data package was reviewed and inventoried and found to be com-
plete ~07ith the exception of minor problems (Reference paragraph 
4.11.3). 
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PREP (KMOOOl) 
CSM-AM/MDA ELECTRICAL INTERFACE. 
---
DOCKING & LEAK TESTS (KOO71) 
CSM-AM/MDA BUS ISOL. SPG & CABLE II 
(KM0071 ) 
ELECTRICAL I & F (KMOOOI) 
•• 
DATil. REVIEW 
PREP TO MOVE (KMOOOI) I 
UNDOCK & INSTALL AM/MDA ON I 
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" i .... 
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• HARNESS (KMOOOl) 
DEPLOYMENT TEST (KMOO02) 
• EXPERIMENTS SYS TEST (1<1'.0002) .. 
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GSE HOOKUP & ATM SOLAR SHIELD" I •• . 
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Figure 7.7-3 AM/MDA KSC Test Schedule 
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7.7.5 AM/MDA Integrated System Test and Experiment System Test 
(KM-0003) 
7.7.5.1 Test Objectives 
A. Electrical System - Functional verification of Electri-
cal System including the following: 
e Power Distribution - AM - CSM (Simulator) 
G Utility Outlets and Control 
~ Interior Lighting and Control 
G Exterior Lighting and Control 
• Wall and Docking Port lieaters and Control Systems 
• S190 Window Heaters and Control System 
o Running Light Operation 
B. Communications/Instrumentation/Television and Caution 
and Warning (COMM/INSTR/TV and C&W) - Functional Verification of 
Communication/TV System including: 
• Speaker Intercom Assembly Operation 
• Crew Communication Umbilical Functional Operation 
• 'IV Input Station Operation 
G Determination by Quantitative Measurements that the 
Instrumentation System and TV Systems performed with-
in specified tolerances. 
• Temperature Transducer Operation 
• Signal Conditioner Operation 
• Pressure Sensor Functional 
• MDA Fire Detector Sensor Operation 
• MDA Emergency Light Operation 
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C. Structures/Mechanical/ECS-
(1) Functional verification of Structural/Mechanical/ 
ECS including: 
o MDA Window Cover Operating Torques 
e MDA Docking Port and Radial Hatch Actuation 
Forces 
e MDA Axial Docking Target Alignment 
o MDA Cabin Fans and Diffuser Operation 
o CSM Port Fan Operation Using Normal and Spare 
Electric~l Connectors 
• MDA Window and Insulation Purge System Opera-
tion 
S Operation and Accuracy of Docking Port Hatch 
(Axial and Radial) Delta Pressure Gauges 
(2) Leak checks of th(;\ following: 
• MDA Docktng Port Hatches and Pressure Equali-
zation Valves 
• Window Mechanism 
o Vent Plug and Manifold 
• All AM/MDA Compartments Common 
• MDA/STS Compartment 
D. Experiments-
(1) M5l2 - Materials Processing in Space and Associ-
ated Experiments including: 
e Verify power distribution and regulation 
• Verify instrumentation system 
o Functionally verify M5i2 faci.l ity and experi-
ments M479 and M55l thru M555 interfaces 
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• Functionally verify integrity of lines and 
valves with vacuum and pressure test. 
8 Operate the electron beam gun into a dummy 
we ld ing samp le 
(2) S009 - Nuclear Emulsion -
e Functionally verify experiment housing opera-
tion with detector package 
(3) Radio Noise B'.lrst Monitor (RNBM) -
~ Functionally verify electrical interface with 
i\TM 
• Verify no degradation in the antenna and coax 
system 
• Verify operation of flight and spare unit 
(4) Proton Spectrometer 
$ Verify ground and isolation 
~ Verify temperature transducer operation 
• Verify functional operation 
(5) Earth Resource Experiment Package (EREP) -
(a) S190 - Multispectral Photographic Facility-
• Operate the MDA S190 window cover 
• Verify the S190 Camera operation 
• Verify the S190 C&D Panel controls 
• Verify light leaks and fogging 
• Accumulate PCM data and display at the 
Quick Look Data Station (QLDS) 
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(b) S19l - Infrared Spectrometer -
• Verify the V/TS operntion 
• Verify cooler/dewar operation, calibration/ 
reference thermal source intensity selec-
tion and auto calibration 
• Verify DAC photogrnphic capability, tele-
scope/cavity pressure and external source 
calibration 
• Accumulate PCM data nnd display at the QLDS 
(c) S192 - Multispectral Scanner -
• Operate S192 door 
• Verify internal optics alignment on the 
primary and secondary detectors 
• Verify both detectors in the check nnd 
ready mode 
o Verify flight scan motor and one shot 
actuator circuit operation 
• Accumulate PCM data and display at the QLDS 
(d) S194 - L-Band Radiometer -
• Verify S194 in the manual and auto A 
calibration modes 
• Verify end-to-end system operation 
• Display PCM data at the QLDS 
(e) EREP Support Equipment -
• Verify EREP C&D Panel indicators 
• Verify Primary and Secondary tape recorders 
bit error and diagnostic capability at 7.5. 
and 60 IPS 
• Verify Voltage Controlled Oscillator (VCO) 
center'frequencies and deviation. 
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(f) EREP Simulated Data Pass -
• Verify EREP Sensor operation and systems 
compatibility under "on orbit" conditions 
with the support equipment and data stn-
tions 
• Record data on the FR 1928 Recorder 
• Display S190, S193 and S194 sensor data 
at the QLDS 
• Display selected data from the S19l and 
S192 sensors at the General Purpose Lab 
• Operate the S193 altimeter in Nadir Align, 
Mode 5, Mode 3, Radiometer/Scatterometer 
(RAD/SCAT), In Track Non Contiguous (ITNC), 
and Cross Track Contiguous (CTC) with Sin-
gle Point Temperature Reference (SPTR). 
• Record data on the primary tape recorder 
• Record data from S192 for a minimum of 
four minutes 
• Bring all EREP sensors to the Ready Mode 
and operate the S193 in Altimeter Reset, 
Nadir align, Mode 5, and Mode 3 configura-
tions 
7.7.5.2 Test Location 
O&C Building 
7.7.5.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• Test and Checkout Requirements Specification and Cri-
teria at KSC for AM/MDS, MDC-E0122 
• Skylab Integrated System Test Checkout Requirements and 
Specifications, TM-012-003-2H 
7.7.5.4 Test Configuration 
, MDA axial and radial port hatches open with pro-
tective sleeves installed 
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• MDA internal access platforms and ladder instnlled 
• MDA test lighting fixture instnlled 
• MDA window internnl and external protective covers 
installed 
e Proton Spectrometer located on 28 ft level WITS 
• S193 and S194 Experiments on 28 ft work platform nnd 
electrically moted by GSE cables 
7.7.5.5 Test SumrnClry 
This test was the first major AM/MDA test Dnd checkout pro-
cedure performed at KSC. There were mDny deviations written to 
correct procedural errors and to facilitate out of sequence 
testing. This TCP was the first attempt to test EREP on-module 
after St. Louis testing and some modification to most other 
experiments. Problem areas were as follows: 
A. E1ectrical-
(1) MDA wall heater 4~F thermostat verifications were 
not performed and were deferred to TCP KM-0002. 
(2) The docking port heater control thermostat failed 
to close and was replaced. The failed unit was 
sent to Denver for failure analysis. Retest was 
deferred to KM-0002. 
(3) S190 window heater verification was not performed 
because the control box was not installed. This 
test was deferred to KS-0045. 
B. Comm/Instr/TV and C&W -
(1) TV bus shield was improperly grounded. Problem 
was corrected and retested in a deviation to the 
TCP. 
(2) TV signal was not received at the TV output rack. 
A faulty connector pin was replaced and system 
retested. 
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(3) Communication tunnel connector was found to be 
intermittent. The connector was repw ced and 
retested. 
(4) Temperature sensor circuits failed and sensor was 
replaced. Retest was deferred to KS-004S. 
(S) The MDA signal conditioner was found to be dis-
crepant. The unit was removed and sent to Denver 
for failure analysis. A replacement unit was in-
s~alled and retest deferred to KS-004S. 
(6) Inverter Lighting Control Assembly (, T../LCA) tempera-
ture sensor'was not installed. Test was deferred 
to KM0002. 
C. Structures/Mechanical/ECS - Radial and Axial Hatch Delta 
P gauges tests were performed off-module to provide accuracy 
in the one-G environment. 
D. Experiments-
(1) M5l2 - Materials Processing in Space and Associated 
Experiments: 
(a) Flanunability (M479) did not operate due to 
improper operation of timer sequencer. 
(b) Temperature and voltage indications were out 
of tolerance. 
(c) Data Acquisition Camera (DAC) shutter would 
not open due to interference with borescope. 
(d) Sphere forming verification test was unaccept-
able because the electron beam current could 
not be controlled conSistently and the target 
was misaligned. 
Note: Testing of the M5l2 was deferred to subsequent 
TCP due to AM/MDA pressurization. 
(2) RNBM - No problems 
(3) S009 - Detector package did not open completely 
due to interference with debris shield. The 
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shield was modified to nllow package operntion. 
(4) Proton Spectrometer - The Ground Support Equipment 
(GSE) was incompatible with the Proton Spectrome-
ter. Test was deferred to u subsequent TCP. 
(5) S190-
(a) No S190 window heater verification as window 
heater control box was not installed. De-
ferred to KS-0045 
(b) Spare magazine drive assembly ran continuously. 
(c) Incorrect data printouts 
(d) Scratches and streaks on film 
(e) Film skewing on stations 1 and 3 
(f) Experiment reworked for KM-OOOl 
(6) S19l-
(8) Data would not play through QLDS 
(b) Dewar pressure momentarily out of specifica-
tions 
(c) Alignment dot improperly located on tele-
scope port 
(d) Excessive drift during telescope alignment 
(e) Expetiment reworked for KM-OOOl 
(7) S192-
(a) Could not achieve detector cooldown 
(b) Could not obtain sync on data 
(c) No data on tracks 1, 7 and 21 due to inter-
mittent contact in C&D Panel 
(d) Experiment would not power-up due to break-
down box 
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(e) Scan motor stopped before shutoff. 
(f) Experiment reworked prior to KM-0002. 
(8) S193 - Satisfnctory ground check off-module. 
(9) S194 - Satisfactory operation off-module. 
7.7.6 AM/MDA Moves and Preps for Docking Test (KM-13008) 
7.7.6.1 Test Objectives 
• Prepare and pressurize AM/MDA 
• Reconfigure the AM/MDA during controlled portions of 
the docking test operations. 
• Perform axial hatch force test. 
7.7.6.2 Test Location 
O&C Build ing 
7.7.6.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications and 
Criteria - MDC E0122 
7.7.6.4 Test Configuration 
• AM/MDA powered down 
• AM/MDA installed on horizontal trailer 
• Axial and Radial Docking Port Hatches installed 
7.7.6.5 Test Summa~ 
The axial hatch force test -",as per:Eormed after the AM/MDA 
was positioned on the horizontal trailer. It was then lifted 
from the transporter, inverted and leveled using the axial 
docking port interface,as a reference. After docking prepara-
tions were completed, the AM/MDA was moved to the WITS and 
lowered above the CSM. The AM/MDA was reinstalled on the hori-
zontal transporter after docking and interface compatibility 
tests were completed. 
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7.7.7 CH-AM/MDA Mechanical Docking Test (K-0071) 
7.7.7.1 Jest Objectives 
• Verify docking capability of the CSM to MDA port 5 
(axial) with and without the docking latch inhibitor 
ring installed. 
S Vel:ify the CSM-AM/MDA docking interface seal leak rate. 
o Verify the CSM-AM/MDA COAS/docking·target nlignment at 
Port 5 (axial). 
o Verify Air Interchange Duct (AID) and Contingency Power 
cable £it between the MDA and the CSM. 
• Verify electrical bonding between CSM [lnd AM/MDA. 
7.7.7.2 Test Location 
O&C Building (WITS) 
7.7.7.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications and Cri-
teria MDC-E0122 
8 Systems Composite Mechanical Schematics lOM30899 
~ AM/MDA Mechanical ICD l3M0252l 
• Skylab (AM/MDA/ATM) O&C Mechanical System Requirements 
66ICDSO-42 
• CSM to MDA Phys:t.:al Requirements l3M20979 
• Skylab Integrated System Test Checkout Requirements and 
Specifications TM012-003-2H 
7.7.7.4 Test Configuration 
• CSM installed in WITS 
• AM/MDA suspended inverted over CSM 
• AM/MDA pressurized 
7-76 
• AM/l'IDA powered down 
• MDA Port 5 (axial) docking target instnl1ed 
7.7.7.5 Test Summary 
The docking operations were performed with no problems nnd 
all test objectives were accompU.shed. The astronnuts were in-
volved to a great extent in this test and were instrumental in 
its success. 
7.7.8 CSM-AM/l'IDA Electrical Interface Test (KM-0001) 
7.7.8.1 Test Objectives 
A. Functionally verify the AM/l'IDA-CSM electrical inter-
face compatibility including: 
• Power Systems 
• Caution and Warning 
• Televisi.on 
• Communicntions 
B. Functionally verify AM/MDA flight systems compatibility 
with CSM in quiescent mode including: 
• Power Systems 
• Caution and Warning 
• Television 
e Communications 
• ECS 
• Experiments 
7.7.8.2 Test Location 
O&C Building (WITS) 
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7.7.8.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• Test and Checkout Requirements and Specifications 
MDC-E0122 
• Skylab Integrated System Test and Checkout Requirements 
and SpecificCltions TM012-003-2H 
7.7.8.4 Test Configuration 
• CSM installed in WITS 
• AM/MDA mechanical structurally and electrically mated 
to CSM 
• AM/MDA stabilization kit installed 
• AM/MDA internal platforms installed 
• AM/MDA hatches open and protective covers installed 
• GSE cables mated to AM/MDA 
$ S193 and S194 EREP experiment located on 28 ft level 
work platform and electrically connected to spacecraft 
by GSE cables 
7.7.8.5 Test Summary 
This test successfully demonstrated the AM/MDA-C8M inter-
face and verified S190, S191, S193, and S194 compabiti1ity in 
an MDA/CSM docked configuration. This TCP worked the 8im Data 
Pass procedure with available experiments even though all per-
formance problems were not worked off. Hardware/Systems operated 
during this TCP were as follows: 
A. Electrical 
B. Comm/Instr/TV and C&W 
C. Structural/Mechanical/ECS 
D. Experiments 
(1) M512 
(2) S009 
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(3) RNBM 
(4) Proton Spectrometer 
(5) gREP S190 
(6) EREP S194 
(7) EREP S192 
This experiment was not opernted as planned. It 
was being reworked. 
(8) EREP S193 
• S193 tracking loop caused altimeter abort. 
Experiment reworked for KM-0002. 
• Data Acquisition Camera (DAC) stopped before 
shut: off. 
• Timing Problem 
(9) EREP S 194 
7.7.9 Deployment Assembly Functional and Experiments System 
Test (KM-0002) 
7.7.9.1 Test Objectives 
A. Perform operational checkout of Earth Resources Experi-
ment Package (EREP) with all sensors electrically and mechanical-
ly mated. 
B. Verify installation and electrical resistance of I/LCA 
heater circuits. 
C. Functionally verify BI~ continuity, interface and 
controls. 
D. Functionally verify integrity of the ATM TV cable. 
E. Functionally verify the Proton Spectrometer inc1udi.ng: 
• Operation 
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e Interfnce with AM Telemetry system 
C QLDS Program 
F. Verify Radial Docking Target Alignment 
7.7.9.2 Test Location 
O&C Building (WITS) 
7.7.9.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
o Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications and 
Criteria MDC-E0122 
7.7.9.4 Test Configuration 
o All EREP sensors were electrically and mechanically 
mll ted 
• L-Band Truss installed 
• S193 and S194 Experiment Test Set connected 
7.7.9.5 Test Summar~ 
This test was 
flight ATM cables. 
porate retest into 
were operated: 
the first test performed utilizing the 
Several deviations were required to incor-
the TCP. The following hardware/systems 
A. Electrical - MDA wall heater 45~ thermostats and dock-
ing port heater, control thermostat, and overtemp switch were 
successfully tested. This was deferred work from TCP KM-0003. 
B. Comm/Instr/TV and C&W -
C. Structural/Mechanical/ECS-
D. Experiments-
(1) M512 
(2) S009 
(3) RNBM 
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• Threshold adjustments and settings were out of 
normal limits. The unit was removed nnd 
returned to MSFC for nnalysis. The replnce-
ment unit was successfully tested. 
• Alignment marks on the power cable and mating 
connector did not align. Cable and connector 
were found to be proper. Alignment marks were 
repositioned. 
(4) Proton Spectrometer 
(5) EREP S190 
o Performed S190 retest 
• Loss of signal required C&D Panel rework. 
(6) EREP S192 - Retest after rework 
(7) EREP S193 
• Test objectives met with data anomalies. 
(8) EREP S194 
(9) EREP 8im Data Pass 
• C&D Panel changed-out in pass #1 
e Quick look timing problem in pass #2 
7.7.10 SWS End to End Systems and Experiment Test (KS-0045) 
7.7.10.1 Test Objectives 
A. Electrical System - Functional verification of Electri-
cal System including: 
• MDA running lights 
• S190 Window Heater Verification 
• AM to CSM (Simulator) Power Transfer Evaluation 
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B. Communication/Instrumentation/Television and Caution 
nnd Warning - Functional verification of COMM/TV System in-
eluding: 
e Speaker Intercom Assembly operation and interface 
compatibility with AM and OWS. 
• TV input station operation and compatibility 
• Functional verification of INSTR/C&W Systems in-
cluding: 
Temperature Transducer Monitoring 
Caution and Warning Alarm operation and compati-
bility with AM and OWS 
C. Structures/Mechanical/ECS-
• Verify operation of MDA vent valves via the OWS 
switch selector 
• Verify the Instrument Unit - Orbital Workshop (IU-
OWS) - Interface through operat'ion of the MDA vent 
valves via IU Command. 
D. Experiments-
• M5l2 - Confidence level verification of the vacuum 
system 
• RNBM - End to end verification of RNBM alert 
• EREP Perform operational checkout of Earth 
Resources Experiment Package 
7.7.10.2 Test Location 
Vertical Assembly Building (VAB) 
7.7.10.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• Test and Checkout Requirements Specification and Cri-
teria MDC-EOl22 
• Sky lab Integrated System Test Checkout Requirements and 
Specifications. IMOl2-003-2H 
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• Skylab AM/MDA/ ATM PAD/VAB Mechnnical 'Requirements 
65ICD9542 
7.7.10.4 Test Configuration 
• Radial and axial hatches open (drogues not installed) 
• MDA internal platforms installed 
• MDA internnl GSE lighting installed 
! 
• MDA internal ground lug assembly installed 
• Radinl port protective sleeve installed 
• Axial port protective cover installed 
• Al1,MDA experiments installed 
7.7.10.5 Test Summary 
This test was utilized to retest many discrepancies de-
ferred from previous testing and was the final test for most of 
the hardware/systems which included the following: 
A. Electrical - Sequence 05 was deleted and S190 window 
heater control system verification was performed by Test Prepa-
ration Sheet (TPS) which successfully demonstrated the opera-
tion of the S190 heater system. 
B. Comm/lnstr/TV and C&W - During the TV system checkout, 
the camera power cable would not mate with TV input station. 
Problem was corrected by reworking the TV input station. 
C. Structural/Mechanica1/ECS - Failure of Docking port 
heater thermostat to close. Problem was corrected by replacing 
unit. 
D. Experiments-
• M5l8 
• M133 
• . M074 
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• Ml72 
• M093 
• M092 
e M17l 
., MDl 
at '1.'013 
" 
S01.9 
@ 
'1'027 
e M509 
0 EREP 
e Added index marks for visible alignment controls 
on S192. 
o Operated EREP through Sim Data Pass 
The test was successful and all test objectives were accomplished. 
7.7.11 Swing Arm Overall Test (KS-OOOS) 
7.7.11.1 Test Objectives 
Verify SWS/Launch Vehicle compatibility during countdown 
nnd during an abbreviated plus count (approximately 10 minutes) 
while in a minimum GSE/ESE cabling configuration. 
7.7.11.2 Test Location 
Vertical Assembly Buiilding (VAB) 
7.7.11.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• TCRSD MDC-E0122 
7.7.11.4 lest Configuration 
• AH/MDA/OWS/ATM/LV mechanically and electricDlly mDted. 
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• SWS BUR, DCS, INSTH, Coolant and C/W powered 
7.7.11.5 Test Summary 
MDA vent valves were operated through nll IU switch selector 
command combinations to determine the effect on SWS circuits. The 
TM event lights were monitored for proper indication during this 
operCltion. The insulation and window purge was initiated Lind 
terminated at swing arm retraction. All test objectives were 
accomplished. 
7.7.12 Saturn Workshop (SWS) Operations and Space Vehicle -
Overall Test Mission Simulation/Flight Readiness Test (KS-0009) 
7.7.12.1 Test Objectives 
A. Electrical System - Support systems and provide loads 
for simulated mission. 
B. Communication/Instrumentation/Television and Caution & 
Warning - Functionally verify proper operation of the Audio, TV 
Instrumentation and C&W Interface compatibility during Simulated 
Mission Sequence. 
C. Structures/Mechanical/ECS 
• Functionally operate MDA vent valves during a simu-
lated SL-l countdown and countup. 
• Activate all MDA fans in various combinations with 
other AM/MDA/OWS systemS to determine overall effects 
during simulated orbital operations. 
D. Experiments - Verify I?ompatibility of following experi-
ments with other systems when run concurrently: 
• M5l2 
• Proton Spectrometer 
• RNBM 
• S009 
• Operate Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP) 
in support of a simulated flight orbital operation. 
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7.7.12.2 Test Location 
Vertical Assembly Building (VAB) 
7.7.12.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• Test Checkout Requirements Specificntion and Criterin 
MDC-E0122 
• Skylab Integrnted System Test Checkout Requirement nnd 
Specifications (TCRSD) TM012-003-2H 
• Skylab (AM/MDA/ATM) PAD & VAB Mechanical System Require-
ments 65ICD9542 
7.7.12.4 Test Configurat~ 
• SWS/LV mechanically and electrically mated 
• M5l2 Vacuum System Connected 
• All MDA experiments installed and electrically con-
nected 
7.7.12.5 Test Summary 
The MDA hardware was operated primarily in support of an 
overall Mission Simulation and Flight Readiness Test. The test 
was performed with no major problems and test objectives were 
accomp lished. 
7.7.13 Integrated Crew Compartment Fit and Functional (C2F2) 
(KS-0010) 
7.7.13.1 Test Objectives 
A. Verify no interference between equipment that inter-
faces with the flight crew and other equipment. 
B. Demonstrate no impact to crew mobility and safety when 
functioning these interfaces. 
C. These objectives will be accomplished on equipment not 
previously verified at the contractor's plant and/or on equip-
ment that was modified/recalibrated subsequent to·yerificati6n 
at the contractor's plant. 
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7.;.13.2 Test Locntion 
Vertical Assembly Building (VAS) 
7.7.13.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
This TCP was developed to accomplish the deferred C2F2 
work originally specified in the MDA TCRSD. 
7.7.13.4 Test Configuration 
• SWS/LV mechanicnlly and electrically mated 
• AM/MDA powered down 
• AM/MDA internal lighting and platforms installed 
7.7.13.5 Test Summary 
This test was conducted with no major problem~ and all de-
ferred C2F2 items were accomplished. TCPs KM-30l4, Stc)wage of 
MDA Hardware, and KM-7000, Stowage of Experiments, were performed 
in conjunction with the integrated C2F2 TCP. 
7.7.14 Saturn Workshop Electrical and Mechanical Closeout 
(KS-0016) 
7.7.14.1 Test Objectives 
A. Perform all possible power-off AM/MDA/ATM final switch 
and valve verifications and white light inspections, external 
and internal, to the MDA prior to Countdown ,Demonstration Test 
(COOT) •. 
B. Perform docking drogue installation in MOA axial and 
radial tunnels and clos!out docking port hatches. 
C. Perform axial docking target installntion. 
D. Perform fit check of S009 detector package. 
7.7.14.2 Test Location 
Vertical Assembly Building (VAB) 
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7.7.14.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
o Skylab Integrated System Test Checkout Requirements nnd 
Specificationb. TM012-003-2H. 
" Skylab (AM/MDA/ATM) pad and VAn MechnnicnlSystems Re-
quirements. 65ICD9542. 
7.7.14.4 Test Configuration 
Q MDA axinl port externnl access platform installed 
$ SWS/LV mechanically and electrically mated 
$ AM/MDA powered down 
• AM/MDA internal lighting and platforms installed 
7.7.14.5 Test Summary 
Final "Cheakout" was accomplished of all open items which 
would not be used or disturbed during Countdown Demonstration 
and Countdown. All possible unpowered switch and valve position-
ing was performed. Final photographs and biological samples were 
taken. All test objectives were accomplished with no major prob-
lems. 
7.7.15 SWS Operations for S-V CDDT-Recycle-CD (KS-0007) 
7.7.15.1 Test Objectives 
A. Countdown Demonstration (MDA) 
B. Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP): 
S193 PYRO installation check of reset relays and stray voltage 
was made. 
S193 and S194 antenna protective covers were removed. 
C. Provide MDA purge from cryo loading through lift off. 
(SIM) CDna:. 
D. Remove all MDA internal nonflight CQvers for AM/MDA 
closeout. 
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E. Perform final AM/MDA leak test. 
F. Remove all MDA external nonflight covers prior to 
countdown. 
G. Remove MDA window covers and inspect and clean windows. 
H. Install radial docking target. 
1. Place all MDA switches and valves in final position for 
AM/MDA closeout, and photograph. 
J. Remove MDA hoist and track for AM/MDA closeout. 
K. Remove MDA internal lights and platforms for AM/MDA 
closeout. 
lout. 
,:-. 
L. Perform final white light inspection for AM/MDA close-
7.7.15.2 Test Location 
Launch Complex (LC) 39A 
7.7.15.3 Documents Used to Develop this TCP 
• Systems Composite Mechanical Schematics lOM30899 
• AM/MDA Mechanical ICD l3M02521 
• Skylab (AM/MDA/ATM) pad and VAB Mechanical System Re-
quirements 65ICD9542 
• Skylab Integrated System Test Checkout Requirements and 
SpeCifications TM012-003-2H 
• Test and Checkout Requirements, Specifications and Cri-
teria at KSC for fu~/MDA. MDC-E0122 
7.7.15.4 Test Config~!ation 
• SL-l 'stacked on pad 
at AM/MDA powered down 
• MDA radial and axial hatches closed, drogues installed 
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• AM/l:1DA internal lighting and platforms instnlled 
• MDA hoist and track assembly installed 
• Payload Shroud Platform levels 1, 2, 3, nnd 4 installed 
• Axial Docking Target installed 
7.7.15.5 Test Summary 
Final equipment and film vault stowage was performed, 
prior to AM/MDA closeout, per TCP KM-3014. 
Sequentia11y, the white light inspection, nonflight cover 
removal, MDA switch and valve positioning and photography was 
performed on the upper and lower MDA platform levels. The 
lights and platforms were removed in the same order, which com-
pleted MDA closeout operations. 
External MDA operations included nonflight ,cover removal, 
MDA Window Inspection and Cleaning (concurrent with internal 
operation). During recycle only, the external nonflight covers 
were reinstalled for final removal during CD. All test objec-
tives were accomplished. 
The final countdown was conducted with no problem on the 
MDA. 
7.8 MISSION SUPPORT TESTING 
7.8.1 Introduction 
Mission support testing of MDA hardware in St. Louis was 
directed by the SL-AL/MDA Program Office. Testing was per-
formed per Engineering Test Order (ETO). The ETO identified the 
test objectives and established test requirements. Sometimes 
the test procedure was contained in the ETO, but normally the 
test procedure was contained in a Mi.ssion Preparation Sheet (MPS) 
if "MDA only" hardware was involved, or by a PCN to a MDAC-E 
Test ~rocedure (SEDR) if the MDA and the AM were involved. 
~~C also provided mission support to the MDAC-E, Skylab 
Test Unit/Spacecraft Tracking and Data Netwbrk (STU/STDN)'simu-
lator. See paragraph 7.9. 
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7.8.2 On-Module Mission Support 
7.8.2.1 MDA Work Station Evaluation(ETO MDA/SL/BU/94) 
This test was performed on 5/18/73 to determine the mini-
mum on-orbit lighting requireu in the MDA to support the SL-2 
mission under reduced power conditions. Minimum lighting 
arrangements ·were subjectively determined, and recommendations 
were forwarded to KSC. 
7.8.2.2 Radial Hatch/Docking Probe Interference Test(ETO MDA/ 
SL/BU/95) 
This test was performed on 8/30/73 in support of SL-3. It 
proveu that although there are dimensional differences in the 
axial & radial docking ports, there would be no trouble docking 
a CSM to the r[ldial port if [I rescue mission were required. 
7.8.2.3 Determination of AM/MDA EMI Noise Levels in Support of 
SL-l(ETO MDA/SL/BU/9~ 
This test was performed to determine the magnitude of EMI 
on utility outlets in the MDA at three specific frequencies. 
The test was performed to support the "6-pack" Rate Gyro instal-
l[ltion on orbit and indicated that noise levels measured would 
not affect its operation. 
7.8.2.4 Multipurpose Electrical Furnace (MEF) Control Package 
to Flammability SpeCimen Mounting Ring Electrical Resistance 
Test(ETO MDA/SL/BU/97) 
This test was performed to determine the electrical resis-
tance between the MEF control package and its mounting point. 
Data was gathered to verify a different MEP power interface 
for SL-4 and forwarded to KSC for evaluation. 
7.8.2.5 Removal of MDA Cabin Fan 4F2 Diffuser with In-Flight 
Maintenance Tools (ETO MDA/SL/BU/98) 
This test was performed to determine if the :/12 Cabin Fan 
diffuser could ~e removed with in-flight maintenance tools. The 
removal was being considered to effect cooling of the "6-Pack" 
rate gyros. Removal was accomplished with In-Flight Maintenance 
tools and th~ procedure used in test was forwarded to KSC. 
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7.8.2.q Fit Check of S082 Timer Cable(ETO MDA/SL/B'!/99) 
MSFC's decision to add a timer to the S082 Experiment re-
sulted in a test being performed in support of SL-4, to fit 
check an auxiliary S082 Timer Cable in the MDA nnd to eVDlunte 
a crew procedure for instnlling the cable. SL-4 crew members 
participated in the test on 9/12/73. The fit check was sads-
factorily accomplished and the crew members approved the pro-
cedure. 
7.8.2.7 Fit Check of ATM TV Bus Redundancy Connector Module 
(ETO MDA/SL/BU/IOO) 
This test was performed to determine the best way to in-
stall a connector module capable of switching the ATM TV from 
one Bus to another in the event one Bus is lost. It was per-
formed with a mock-up module on 9/17/73 in support of SL-4. A 
procedure was developed and recommendations were forwarded to 
JSC. 
7.8.2.8 Timer Cable Crew Interface(ETO MDA/SL/BU/10l) 
This test was performed on 9/17/73 to evaluate the task of 
demating and remating ATM C&D Panel connectors on-orbit in sup-
port of SL-4. It was basically a rerun of ETO 99, using a dif-
ferent pair of connector pliers. The procedure developed in 
ETO 99 required demating and remating a total of four connectors 
to install the cable. It was desirable to develop a procedure 
that would not require demating more than one connector. A 
procedure was developed, using the same connector pliers (on-
board maintenance) that were used in ETO 99, and forwarded to 
JSC for evaluation. 
7.8.2.9 Fit Check of S082 Timer Cables (ETO MDA/SL/BU/102) 
This test was performed to select one of two cables fabri-
cated for SL-4 and verify crew procedures for installation. A 
crew systems representative from JSC hand carried the cables 
and procedures to St. Louis. Several methods were tried on 
9/24/73 and test results were sent to JSC for evaluation. 
7.8.2.10 Fit Check Two TV Bus Connector Modules ~TO MDA/SL/BU/ 
103> 
This test was performed on 9/25/73 to evaluate the task of 
installing a connector module in the ATM C&D on-orbit. It ~as 
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basically a rerun of ETO 100 with two flight quality connectors. 
Installation of both modules was verified and as a result, the 
ETO 100 procedures were amended. Test results were sent to JSC 
by a participating JSC representative. 
7.8.2.11 Radial Docking Port Insulation Blanket Removal Verifi-
~ation(ETO MDA/8L/BU/l04) 
This tesl; was performed on 6il4/73 to develop a method for 
removal of the radial port insulation blanket from within the 
MDA. The test was performed to support a proposal to carry an 
auxiliary Solar Array Module on SL-4 that would be docked to 
the HDA radial port. Access to the Solar Array Module on..orbit 
would be through the Radial Docking Port from inside the MDA. 
The insulation blanket in question was designed to be removed 
from outside tr.e MDA. Two, methods for removal of the blanket 
from inside were successfully employed and test results were 
sent to JSC. 
7.8.2.12 Fit Check of Cable for the "Carry-Up" Rate Gyro 
Package(ETO MDA/SL/BU/l05) 
This test was performed to fit check a "y" cable to supply 
power for the "6-pack" rate gyro package that was instalt~d in 
the MDA by the 8L-3 crew to replace the ailing SWS rat:~·. gyros 
on orbit. The test successfully developed a procedur~ for in-
stalling the "yU cable in the Flight MDA. 
7.8.2.13 MDA Ground Measurements Analysis(ETO MDA/SL/BU/l06) 
This test was performed to evaluate MDA transient voltages 
and the possibility of their affecting the "6-pack" rate gyros 
on the SL-3 mission. A modified simulated flight sequence was 
run and voltage transient measurements were made at Panel 139. 
Data accumulated was sent to M8FC for evaluation. 
7.8.2.14 M518 Power Adapter Assembly Test(ETO MDA/SL/BU/l07) 
This test was performed to fit check and test a power cable 
that would allow M5l8 to be powered from Panel 202-CB5l2 rather 
than Panel 115 which was already in use. The cable was installed, 
flight loads were simulated, and the M5l8 was operated. The test 
was successful and results were sent to MSFC. 
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7.8.2.15 Fit Check of Flight S082 Timer CablemTO MDA/SL/BU/108) 
This test was a rerun of ETO's 99 and 100 with a modified 
back-shell design. JSC personnel participated in the success-
ful test and a new installation procedure was developed. Test 
results were sent to JSC. ' 
7.8.2.16 Evaluation of Screw Removal Tools (ETO MDA/SL/BU/109) 
This test was performed to evaluate new tools that were 
designed for removal of the ATM C&D kickp1ate on-orbit because 
flight maintenance tools were inadequate. 
Two tool designs ~ere evaluated that could successfully 
remove the screws in question. One design of a collet type was 
determined to be best. Test results were sent to JSC. 
7.8.3 Sky1ab Test Unit/Spacecraft Tracking & Data Network (STU/ 
STDN) 
Mission support for pre-launch and inf1ight television 
anomaly investigation was provided by utilization of the STU/ 
STDN simulator at MDAC-E, St. Louis. 
MMC support of the television system portion included 
design of breadboards, GSE and simulated components, as well as 
providing the personnel to investigate anomalies and evaluate 
system performance during and after each mission. The Skylab 
TV system portion of the STU is shown in Figure 7.8-1. 
System performance was evaluated by review of video 
recordings of down1inked real and de1~yed time color TV and 
ATM TV. Details of the overall STU/STDN activities are dis-
cussed in paragraph 7.9. 
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7.9 MMC STU/STDN ACTIVITY 
7.9.1 Background 
The Systems Test Unit (STU)/Spacecraft Tracking and Data Network 
(STDN) was established at MDAC-E by the NASA to provide mission 
support for the orbital Skylab Communications and TV systems. 
The test configuration was implemented to the extent necessary to 
permit ground simulation and fault isolation of anomalies that 
might occur in these systems. MMC supported this activity with 
TV system personnel during all mission phases and, in addition, 
provisioned the following hardware components for the test unit: 
~ TVIS Simulator with nonflight connectors 
~ TVIS Simulator Isolation and MOunting Plates (4) 
m VTR Simulator 
o Video Selector Switch Breadboard 
@ TVIS Breadboard Modification 
o' New TVIS Simulators with Flight Connectors 
~ T027 Simulator Cable 
o Video Selector Switch Delta Qual Unit 
(r) TVIS Unit 
During the establishment of this facility, MMC was directed 
to provide an EREP Diagnostic Data Unit (EDDU) to permit telemetry 
of selected EREP data to the various ground stations. This 
capability was implemented via the TVIS from the EREP C&D Panel 
as described in paragraph 7.9.2-C below. Total system compatibility 
was functionally verified utilizing an EDDU breadboard in the 
STU/STDN facility. 
MDA personnel participated in the planning, testing and 
readiness review activities at this facility prior to SL-l launch. 
During the mission, MDA TV personnel supported the evaluation of 
downlinked TV and the development of procedures for onboard 
repair/replacement of orbital TV hardware that had failed, e.g., 
the VTR. 
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7.9.2 Hardware Description 
A. TV Input Station Simulator - Good flight fidelity was a 
major goal in the fabrication of the system, however, it was not 
necessary to make exact duplications in all cases. A flight TV 
Input Station (TVIS) was acquired for the installation, but the 
remaining four were simulated in their "off" state, since only 
one TVIS was active at anyone time. In the "off" position, the 
TVIS behaved as a switch to connect the bus input to the TV bus 
output and utilized only a minimal amount of circuitry in accom-
plishing this. The actual parts comprising this circuitry, a 
PC board, relay, coax cabling and connector, were used in the 
TVIS simulator and verified by Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) 
tests. The TVIS simulator duplicated the flight TVIS in the "off" 
mode. A flight Video Switch and VTR were assembled in racks 
along with the TVIS and simulator using actual lengths of flight 
type cable with all significant system cable impedance discon-
tinuities duplicated. Care was taken to preserve the single point 
ground concept so that only one signal ground was used at the CSl({ 
simulator. 
B. TVIS and Video Switch Breadboard - Breadboard models of 
the TVIS aud the Video Switch were built to provide a flexible 
diagnostic capability for the installation. The design criteria 
applied to each unit was the functional portion of respective flight 
hardware specifications. The TVIS breadboard was a, modification 
of the engineering model. This was accomplished by mounting the 
amplifier boards on standoffs external to the TVIS housing, while 
the power supply remained inside the housing. One chan~el of the 
Video Switch c9nsisting of a DC to DC converter and amplifier was 
built and packaged with flight connectors. The parts on both 
TVIS and Video Switch breadboards were easily accessible for prob-
ing or for component ch~nges. Both units were verified prior to 
installation into STU/STDN by performing functional tests in ac-
cordance with their individual Acceptance Test Procedures. 
C. EREP Diagnostic Downlink Unit (EDDU) - A new Skylab 
mission requirement for a downlink capability for EREP led to de-
sign of a device to interface EREP data with the TV system through 
a TVIS. This device, called the EREP Diagnostic Downlink Unit 
(EDDU), processed EREP data to the correct amplitude, bias level 
and impedance source for compatibility with the TVIS interface 
specifications. 
(1) Design Requirements - The design requirements for 
the flight and One-G trainer EDDUls were specified 
in the "End Item Specification for Flight Hardware 
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for EREP Diagnos tic Downlink Unit", ,MSC-05512, 
dated March 11, 1973. The lCD's affected were 
40M35673, (PIRN MMC-O) , 40M35673, (PIRN MMC-9) and 
50M16154 (PIRN MMC-12). These units were built to 
model shop standards and the DD250 activity was not 
constrained by the approval of the above referenced 
documentation. 
Parallel with the building' of the flight hardware 
and storage provisions was a feasibility program 
to determine the compatibility of the EREP data 
downlink with the TV system, CSM USB transmitter, 
and the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN). 
A one channel breadboard was built and tested to 
criteria included in the amendment to the contract 
modification authorized by CCA 857 Rev. 1 dated 
3-16-73. 
(2) Functional Description - The EDDU provided a method 
of checking the real time data outputs from EREP. 
A total of twenty-eight channels were carried on 
three cables from the EREP C&D panel 'to the EREP 
Recorder. Twenty-six of these were digital data 
channels and two were FM data channels. One cable 
carried eight channels and two additiohal cables 
carried ten channels each. 
In order to check or monitor the EREP real time 
data outputs, it was necessary that the cables be 
manually connected to the EDDU. Only one cable 
could be connected and tested at a time. A ,rotary 
switch on the EDDU permitted the selection of the 
desired data channel and routed it to ariisolation 
amplifier. The signal was then fed to the SWS TV 
system for eventual transmittal to a ground station 
where it was monitored for data content. 
An EDDU breadboard was built to the same electrical 
design as the flight unit, utilizing as many of the 
identical components as possible. Cabling and con-
nectors were identical to the flight units. 
Two pieces of test equipment for testing the EDDU 
BB were also built. One, the Input Signal Simula-
tor (ISS), simulated the EREP C&D Panel data channel 
signals and outputs. The other, the Tape Recorder 
Input Simulator (TRIS), simulated the EREP Tape 
Recorder inputs. 
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The ISS was built so that anyone of the 28 data 
channels could be simulated. The ISS had 10 digital 
data outputs, two of which could be FM data outputs. 
The TRIS simulated the input loads of the EREP Tape 
Recorder data channels. 
(3) Test - Each box was tested at Denver individually, 
then in the complete system. The final tests were 
performed at STU/STDN to simulate the rest of the 
flight system. 
• Testing at Denver was performed by I&C engineering. 
• No formal tests were performed or required on 
the EDDU flight units in Denver. 
No formal test procedures were available. Minimal 
testing was accomplished at STU/STDN. ' 
Testing of the EDDU breadboard at STU/STDN was per-
formed to Test Procedure, STDN Test EDOl8 generated 
) by I&C engineering. No problems were encountered 
and testing was successfully completed. 
(4) Mission Results - The EDDU was first used on SL-3. 
It performed satisfactorily for this and the follow-
ing (SL-4) mission. 
(5) Conclusions and Recommendations - The EDDU Breadboard, 
ISS and TRIS were built in limited time. More time 
for procurement of parts would have been helpful, 
as some parts were received late and had to be in-
stalled at St. Louis. 
The circuits all performed as expected. The results 
of the test gave I&C confidence that the EDDU would 
pass data through the TV system without degradation. 
7.9.3 Prelaunch Tests 
A test plan was formulated by MMC a~d MDAC-E engineers from 
test requirements prepared by SE&I and put into a MDAC-E format. 
These tests were designed to assure STU/STDN system readiness, 
provide calibration dat.a and off-nominal and anomalous performance 
characteristics. The evaluation was done in three steps: #1-
System Nominal Tests, #2 - Off-nominal Tests and #3 - Anomaly 
Testing. 
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The tests of Step #1 were preceded by an installation valida-
tion test, i.e., a continuity and short test of the systems cab-
ling and grounding system. The remainder of the test followed 
the outline below. 
7.9.3.1 STU TV Phase II Test Requirements 
A. CSM/STDN Calibration -
Q) Carrier Noise 
o Signal Noise 
• FM Demod CW and Dynamic Characteristics 
B. 
• Transmitter Static Characteristics 
~ Transmitter Frequency Response 
~ CSM/STDN Dynamic Response 
• CSM/STDN Linearity 
• CSM/STDN Diff. Gain 
e CSM/STDN TI LT 
c CSM/STDN K Factor 
e Audio Splitter Cal. 
• Color Converter Cal. 
a VTR Control Function - DCS and Manual 
Systems Test With GSE Signal Source -
(1) Color Camera TV 
Distribution System SWS Onl:t; SWSLCSM/STDN 
RLT VTR PLB RLT VTR PLB 
Freq. Response X X X X 
Linearity X X X X 
Diff. Gain X X X X 
Tilt X X X X 
K Factor X X X X 
Video SIN X X X X 
Transmitter Deviation N/A N/A X X 
(2) ATM 
Freq. Response 
Linearity 
Diff. Gain 
Tilt 
K Factor 
Video SiN 
SWS Only sws/CSMLsTDN 
'MON-l MON-2 MON-l MON-2 
RLT PLB R/T PLB RLT PLB R/T PLS-
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X 
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C. Systems Test With Camera Inputs As Signal Sources -
ATM SWS Onlx: SWS L CSML S TON 
MON-l MON-2 MON-l MON-2 
RLT P/B RLT P/B R/T P/B RLT p/B 
Resolution X X X X X X X X 
Grey Scale X X X X 
Video Levels X X N/A N/A 
Transmitter 
Deviation N/A N/A N/A N/A X X 
D. Off-Nominal Tests -
(1) Vary power bus voltage from 24 to 30 volts and 
measure output at MDA/CSM interface: 
• With MDA TVIS activated and with 50% multiburst 
input. 
o With Video Switch activated in ATM-l position 
with 50% multiburst input. 
(2) Vary input video signal to MDA TVIS 
• Peak to Peak amplitude from 1.5 to 2.0 volts. 
~ Sync tip bias -0.7 to +0.57 volts. 
• Maintaining ATM sync amplitude and sync tip bias 
.constant, vary ATM video to determine input 
level which causes white compression. 
• With standard video input to video switch, vary 
gain of video switch to determine pot-.nt at which 
white compression first occurs. 
E. Anomaly Testing - A final form of tests was devised to 
observe and record operational symptoms resulting from induced 
anomalous performan~e to assist in recognition of system malfunc-
tions and to aid iIi. fault locat ion during miss ion support. The 
following effects Il4-ere evaluated. 
• Converter Noise - Open filter capacitors in Video 
Switch Breadboard to produce coherent nOise. 
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• Shield Grounds - Ground TV bus shield at TVIS output, 
Video Switch TV bus input and VTR video input. Ground 
ATM video shield at MDA Video Switch video input. 
Witness effects of ground loops on TV performance. 
• Power Grounds - Connect 28 V return to structure 
ground and note effects of ground loops on TV per-
formance. 
• Crosstalk - Introduce video signal into MDA TVIS with 
MDA Video Switch in ATM - MON-l mode and with no ATM 
video input, observe crosstalk. on output TV signal 
with and without a short between ATM and TV bus shield 
and TV bus shield connected to structure ground. 
• Supply Voltage - Drop supply voltage to TVIS and MDA 
Video Switch to that point which causes degradation 
in video output and note values. 
7.9.4 Mission Support 
Mission support effort was conducted mainly in two areas, 
monitoring system performance through tape reviews and conduct-
ing special tests in compliance with I&C action requests. Im-
plicit also to support was another segment consisting of station 
keeping. ' 
A. Tape Reviews - The continuing surveillance of TV system 
performance was supported by systematic review of video tapes 
dubbed from originals made at the MILA STDN. In contrast to SL-2 
support, the tapes monitored for SL-3 were VRllOO to V'RllOO dubs, 
instead of VR660 originals, and in general, produced much improved 
NTSC color conversion than the VR660tapes. 
The purpose of the review was to identify significant per-
formance degradation, rather than small variations'. This review 
method was largely by design, but, in part, was due to necessity. 
,Although the VRllOO tapes appeared to have lower noise content 
than the VR660 tapes received during the previous mission, noise' 
still precluded rigorous evaluation of frequency response and 
linearity using the VITS of the portable color camera. This effect 
existed even when the video SIN was sufficient for good TV view-
ing and was due to the eye's response to noise when viewing 
A-AXIS display of video, as opposed to Z-AXIS display. The eye 
tended to respond to peak values of noise for the former case 
and rms values for the latter. Another contribution to the dif-
ference was that the video SiN calculated for TV viewing was 
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based on maximum video signal (100 IEF..E units), whereas, measure-
ment of VITS for frequency response, for instance, used the actual 
amplitude of the bursts. The results of these factors was to 
produce a drastic disparity in the effects of noise on the two 
different displays with the SiN of "A" display often being 26 DB 
below that calculated for TV viewing. 
The tape review was implemented in procedural form which set 
a minimum requirement for the review, and did not attempt to 
limit the parameters of performance to be monitored. Listed be-
low are some additional parameter variables that were surveyed 
for anomalies. 
• Geometric Linearity 
• Image Orientation 
• Image Burn 
• Beam Extinction 
• Shading 
• ALC Stability 
• Sync Stability 
• Face Plate Contaminants 
The technique of selectively photographing waveforms and 
logging characteristics allowed frequent back check of data for 
trend detection. 
Color conversion was made of portable TV camera video with 
best results when the converter had been adjusted using taped 
sequences having the Skylab color bar chart in the scene. Use 
of the Field Sequential Color Bar generator as a color signal 
source in adjusting the converter produced color with a red cast 
when Skylab tapes were processed. Skylab lighting probably ac-
counted for this requirement for color .correction. 
The review of SL-2 and SL-3 and SL-4 MILA mission tapes led 
to the identification of several degrading factors in the per-
formance of the TV system. The most significant of these are 
listed below: 
(1) SL-2 VR660 Original Tapes from MILA 
e On Tape 14503, camera SIN 3002 exhibited coherent 
.. noise when televising a low light level scen~ 
and on occasion in those views out o~ the win-
dow, black spots showed up in the lower third 
quadrant of the picture. 
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• The review of Tape #15003 revealed black spots 
in lower third quadrant of the picture again. 
This occurrence was during TV37 where the earth 
was viewed from the window. 
(2) SL-3 Dubs of VRllOO Tapes from MILA made onto VRllOO 
Tapes at MSFC -
• The Vertical Interval Test Signal (VITS) of port~ 
able TV camera SiN 3006 increased from 100/40 
IEEE units video to sync format to B 130/40 IEEE 
format. On DOY 252, the VITS format was 1~O/40. 
Q Portable TV Camera SiN 3002 failed on DOY 236. 
Review of mission tapes indicated that the cam-
era temperature reached approximately 740 C during 
the EVA on that day. 
• The portable TV Camera signal was observed to 
have a "bounce" of approximately 5 IEEE units 
when the signal was viewed on the waveform moni-
tor. The "bounce" did not affect the black and 
white or color quality. The "bounce" was observed 
on DOY 248 and 253. 
o A pulse of approximately 10 IEEE units was ob-
served on the VITS Multiburst Signal on DOY 225 
and 228. The pulse was located 8 microseconds 
from the right edge of the mu1tiburst signal. 
The problem was isolated to the VRi100 dubbing 
process, as the pulse did not appear on the 
original tapes. 
• On DOY 265 the video from the ATMH-A1pha-2 
camera was pulsating from very light to dark at 
a 1 Hz rate. The focus was changing at the same 
rate. This was an indication of problems in the 
ALC circuits of the H-A1pha-2 camera. 
• Image burn was seen on the ATM H-Alpha-2 dumps. 
The image burn was observed on DOY 244. The 
video to sync format of the ATM H-A1pha-2 was 
normal at 100/40 IEEE. 
o Peak White Inversion was observed at various 
times between DOY 215 and 239. The problem was 
found to be in the VR1100 dubbing process as the 
Peak White Inversion did not appear in the VR1100 
originals. 
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o The temperature pulse on portable TV 
camera SiN 3002 and SiN 3006 was measured on 
DOY 233. The position of the pulse differed 
between cameras. The temperature pulse of SiN 
3006 was displaced approximately 1.5 micro-seconds 
to the left. This caused the leading edge of 
the temperature pulse to meet the trailing edge 
of the VTR Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM) pulse 
before the trailing edge of the PAM pulse could 
reach blanking. 
(3) SL-4 Dubs of VRllOO Tapes from MILA made onto VRllOO 
Tapes at MSFC 
• The format of the VITS of both portable color 
cameras varied from 100/40 to 130/40 throughout 
the mission. Significant differences between 
VITS formats of cameras SiN 3004 and S/N 3006 
were not noted. 
• The VITS temperature pulse was periodically 
monitored throughout the review of the MILA tapes. 
The highest cameras temperature noted was 50 
degrees centigrade (122 degrees F) on DOY 012, 
dump 130-1 from camera 3004. The temperature 
pulse from camera SiN 3006 continued to be dis-
placed approximately 1.S micro-seconds as was 
noted in the SL-3 tape review. 
• Narrow spikes, due to head switching during the 
dubbing process, were seen during the horizontal . 
sync pulse on several tapes. 
• TV sequence TV64 was recorded on the Sky lab VTR 
prior to the connection of the SL-4 CSM/MDA 
umbilicals. Recording on the VTR without the 
impedance loading of the CSM transmitter created 
an impedance mismatch. Review of a tape dub of 
the downlink of TV64 revealed peak white clipping 
and loss of detail in high light areas. This 
resulted from clipping of the peak white levels. 
G Review of video transmitted via a newly installed 
inflig~t maintenance TVIS indicated the unit 
was performing satisfactorily. 
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• Earth scenes through spacecraft windows using 
camera SiN 3006 showed spots thought to be con-
taminates on the camera face plate. 
• An intense oval burn spot located at approximately 
10 o'clock on the periphery of the occulting 
disc was noted during dump 46-1 on DOY 343. A 
second burn spot located above and to the right 
of the first spot was seen on dump 119-1 DOY 
006, 1974. These burn spots appeared to increase 
in size by DOY 024 as seen in dump 191-3. 
Additional parameter variables were surveyed for 
anomalies, but did not show significant degradation. 
B. I&C Action Requests (AR's) - Eleven r&C AR's were issued 
to STU/STDN and answered in the period from SL-2 to SL-3 splash-
down. All but four required end-to-end system operation and one 
investigated a new application for the TV down-link. All AR re-
sponses were preceded by an internal MMC STU/STDN document, the 
Engineering Work Order (EWO) , that directed and documented the 
method in which the data was derived. 
The following AR's were directed to STU/STDN for action: 
(1) IC-30 - Required operation of audio and TV systems 
~o determine the effect of light weight headset 
position and orientation on audio quality. 
The STU audio system was configured and connected 
to the VTR audio input. Ustng a test pattern gen-
erator, a video input was also provided to the VTR. 
Recorded signals and levels and the corresponding 
results noted during VTR and playback were recorded 
to provide a baseline for the LWHS test. Tests 
j with the LWHS showed that it could be worn or hand-
held at distances up to six inches and produce ac·· 
ceptable audio provided the microphone was oriented 
toward the mouth. 
(2) IC-38 - Test the TV system to determine the most 
suitable point at which to insert AM tape recorder 
data for downlink through the CSM FM S-band link. 
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Five possible downlink configurations were tested: 
• AM recorder hardline output "A" to input of AM 
TVIS. 
• AM recorder hard line output "A" to input of MDA 
Video Switch (J2). 
• AM recorder NRZ output "A" to input of AM TVIS. 
G AM recorder NRZ output "A" to input of MDA Video 
Switch (J2). 
o AM recorder NRZ output "A" to input Channel "1" 
of MDA EDDU and then to input AM TVIS. 
The above five tests showed either the AM recorder 
hardline output "A" to AM TVIS or MIlA. Video Switch 
would be an acceptable means of downlinking AM 
ree.order data. 
(3) IC-40 - Measure the VTR PAM audio pulse with ~e­
spect to the leading edge of the horizontal sync 
pulse on selected dubs of flight video tapes. 
(4) 
Playback of selected flight tapes were made on the 
STU VR1200 recorder using the demod output. Mea-
surements showed that the PAM pulse width remained 
at 2.22 usec on all flight dumps and at 2.06 usec 
on both tapes made at KSC on 2/15 and 2/16. , 
IC-54 - Required operation of the STU audio and 
video system to determine the maximum audio level 
possible into the VTR before limiting occurs at 
the audio splitter output. 
An audio signal of varying level:~ .l:rom 10 to 0.4 
VRMS was applied to the audio system via SIA head-
set lines and recorded on the VTR for playback. A 
video "ten step grey seale" signal was also re-
corded on the VTR simultaneously. 
Measurement on the playback signals indicate that 
limiting occurred at an audio input level of 4.0 
VRMS. 
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(5) IC-56 - Required operation of the STU Video System 
to determine the effect of DC offset on output 
signal quality. 
The video switch bias adjustment was used to apply 
the DC offset. Video inputs of stair step and sin2 
window signal at 100/28 format were used. DC off-
sets of from -0.14 volts to -2.5 volts sync tip 
reference at the M~/CSM interface were obtained 
with no apparent degradation of the output signals. 
(6) IC-58 - Required operation of STU Video System to 
determine frequency or modulation characteristics 
of S-band transmitters as a function of VTR play-
back with no composite video input at an active 
TVIS. 
With no signal there was no modulation of the carrier. 
With the VTR in record mede and no video signal, 
there was a modulation of 0.465 MHz on the carrier. 
With the VTR in playback and no video signal, there 
was a modulation of 3.433 MHz on the carrier. 
(7) IC-62 - Required operation of the STU VTR (S/N 
FLT 8) with the backup VTR (SiN FLT 7) for compati-
bility test. 
Good co~mpatibility was achieved in all combinations 
of transpoxt and electronic units of FLT 7 and FLT 
8 VTR's. The worst case existed between FLT 7 
electronics and FLT 8 t~ansport unit. 
(8) IC-72 - Perform a VTR playback with J4 connector 
cable between electronics unit and transport unit 
disconnected. 
The output at the MDA/CSM interface showed noise 
spikes of 4.25 volts with a 4.0 millisecond pause 
between spikes. 
The signal, after downlink, shbwed noise spikes of 
-1.0 to +2.0 volts. The S-band frequency at ISO 
AMP output was 2271.2414 MHz. Spectrum analyzer 
data showed a noise spectrum of 40 0 MHz band\.3idth 
and centered at 50.425 M1!z. 
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(9) IC-73 - Required STU/STDN personnel to develop a 
procedure to remove circuit boards from the VTR 
electronics unit. 
A color video tape was produced which covered the 
entire circuit board removal procedure. A written 
procedure was also prepared to accompany the tape. 
The procedure was approved by the on-site RCA repre-
sentative. 
(10) IC-81 - Directed support crew training on AM Tape 
Recorder rework and VTR circuit board change. 
On 9/11/73 and 9/12/73, crew members Lind, Pogue 
and Carr successfully accomplished all tasks per 
written procedures. No further action was requested. 
(11) IC-87 - Directed the shipment of the backup VTR 
. (S/N FLT 7) to RCA, Camden, New Jersey, to test 
failed flight circuit boards. 
VTR shipped 9/24/73 to Camden, New Jersey. 
(12) IC-106 - Record video on the VTR without the CSM 
transmitter connected. Reconnect transmitter, dump 
and evaluate the video. 
White levels above about 55 IEEE units were clipped 
due to saturation in the VTR. 
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8. MANUFACTURING 
8. 1 ARTICLE S MANUFACTURED 
The Manufacturing Department was involved in the fabrica-
tion of the following articles. 
8.1.1 Engineering Mockup/One-G Trainer (See Figures 8.1-1 and 8.1-2) 
The structural/electrical development phase was initiated 
with the fabrication and assembly of the Engineering NOckup Unit 
(EMU) on the factory floor at the ~A mockup area. The EMU was 
then shipped to MDAC-East where it was mated with the STS-Airlock 
NOdule for CSR. The EMU was returned to Denver after CSR and 
updated to become the One-G Trainer. The One-G Trainer was 
modified in a mockup area using the team concept in order to 
reduce the necessary paper work. The team consisted of structure 
and electrical design engineering, manufacturing pre-production 
and production engineers, and manufacturing fabrication personnel. 
The One-~Trainer was then shipped to JSC-Houston to be used to 
support extensive crew training operations. During these oper-
ations the effort was supported by the Denver Manufacturing 
Engineering Group providing modification instructions and 
technical assistance for design updating. 
8.1.2 Development Mockup (DMU) (See Figure 8.1-3) 
After completion of the EMU and prior to the One-G Trainer 
modification, a development unit was fabricated in the factory 
mockup area. The electrical harnesses were developed on this, 
the DMU, to determine wire lengths and routing paths. The simu-
lated harnesses were built in the mockup; then removed and placed 
on harness boards. Using the simulated harnesses as models, 
Mylar overlays were designed and used for component location and 
routing of the production har!1essand cables. 
Several new manufacturing concepts and techniques were 
introduced during this development phase. Flammability protection 
of MDA cabling required that all internal wiring be enclosed in 
"flourel" tubing and connectors closed in woven fiberglass 
"beta bags". Connectors and cabling that required crew "mating 
and de-mating" to power boxes, intercoms, and experiments 
required the use of quick disconnect type connectors and flexible 
"convolex" tubing. Section 2.2.4 of this report includes illus-
trations of these fabrication techniques. 
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Figure 8 . 1-1 MDA EMU 
Figure 8.1-2 MDA One-G Trainer 
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Figure 8 .1-3 MDA DMU 
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All wiring was enclosed and routed through cable trays 
to provide cable protection during flight operations. Design 
requirements called for both redundant and backup wiring cir-
cuits, to be separated physically and routed independently. This 
resulted in close routing conditions within the trays, increasing 
the tight tolerances necessary for the harness builds. Equipment 
fit checks (intercoms, outlet boxes) were performed in conjunction 
with harness development. The DMU was updated, after the harness 
development phase, to meet the Code 4 Clean Room environment, and 
then routed to the SSB high bay to be used as a three-dimensional 
harness build fixture. 
8.1.3 Structural Test Article 
The MDA structural test article 'shell was built at MSFC 
exclusive of cut-outs for the EREP window, mounting plates, and 
supporting structure. It was used to support both the static 
and dynamic test programs. The following mass' simulators were 
provided to MSFC for use in the static test article: 
• 10 Band MUltispectral Scanner, 
• IR Scanner Tracker, 
• Multispectral Photography, 
• EREP Support Equipment Rack #1, 
• EREP Support Equipment Rack #2, 
• EREP Support Equipment Rack 13, 
• ATM C&D Panel, 
• Film Vault iff 3 , 
• Fan. 
The structural shell was shipped to Martin Marietta 
Aerospace, Denver, after completion of the static test. ·MMC 
outfitted the Static Test Article to the Dynamic Test Configura-
tion for use at MSFC in an acoustic vibration test. 
8.1.4 Flight and Flight Backup 
The Flight and Flight Backup shell structures were built 
at MSFC and shipped to Denver for the installation effort. All 
cut-outs and ~enetrations were made at MSFC with the exception 
of those for the S-190 window and actuators, ATM/MDA umbilicals, 
and the S-191 IR Spectrometer, which were done at Denver. 
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8 . 2 MSFC BUILD HISTORY 
The following is, in part, a s ummary of MSFC's Manufacturing 
Plan for the MDA Pressure Vessel Assembly as revised August 1970. 
The plan was updated to reflect that the penetrations for the MDA 
Flight Article windows were installed in Denver rather than at 
MSFC. 
8.2.1 Pressure Vessel Assembly (See Figure 8.2-1) 
The MDA Pressure Vessel Assembly was manufactured at the 
NASA/MSFC facili t y in Huntsville, Alabama, under the auspices 
of the NASA Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory. 
Interface 
Cylinder 
Assembly 
II 
Bulkhead Assembly 
Lifting Lugs 
Figure 8.2-1 MDA Pressure Vessel Structure Assembly 
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The Pressure Vessel Assembly consisted of a welded Upper 
Cylinder and Bulkhead Assembly, Docking Cylinder Assembly, Lower 
Cylinder Assembly, and mechanically assembled Axial Docking Port 
and Radial Docking Port Assemblies. Welded Interface Tees on 
the external structure and welded Interface Fittings on the Bulk-
head were provided. Internally, the structure had mechanically 
fastened Rings, Splice Section openings we~e provided to accom-
modate the S192 (10 Band Scanner) Support Plate, Vent Manifold 
and Umbilicals for Experiment Equipment. The Pressure Vessel 
was fabricated primarily from 2119 aluminum alloy 
The Pressure Vessel Assembly, (See Figure 8.2-1) consti-
tuting the bulk of the MDA, was made of three subassemblies. 
These were: 
o Pressure Vessel Structural Assembly 
o Axial Docking Port Assembly 
o Radial Docking Port Assembly 
The Pressure Vessel Structural Assembly consisted of three welded 
major subassemblies. These were the Upper Cylinder and Bulkhead 
Assembly, Docking Port Cylinder Assembly and the Interface Cylin-
der Assembly. 
The Upper Cylinder and Bulkhead Assembly was cylindrical 
and conical in design. Its purpose was to close the outboard 
end of the Pressure Vessel Structural Assembly and provide areas 
to accommodate the Axial Docking Port, openings for various pieces 
of equipment such as windows, vent manifold, electrical umbilicals, 
and supports for experimental equipment. It also provided a 
mating surface for the Docking Port Cylinder. The principal sub-
assemblies were the Bulkhead Assembly and the Cylinder Assembly. 
8.2.2 Bulkhead Assembly 
The Bulkhead Assembly consisted of the Buikhead Assembly 
Ring, Ring Adapter and the Cone Segment Assembly. Fabrication of 
the Bulkhead Assembly Ring was accomplished conventionally from 
a procured aluminum rolled ring forging, utilizing a vertical 
boring mill and turntable. The Ring Adapter was manufactured 
conventionally from aluminum plate material. ' 
The Cone Segment Assembly was the principal part of the Bulk-
head Assembly and was fabricated as a weldment from four aluminum 
alloy segments. 
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Welding of the Cone Segment Assembly was accomplished on 
the longitudinal weld and trim fixture by trimming the mating 
edges of 'c.wo segments and welding them together to form one 180-
degree s~gment. The two lSO-degree segments were trimmed and 
welded, one seam at a time, to form the Cone Segment. 
The Bulkhead Assembly was positioned on the turntable and 
clamped to receive the Cone Segment. The Bulkhead Assembly Ring 
was welded to the base of the Cone Segment uitlizing the circum-
ferential welding positioner and welder. The Ring Adapter was 
welded at the apex of the Cone Segment. 
8.2.3 Upper Cylinder Assembly 
The Upper Cylinder Assembly was formed by welding together 
eight Skin Panels. The Skin Panels were formed from aluminum 
sheet material using a piece large enough to make two Skin Panels 
at a time. After drilling toOlitig holes, the material was rolled 
to the specified radius and then clamped to a heat treat fixture. 
The Skin Panels were then age-formed to a T-S7 condition. 
Assembly of the Upper Cylinder was accomplished on a verti-
cal trim and weld fixture. Two Skin Panels were loaded into the 
fixture and the mating edges trimmed and welded together using 
specified foot settings. The remaining panels were positioned, 
trimmed and welded in place, using an alternating sequence until 
a 360-degree Cylindrical Section was formed. The Bulkhead Assem-
bly was then positioned to the upper edge, clamped and welded 
in place. 
S.2.4 Docking Port Cylinder Assembly 
The Docking Port Cylinder Assembly formed that part of the 
structure between the Upper Cylinder Assembly and the Lower Cylin-
der Assembly and had an opening to accommodate the Radial Docking 
Port. Structurally, it consisted of four skin panels, an ~pper 
ring and a lower ring. 
The four docking cylinder skins were machined, rolled to a 
defined radius, and then clamped to a heat treat fixture and heat 
treated to the T-S7 condition. 
The upper and lower docking cylinder rings were machined 
conventionally from aluminum rolled forgings. 
8-7 
Vertical trimming and welding together the four skin panels 
to form the 360-degree cylindrical section of the Docking Port 
Cylinder Assembly was accomplished in the same manner and using 
the same tooling previously described for the Upper Cylinder As-
sembly. 
The cylindrical section was positioned on the boring mill 
and the aft end was milled to the proper dimensions for mating 
with the lower ring. The cylindrical section was removed from 
the boring mill and the lower ring positioned to it and clamped 
in place. The cylindrical skin section, aft end, was mated to 
the ring and circumferentially welded in place. The upper end 
was milled and the upper ring secured in a similar manner. The 
docking port opening was routed using a mill fixture and the 
holes drilled using a coordinated drill fixture. 
The docking cylinder ring caps consisted of 16 segments that 
were conventionally machined from aluminum plate. The caps were 
attached to the docking cylinder rings with temporary fasteners 
after match drilling using an assembly drill fixture. 
8.2.5 Interface Cylinder Assembly 
The Interface Cylinder Assembly consisted of eight skin 
panels, an interface cylinder ring and intermediate ring segments. 
The eight skin panels were processed in a manner similar to that 
described for the Upper Cylinder Assembly. 
The interface cylinder ring was machined from a procured alum-
inum rolled forging, using a turntable and vertical boring mill. 
Horizontal trimming and welding the interface cylinder ring 
to the cylinder assembly was accomplished in the same manner as 
comparable operations for the Docking Port Cylinder. A convention-
ally fabricated ring was secured to the interface cylinder ring 
for protection while handling. The inner diameter provided for 
access during subsequent assembly sequences. 
The eight intermediate ring segments were rough cut from alum-
inum plate and conventionally machined to final configuration. 
After machining, seven segments were match-drilled to the inter-
face cylinder skin using a specialized assembly drill fixture and 
the mechanical fasteners were then installed. One segment of the 
ring was installed during final assembly. 
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8.2.6 Assembly of the Pressure Vessel Structural Assembly 
Final buildup of the Pressure Vessel Structural Assembly 
was accomplished at the circumferential trimming and welding 
station. All subassemblies were cleaned with an etching compound 
and the edges to be welded were protected from contamination with 
aluminum foil. 
The Upper Cylinder Assembly was positioned on the turntable, 
bulkhead down. The Docking Port Cylinder 'i~eldment was aligned, 
mated and tack welded. After completing the circumferential weld, 
and Interface Cylinder Assembly was hoisted and mated to the aft 
edge of the Docking Port Cylinder, clamped as required and the 
closeout weld performed. 
8.2.7 ~nufacture and Assembly of Docking Ports 
8.2.7.1 Axial Docking Port 
The Axial Docking Port consisted of three major parts. 
These were, from forward end to aft end, the cylinder assembly, 
fiberglass cylinder and lower ring. The cylinder assembly was 
manufactured from an aluminum rolled forging. 
The fiberglass cylinder was "laid-up" on a bond-form fix-
ture, using preimpregnated fiberglass sheets, S-glass, roving 
material and adhesive until the proper thickness was obtained. 
The interface surfaces of the fiberglass cylinder were built up 
to a plus tolerance with glass cloth plies that could be peeled 
at assembly to attain optimum fit. 
The lower ring was manufactured from an aluminum rolled 
forging in the same manner as described for the flanged ring on 
the cylinder assembly. 
To assemble the three components.of the docking port, the 
cylinder assembly and lower ring were chilled in liquid nitrogen. 
The lower ring was removed from the chill tank and installed on 
the fiberglass cylinder. The cylinder assembly was assembled 
to the fiberglass cylinder in a like manner. The axial cylinder 
assembly was drilled ·at the fiberglass cylinder mating surfaces 
and mechanical fasteners installed. The axial cylinder assembly 
lower ring was drilled using a drill jig coordinated to the MDA 
bulkhead mating hole pattern. The axial cylinder assembly was 
then positioned and indexed ona positioning and holding fixture 
and the drogue fitting holes drilled and fasteners installed. 
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8.2.7.2 Radial Docking Port 
The Radial Docking Port Assembly consisted of, from out-
board to inboard end, a cylinder assembly, fiberglass cylinder 
and a lower ring. Both cylinders and the lower ring, while not 
identical to the comparable parts on the axial docking port, were 
manufactured in a similar manner. Assembly of the Radial Docking 
Port was accomplished in the same manner described for the Axial 
Docking Port. 
8.2.8 Manufacture and Assembly of Pressure Vessel Details 
The Pressure Vessel contained the following lesser 
assemblies that were manufactured using conventional machine 
tools and methods: 
• Transition Ring 
• Hatch Ring 
• Electrical Umbilical 
• Longerons and Longeron Angles 
8.2.9 Final Assembly of the Pressure Vessel Assembly 
Final assembly commenced with the Pressure Vessel Struc-
tural Assembly positioned flight direction down on the assembly 
drill fixture. The Longeron Angles were positioned and match 
drilled through the pressure vessel skin. After drilling, the 
angles were removed, cleaned and sealant applied between the 
mating surfaces; they were then repositioned ~nd mechanical 
fasteners installed. The Longerons were then positioned on the 
Longeron Angles, drilled, and then secured to the Longeron Angles 
with mechanical fasteners. Clips and splice plates were drilled 
and mechanical fasteners installed to secure the longerons to 
the internal rings. Special EREP fittings were installed. The 
vent manifold, the S192 mounting plate and the electrical umbi-
lical plate were also installed. After drilling and reaming, 
the parts were removed, deburred, cleaned and sealant applied 
to the mating surfaces prior to installing with mechanical 
fasteners. 
The Axial Docking Port Hatch Ring Assembly was positioned 
inside the bulkhead and a coordinated drill jig was positioned out-
side the bulkhead centered about the Docking Port hole; then all 
items were properly aligned and clamped into place. Holes were 
match drilled through the bulkhead ring adapter assembly and hatch 
ring. Sealant was applied before positioning the axial docking 
port and installing mechanical fasteners. 
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The Radial Docking Port Transition Ring was positioned in-
side the Pressure Vessel after sealant had been applied between 
the mating surfaces and then the mechanical fasteners were in-
stalled. The radial docking port cylinder was then indexed and 
positioned inside the transition ring, using a sealant between 
the surfaces and the mechanical fasteners installed. The radial 
docking port was installed by applying sealant to the mating sur-
faces and "slipping" the docking port lower ring inside the pre-
viously installed transition ring. Mechanical fasteners were 
then installed. 
All openings in the shell were blocked off and the assembly 
was pressure tested. The pressure vessel Was then shipped to 
MMC-Denver. 
8.3 MANUFACTURING TECHNI~...§. 
8.3.1 Mechanical Details/Subassembly Fabrication 
A. Detail Parts - Detail parts for the MDA were fabricated 
by Detail Manufacturing in the machine shop and sheet metal shop, 
with the exception of some nonmetallic items. A special nonmetals 
fabrication area was set up utilizing a plastic bubble enclosure 
to maintain proper cleanliness requirements. The production area 
was located adjacent to the engineering nonmetals lab to take ad-
vantage of existing autoclave facilities. All new process develop-
ment, tool certification, and production fabrication were perfor-
med under the leadership of Advance Manufacturing Technology person-
nel. All details were routed through the detail fabrication area 
using the existing scheduling and movement system. All detail parts 
were fabricated using conventional metal-forming capabilities. 
B. Subassemblies - Subassemblies were welded in existing 
welding facilities. They were drilled, temporarily bolted toge-
ther, disassembled, deburred, cleaned, plastic-bagged, and sent 
to the Space Support Building for final installation. 
8.3.2 Insulation Blanket Fabrication 
During the course of development of the multilayer thermal 
insulation segments for the MDA (approximately 108), the following 
fabrication techniques were developed: 
• Designed and effectively used a tool to stack the lami-
nated insulating iayers (aluminized ,mylar sheet and dac-
ron net fabric) to the required 181 layers. This pro-
cess not only reduced "lay-up" man hours by 150 percent, 
but provided a superior lamination of materials. 
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• Utilized teflon buttoneers (nee, Swiftachments) in 
lieu of sewing thread to tie the multi1ayers together 
in a grid pattern. This method decreased the fabri-
cating costs and improved the thermal characteristics 
of the insulation segments. 
• Utilized a motorized trimming knife (same as that used 
by cloth cutters in the garment industry), permitting 
cutting beveled edges on the multilayer insulation 
segments to provide maximu~ contour coverage. 
8.3.3 MDA Structural Assemb1~ 
Final assembly and installation work on the MDA was 
essentially divided into two phases: (1) Activities in the 
Factory; and (2) Activities in the High Bay area of the Space 
Support Building. The activities i~ the factory also included 
operations which required moving the MDA to various locations 
outside of the factory. (See Figure 8.3-1) 
Because of the numerous moves required, and the possibility 
of damag~ occurring during these moves, considerable attention 
was directed at eliminating as much risk as possible. From the. 
receipt of the MDA at Buckley Airfield in Denver, all moves of 
the MDA were controlled by Manufacturing Engineering Procedures. 
These documents outlined in detail each step required for every 
movement of the MDA~ whether from one location to another, or 
merely a change in position. Prior to the issuance of the docu-
ments, they were approved by Safety, Duality, Engineering and 
Manufacturing Engineering. These same precautions were taken 
with the experiment hardware that was supplied as GFE. The 
Manufacturing Engineering Procedure was also presented to the 
experimenter for his review and approval. During the period 
that these procedures were in use, there were no incidents of 
hardware damage. 
The MDA was received at Buckley Field, Denver, and trans-
ported to the second floor of the fact.)ry where it was placed 
in the vertical position for Receiving Inspection (Figure 8.3-2). 
Scaffolding was then installed and the factory installations 
initiated. The vertical orientation was selected for this 
installation effort to reduce the complexity and cost of support-
ing equipment. The installations in the factory were drilled 
and fastened in place, or drilled and removed for future instal-
lation in the Space Support Building. All details were cleaned 
to the requi;red level, bagged and sent to the Space Support 
Building (SSB). 
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Figure 8.3-1 Sample Manufacturing Flow 
After comple tion of the drilling and insta llation effort, the 
MDA was plac ed in a horizontal rotation fixture for rough c l ean-
in g . This con s i s t ed of rotating th e MDA to l oosen chips and then 
vacuum cleaning . It was then placed on a low boy and moved to 
the Leak Test Facility (LTF) f or pr oof and l eak test . From the 
LTF it went to X- ray , and f rom there back to the vertica l work 
stand on the second f l oor factor y . A "scotch-brite" operation 
wa s then performed to prepare the surface for painting . All 
op enings wer e sea l ed , aft er the "scotch- brite" , and the MDA was 
moved to the Hydrostatic Tes t Facility for f lush irriditing . It 
then came back to the second f l oor factor y for painting . During 
paint ing of the interior a s pecial v enti l ating s ys tem was insta l-
led to vent t he fumes t o the ou ts id e of th e building. The pain t-
ing was per formed in the vertical work stand on the factor y f loor. 
Following completion of an air - cure cyc l e it was moved to the 
Hydrostat ic Test Facility for a bake cyc l e . 
Figure 8.3-2 MDA In stalled in Factory 
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The MDA was placed in the horizon ta l ho lding fixture after 
paint cur e ; bagged and moved to the Space Support Bui l ding 
(Clean Room) for the rema i ning installations (see Fi gur e 8.3-2) . 
A controlled access s ystem was s e t up after erect ion of the MDA 
on the vertical work stand in the Space Support Bu ildin g high 
ba y . Th is system effectively controlled and accoun ted for a ll 
personnel and equipment required in and around the MDA during 
Clean Room activiti es . A wei ght control system was also ini -
tiated at thi s t ime which ac counted for the weigh t of all hard-
ware being insta ll ed an d removed from the MDA. 
During the handling and insta llation of ex periments such 
as EREP, the manufactur ing engineer worked c lose l y with the 
representa tive of the company involv ed to insure that the intent 
of the manu f acturing engineering procedure was met . 
,--= 
.-" I ' I 
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Figure 8.3-3 MDA Installed in SSB 
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Debris shields were developed by making patterns from mylar 
sheets and then developing engineering drawings to match. These 
shields were required to keep hardware from being lost in inac-
cessible places under a zero-G condition. 
The MDA was weighed prior to placing it in a lIdoubl€' bag" 
for shipment to St. Louis. The "double bag" protection consisLed 
of an inner and outer cover, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.11.2-2. 
The preparation for shipment was as follows. 
Prior to the movement of any of the modules to or from the 
airport, a trial run was made over the designated route to check 
for inadequate clearance, crane heights, or other similar problems. 
~ ;. . 
A team at the Martin Marietta-Denver facility supported the 
St. Louis effort by supplying modification kits as required by 
the latest engineering. These kits were in all cases complete, 
and when required, manufacturing personnel were sent to St. Louis 
to assist in the installation. 
8.3.4 Electrical Fabrication/Installation 
Process plans were prepared using the Automated Electrical 
Manufacturing Engineering (AEME) system. Utilizing the Automated 
Wiring System (AWS) in conjunction with AEME, process plans were 
produced for both subassembly and harness assembly builds. 
Fabrication of the production harness began at the sub-
assembly level at the Electronics Manufacturing Facilty clean 
room. The subassemblies were then checked for Level JA cleanli-
ness, double-bagged, and routed to the Space Support Building 
for installation into harness assemblies. The harness assemblies 
were fabricated in two areas and phases. Cable assemblies and 
small harnesses were built on mylar overlays in the clean room 
low bay area. The larger internal harness was assembled in the 
three-dimensipnal harness fixture. The external harness was 
assembled on overlays. Connectors that were encapsulated were 
continuity and megger-tested prior to installation into the 
harness. After completion of the harnesses, electrical tests 
were performed using the Hughes Analyzer. All harnesses were 
then weighed, recorded and installed in the Flight Article, 
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llsing installation plans supplied hy manufacturing engineering. 
The total wiring system was then completely continuity-tested 
and megger-tested usjng the Hughefl Annlyzer. 
All personnel engaging jn the electrical f~hrication and 
infltallation work effort were required to he certified in clcan 
room operations, connector mate-demate operationfl, solderjng 
and connector assembly techniques. Technical and liaison support 
were furnished by manufacturing engineering throughout all phnfles 
of the harness build and installation efforts. 
8.3.5 Manufacturing Processes/Procedures 
Twenty-onc new manufacturing processes were developed, 
and approximately sixty more revised, to support the MDA program. 
Forty-four Manufacturing Engineering Procedures were written to 
define the movement of the MDA and the handling and installation 
of all GSE items. The effectivity of this system is best illus-
trated by the number of ,,!novement and handling operations performed 
wjth minimal hardware damage resulting. 
8.3.6 Ground Support Equipment (GSE) 
Ground Support Equipment was fabricated at Martin-Denver 
in both the Electronics Manufacturing Facility and the factory. 
All fabricated items were built to Form 4 engineering for use 
on the Flight, Flight Backup, Dynamic Test, and One-G Trainer, 
from acceptance at Denver through certain prelaunch activities 
at KSC. 
The handling and installation of experiments and equipment, 
both external and internal to the MDA, required the use of various 
combinations of GSE. Some eqUipment could be used to install 
experiments when the MDA was either vertical or horizontal, and 
other equipment was designed to be used in one specific position. 
Each item of GSE used for lifting experiments had an 
identification tag attached specifying the maximum load capacity. 
There were approximately 87 pieces of GSE of varying 
degrees of complexity fabricated on the MDA program. 
8.3.7 Personnel Staffing 
Manufacturing operations began during the initial proposal 
stage. A Sky1ab Project Representative was assigned to lead a 
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team of Manufacturing and Industrial Engineers responsible [or 
developing the total manufacturing flow plan. This plan and the 
contract statement of work were utilized to define and estimate 
the requirements for facilities, tooling, processes, and total 
fabrication and support. Pre-production engineers, assigned 
full time to the program, worked w lth the design engineers to 
define the manufacturing tasks to be performed. They provided 
producibi1ity inputs to the designer and kept him informed of 
manufacturing techniques and capabilities. 
The pre-production engineer assisted manufacturing control 
by identifying advanced material requirements and long-lead items. 
He also supported tool design and tool fabrication planning by 
identifying long-lead tooling material and standards. The pre-
production engineer also identified fabrication sequences that 
formed the basis for time-phased work. He established a manu-
facturing flow plan 'controlled by a numbering system that pro-
vided the control media for the scheduling of parts, tools and 
ma'teria1s. 
During the pre-production phase, all maior tools were 
identified and tool orders issued to permit tool design to start 
initial design and order material. This design effort was 
accomplished by making use of the Central Tool Design Shop. 
Process planning was accomplished in the initial stage of 
the program by planners from the central planning shop. However, 
in the later stages of installation and test in the Space Support 
Building, planners were assigned to work full time on the MDA 
pTa gram. Noticeable improvement in the turnaround time on change 
traffic resulted from having process planners, quality and 
engineering personnel assigned to the program and located in a 
dedicated area. 
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9. MDA PROORAM CONTROLS 
9.1 PLANNING AND SCHEDULING 
MilA planning and scheduling was carried out at both the 
Project and the department levels. 
Project level planning translated the MilA program hardware 
and documentation requirements into the actions necessary to 
satisfy these requirements. Planning meetings at the Project 
level defined and clarified the efforts of all departments and 
produced coordinated master schedules reflecting the time-phasing 
of these efforts. These master schedules were published as 
direction from the Program Manager to the Project Organization. 
The planning meetings also produced the information necessary to 
establish schedules for Government Furnished hardware and data 
and a GFP hardware and data log was published and maintained by 
the Project, and used as the basis for GFp· schedule coordination 
wi th the NASA MSFC. . 
Department level planning further defined and detailed the 
effort necessary to satisfy program requirements. These plans 
were derived from the master schedules and reflected the require-
ments on specific disciplines within the Project such as Engineer-
ing, Procurement, Tooling and Manufacturing., and Test. Engineer-
ing release schedules and procurement schedules were published 
weekly using existing mechanized printout systems. Hardwar~ 
oriented manufacturing schedules were manually produced and 
maintained by Production Control either at the project level or 
at central Production Control under the cognizance of their MDA 
Project representatives. Final assembly and test schedules pro-
ducedat the Project Level were augmented by daily action item 
lists and status meetings to gccomplish the detail planning, 
scheduling and fo1~ow-up. 
Planning was accomplished at the Proje1ct Level primarily 
using three tools: planning meetings, master schedules of the 
traditional Gantt (bar and milestone) type, and master schedules 
depicting the logical sequence of activities and events in a 
network formatcomparahle to that employed in a PERT system. 
Program, hardware and test requirements, as initia lly set out by 
Planning and Engineering, were scrutinized and reviewed in plan-
ning meetings hy all disciplines on the Project. These meetings 
clarified technical and program requirements in detail. for all 
elements of the Project organization and identified the many 
interrelationships between activities that established the logic 
and time phasings of the program element hieing planned. Several 
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iterations of the initial planning process usually were carried 
out to evolve a suitable 1 coordinated and reasonably complete 
baseline master plan and schedule. At this point, the logic 
network plan was reduced to Gantt type bar and milestone chart 
presentation for publication as the master schedule. The net-
work was maintained by Planning as a tool, and was pertinent for. 
continuing planning activity, performance evaluation, schedule 
recovery planning, and occasional reprogramming. The network 
plan and schedule was maintained in the MDA Control Room for those 
program elements such as the Flight Article which were subject 
to frequent attention by the Program Manager and his project 
leaders. 
Program elements which were accorded invididual planning 
and control attention during the MDA program were the following: 
• The Zero-G MDA segment and simulation hardware 
• The Neutral Buoyancy Article and simulation hardware 
• The E~gineering Mockup and mockup hardware 
• The Development Mockup and electrical harness fabrication 
• Components for installation in the Structural Test, 
Flight, and Backup Article pressure vessels at MSFC 
• ATM Film Vaults 
• Dynamic Test Article and simulation hardware 
• Flight Article and installed CFE 
• Qual,ification Test Program 
• Backup Article and installed CFE 
• One-G Trainer and installed training hardware 
• Ground Support Equipment 
• Gdvernment Furnished Property 
Master schedules were published and maintained during the 
active period at Denver of each one of these elements, except 
Government Furnished Property. Tabulations were maintained 
separately on G9vernment Furnished hardware and data based 
initially on Exhibit liB" to the contract. These logs were updated 
in advance of changes to Exhibit "B" as requirements were more 
thoroughly defined through project planning and the configuration 
change control process. 
Immediately after the limited go-.ahead given the MDA Program 
at Martin Marietta on October 15, 1969 ~he project plunged into 
three essentially different hardware activities. The first 
involved simulation and mockup hardware with initial deliveries 
due in only 15 weeks. The second activity was directed toward 
the final definition of specifications and interface control 
documents for the MDA, and the design, procurement"too1ing, 
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detail fabrication and preparation for factory operations on 
receipt of the flight article shell, then approximately 37 weeks 
distant. The third activity was design and fabrication of 
Ground Support Equipment. 
Response to the requirements for simulation and mockup 
hardware was accomplished expeditiously through "task teams". 
These teams ce~tralized the design and fabrication disciplines 
at the final assembly area and adjacent to the factory. detail 
fabrication areas. Team leadership was vested in Engineering, 
as this effort was contributing primar1.1y to flight hardware 
design. Engineering "release" and configuration control were 
the responsibility of the Lead Engineer. Established production 
control and quality assurance practices were supplanted by less 
formalized management and increased designer/technician communi-
cation. Design changes were made by "red line" to the shop 
drawings as necessary. The manufacturing team leader controlled 
"red lined" drawings in the shop. Meetings were held weekly, 
more often if necessary, to clarify task plans in detail, to 
resolve task management problems, and to measure and forecast 
accomplishments. These meetings were also one of several sources 
of "feedback" to the Progralll Manager with respect to the progress 
and quality of the project Elffort. 
The "task team" approach was applied, in many respects, 
to all the major elements of the MDA effort at Denver. Established 
engineeri~g release, configuration management, production control 
and quality assurance methods were followed with respect to flight 
hardware to comply with the design, process and inspection con-
straints on the build of flight hardware. But the personalized 
team effort was largely maintained. Team leadership shifted 
from Engineering during the design and early drawing release 
phases to Manufacturing Project as detail fabrication prog:r:essed 
and on-module factory operations became imminent. While technical 
direction was maintained throughout the program by the Project 
Engineer, the shift in team leadership reflected the change in 
emphasis from design release to building and delivering hardware 
on schedule. Planning networks maintained in the MDA Control 
Room were successful in depicting the more complex effort involved 
on the Flight and Backup Articles and served as reference during 
the daily meetings held-by the task team leadership. These 
meetings also clarified the detail of task planning, resolved 
task management problems, coordinated the team effort and measured 
and forecast accomplishment. 
Task team efforts at Denver continued beyond the DD250 
of hardware at Denver for the Flight, Backup and One-G T.rainer 
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Articles. Engineering change activity remained relatively high 
until just a few months prior to launch of the Flight Article. 
Modification kit incorporation was, therefore, a significant 
activity at St. Louis for the Flight and Backup Articles, at KSC 
for the Flight Article, and at JSC for the One-G Trainer. The 
respective task teams at Denver coordinated the planning and 
scheduling of this change activity with the several off-site 
locations. In addition, the team maintained daily technical and 
operational coordination in support of the off-site activities 
at St. Louis and KSC. 
More than 170 end items of Ground Support Equipment were 
produced by the MDA Project. Fabrication of details and final 
assembly were accomplished by Manufacturing and Tooling primarily 
in the factory area for the structural and mechanical GSE. Most 
of the Electrical GSE was built in the Engineering Electrical 
Laboratory. Conventional production control practices were 
'followed in managing the factory effort. Periodic planning 
meettngs at the project level obtained hardware build status and 
for~casts from both Manufacturing and Engineering, and served to 
clarify program and schedule requirements for GSE. Many of the 
GSE items were needed to support Flight Article build or for fit-
check with flight hardware. These requirements also subjected 
GSE status to review during action item meetings held by the task 
team for the Flight Article. 
Design and fabrication of GSE for the Flight Article con-
tinued beyond the delivery of the module from Denver to St. Louis. 
For example, incorporation of the Video Tape Recorder into the MDA 
and a change in schedule for installation of Experiment M5l2 
required new GSE. Design changes also were incorporated into 
GSE up to within a few months of launch of the Flight Article as 
a result of experience with the hardware at KSC or St. Louis. 
Design and fabrication of these new GSE items was covered by the 
GSE team and design changes were managed through the change 
authorization process. 
9.2 CONFIGURATION CONTROL 
The establishment of a responsive yet flexible Configuration 
Control System required the implementation of several management 
techniques, among which were the utilization of Configuration 
and Data Management personnel as well as Change Management 
personnel to pursue contractual paperwo~k. The Configuration 
Control System was contractually established with the implemen-
tation of the Configuration Management Plan, ED-2002-1004, as 
approved by MSFC Supplemental Agreement 145 dated July 1970. 
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NASA documents NHB 8040.1 and CM 027-001-2H (Contractor Con-
figuration Management Requirements) were extensively referenced 
in the preparation of this plan in order to provide continuity 
between NASA Sky.lab Configuration Management objectives and the 
MMC configuration control disciplines. 
9.2.1 Program Milestones 
As certain major program milestones were ap~roached it 
became necessary to definitize the exact status Jf rCDs, Spec 
Changes, and ECPs relating to each milestone. 
All open rCD Category 1 (hardware related) items, Spec 
Changes, ECPs and open hardware items were identified for each 
of the following milestones: 
• Flight Article DD250 12-20-71 
• Spacecraft Acceptance Review ~ I 05-10-72 
• Spacecraft ,~cceptance Review ¢ II 09-18-72 
• Backup Article DD250 10-25-72 
• Flight Art:1.cle Flight Readiness Review* 04-10-73 
• SL-1 Launch* 05-14-73 
*A1l open items were reduced to zero for this event. 
The list of open items pertinent to rCDs were generated by 
C&DM, forwarded to the MSFC Program Office for signature, and 
subsequently enclosed with the Acceptance Data Package accompany-
ing the hardware. 
The list of open items pertinent to Specs, ECPs and Hard-
WU'-',! Changes wus verified as being open in the MSFC tab run and 
enclosed in the Acceptance Data Package accompanying the hardware. 
9.2.2 Configuration and Data Management 
, The prime responsibility of the Configuration and Oata 
Management Section was the initiation, organization, issuance 
and maintenance of contractual paperwork such as Interface 
Control Documents (rCDs), End Item Specifications (EISs) and 
Program Plan & Requirements documents. In addition, the Con-
figuration Status and Accounting function was also performed. 
Each item of documentation was issued for a specific purpose 
(as defined herein) and each was contractually implemented by 
the NASA. Refer to the following paragraphs for an in-depth 
historical report of the various documentation areas and manage-
ment functions. 
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9.2.2.1 Interface Management (MSFC) 
An interface is the specifically defined and located junc-
ture between two or more end items which are under the design 
jurisdiction of different Contractors or Government agencies. 
The responsibilities of MMC relating to the identification, 
documentation, implementation, status and change control phases 
of interfacemauagement for the MDA Program are summarized herein. 
ICDs have been utilized to record interface agreements and inter-
relate very closely with internal engineering drawings which, in 
turn, control hardware development. 
A. Identification Phase - Formal identification activities 
for rCDs authorized by the procuring agency were initiated in 
late 1969. MSFC Change Order 65, dated December 1969 approved 
modification of the Contract Statement of Work (Exhibit A) to 
implement MSFC Document lOM01840C, ICD Identification Matrix. 
This matrix specified twenty-seven (27) ICDs as pertinent to 
MDA (MMC) as follows: 
l3M_ 4 OM_ 5 OM_ 65ICD_ 
13M02521 4OM35595 *5OMl3125 65ICDXXXX 
*l3M04632 *4OM35596 5OMl3l26 65 I CDXXXX 
*l3M12l6l 40M35600 5OM13l36 
*l3M12l9l 4OM3560l 5OM13l46 
*13Ml2l93 *4OM35625 5OM13l48 
*13M1220l *4OM35646 5OM16132 
*13M12203 4OM3565l 
l3M20723 *.4OM35652 
l3'M20726 
13M20727 
*13M20979 
Twelve (12) of these twenty-seven (27) ICDs were initiated 
by MMC/MDA as indicated by the asterisks above. 
Since 'initial ~mplementation, document lOMOl840 has under-
gone numerous revisions to incorporate additional lCD's. The 
latest revision to the document was AE dated April 1973. Eighty-
one (81) ICDs are rlow specified as relevant to MDA (MMC) , as 
follows: 
9-6 
65ICD & 
l3M_ 4 OM_ 5 OM_ 66ICD 
13M02521 *13M13431 *4OM35601-2 5OMl3l20 65ICD9023 
* 13M04632 *l3Ml3432 *4OM35625 SOMl3122 65ICD9213 
*13M07393 *13M13513 *4OM3S646 *5OM13125 65ICD9220 
*13M07397 *13M13525 *4OM35652 5OM13136 65ICD9542 
*13M07399 *13M13534 *4OM35656 5OM13l46 661CD2138 
*13M07400 *131'1113543 *4OM35661 5OM13l48 66ICD8036 
*l3M07401 13M2 0723 4OM35662-2 5OMl6132 66lCD8042 
* 13M07402 13M20726 *4OM35664 *5OM16l34 66lCD8044 
*13M07403 l3M207.27 *4OM35672 5OM16139 OTHER 
*13M07404 *13M20979 *4OM35673 5OM16142 10lE439G 
*13M07405 l3M20988 *4OM35674 *5OM16145 
*13M07408 l3M20989 *4OM35675 5OM16147 
*13M12l6l 4OM35679 *5OM16149 
*13M12l9l 4OM35681 5OM16154 
*13M1220l 4OM35690 *5OM16155 
*13M1340l *5OM16158 
l3M13414 5OMl6159 
*l3M13420 
*13M1342l 
*13M13422 
*l3M13423 
*13M13424 
*13M13425 
*13M13426 
*13M13427 
*l3M13428 
*13M13429 
*13Ml3430' 
Of the eighty-one (81) lCDs, fifty (50) have been initiated 
by MMC/MJl.I\ as indicated by the asterisks above. 
B. Documentation Phase - Once the decision was made regard-
ing lCD Custodians, the actual task of preparing and coordinating 
each individual lCD was begun. Working very closely with Engine-
ering personnel, Configuration and Data Management (C&OM) people 
acted as the cohesive force behind assembling all of the individual 
engineering inputs either into a preliminary lCD format, if MMC/ 
MDA was the Custodian, or into a response to the Custodian if 
we were an Associate Contractor. 
Once the Preliminary lCD or r.esponse was typed and reproduced, 
the coordination cycle was begun by C&DM. Information was not 
only exchanged between all associate contractors, but also infor-
mation copies were provided to NASA for their comments prior to 
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the Contractor Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) submi,tta1. A 
majority of the ICDs pertained only to one specific area; i.e., 
mechanical, electrical or instrumentation and communication, 
and therefore required coordination with only one MSFC responsible 
engineer. Se'vera1 ICDs, however, encompassed all three areas and 
therefore requ:!red additional coordination internally within MSFC. 
In the particular case of Level A ICDs, two NASA Centers 
were involved and coordination efforts with both Centers usually 
culminated in Interface Control Working Group (ICWG) meetings 
to resolve any eXisting incompatibilities. 
An example of this specific situation occurred midway in 1970 
when NASA direction was received to install EREP(M8C) into the 
MDA (MSFC). As a result, the following Level A ICDs were impacted: 
Experiment 
8190 
8191 
S192 
ESE 
13M 
13M1220l 
13M07399 
13M07400 
13M07397 
40M 
4OM35646 
4OM35672 
4OM35675 
4OM35673 
50M 
5OM16l45 
In some cases, it was necessax'y to modify the content of the 
ICDs by issuing more than one change/ICD in the same ECP package. 
An extremely complex coordination cycle thereby resulted. ECP 
ED0047Rl was submitted in June of 1970 and by late February 
of 1971 customer Change Order 342 had been received. So within a 
time span of approximately eight (8) months, a major revision 
to the MDA interface configuration was accomplished. 
C. Implementation Phase - Implementing an lCD, after co-
ordination as per Paragraph 9.2.2.1. B above, was merely a matter 
of submitting the document, via ECP , for NASA approval. Dual 
ECP submittals were required for all Level A ICDs. ECPs were 
officially submitted through the Change Management gr.oup whose 
functions/history are defined in Paragraph 9.2.3. Once a sub-
mittal was accomplished, NASAs internal processing obtained the 
cognizant NASA engineers'signature approval, the pertinent center 
signature approval (if Level A), and the issuance of a Configuration 
Control aoard Directive (CCBD) dispositioning the document along 
with either a Contracting Officer's Letter of Approval or a 
Contract Modification to incorporate the document into the Con-
tractual Index and Status Report. If the repository version of 
the document was issued by MSFC "without change" from that sub-
mitted via ECP, MMC closed out the implementation activity by 
issuing a "letterll Record Engineering Change Proposal (RECP) 
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of acceptance. If the repository version of the document was 
issued "with changes" from that submitted via the ECP, another 
review (and potential ECP submittal) cycle was initiated to 
determine the impact of the changes. (No impact again resulted 
in issuance of a "letter" RECP reflecting Contractor acceptance). 
D. Change Control Phase - ICDs need to be readily revisable 
without reissuing the complete document each time a change is 
made. To accomplish this, a Preliminary Interface Revision 
Notice (PIRN) was issued. Each PIRN was submitted via an ECP 
and when approved by the Customer each PIRN became a contractually 
implemented Interface Revision Notice (IRN). By mid 1970, sub-
mittal of PIRNs had begun in earnest and at the time of SL-l 
launch, (May 1973) the total number of repository IRNs tallied 
up as follows: 
Facility ICD 
(65ICD __ & 66ICD_) 
363 
Mechanical ICDs 
(13M __ ) 
318 
Electrical rCDs 
(4OM __ ) 
72 
Instr.& Conunun. 
lCDs 
(SOM ___ ) 
153 
The nine hundred six (906) repository IRNs specified above 
do not reflect the total PIRN activities since an approximate 
additional 10% were either disapproved, withdrawn, or cancelled. 
Additionally, lCD revisions (where the number of repository IRNs 
outstanding made it feasible to perform an incorporation) accounted 
for fifty-two (52) reissued documents, of which forty-four (44) 
were formally released through the Repository and eight (8) were 
either disapproved or no action taken. Eleven (11) other ICD 
revisions were completed but never formally submitted via ECP in 
accordance with an MSFC request to withhold further submittals, 
(Ref. MSFC Letter SL-AL/MDA (241-73), dated March 1973; Subj: 
Discontinuation of ICD revision submittal; signed by Floyd M. 
Drummond, Project Manager). Twenty-eight (28) Drawing Departure 
Authorizations (DDAs) were contractually implemented during the 
life lof the program. A DDA was used to depict a "one-article non-
conformance". DDAs were not incorporated into the document except 
that they sometimes were "attached" to new revisions for reference 
purposes. DDAs an~ Revisions both required the same amount of 
coordination and the same ECP submittal loop as PIRNs before they 
became contractually implemented. 
E. Status Phase - Once each month a "Contractual Index and 
Status Report" was prepared and published by MSFC in conjunction 
with input received from C&DM. CM-023-007-2H is the' 
document number and the lasti88ue date was August 1973. 
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Each major module had a Contractual Index and Status Report and 
a constant effort was expended to keep the reports current 
and up to date. Each ICD (latest revision) and all outstanding 
IRNs (ones not incorporated into revisions) were listed along 
with such entries as Contractor ECP Number, Program'Change Number 
(PCN), CCBD Number, ~ontrac ting Officer's acceptance action, and 
Contractor's acknowledgement thereof. 
F. Conclusions and Recommendations - In the interest of 
providing improved interface management in the future, the 
following comments and/or suggestions are offered regarding the 
present mode of operation. 
(1) Concurrent development of engineering dra~lngs and 
ICDs should be avoided. The Skylab Program pre-
sented a situation where the concurrent aspect 
was unavoidable and MMC was forced to work around 
this situation. Manpower carl best be utilized 
by using the' same personnel to originate the 
engineering drawings as those used to construct 
the ICDs. This then means that the ICD effort 
should be scheduled prior to engineering drawing 
release. 
(2) Precoordination of ICDs/PIRNs with the Customer 
(concurrent with the Associate Contractor coordina-
tion loop) provides adequate opportunity for the 
Customer to input his desires regarding document 
content. It is therefore desirable to eliminate 
the present dual input cycle and the resultant 
Contractor re-impact via Engineering Design Change 
Schedule (EDCS)/ECP if the document is revised 
after ~CP submittal. 
(3) lCD revisions should become "mandatory" after 
is~uance of ten (10) IRNs. In some cases, revisions 
are desirable prior to that point in order to 
provide clarity. Once an ICD revision has been 
submitted via ECP, it is extremely desirable to 
have NASA process the submittal through Repository, 
i.e., p,ositive acknowledgement of completed effort 
rather than a negative 1,'DlSAPPROVAL". 
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(4) Data Requirements List (DRL) submittals and ECP 
submittals of "Basic" lCDs are duplicate efforts. 
An lCD can be contractually implemented via the 
ECP loop only. Therefore, it is recommended that 
the ten (10) copies formerly required for DRL 
submittal be deleted, especially since these ten 
(10) copies hecame obsolete if the Cusomter approved 
the document "with changes". 
(5) .Engineering drawings should reference the applicable 
lCD(s), by number in a general note and specific 
dimensions or parameters controlled by lCDs should 
carry the cbnnotation "controlled by lCD". This 
procedure will facilitate completion of the con-
figuration audit prior to hardware delivery/buy off. 
(6) Eliminate the need for reduction of all interface 
changes to zero prior to Flight Readiness Review 
(FRR). This constraint, although an admirable 
goal, should not be mandatory. Paperwork changes 
could be processed as late as the post launch period 
without jepordizing the program. Hardware changes, 
of course, must be completed earlier (prior to 
FRR, for example). 
9.2.2.2 Specification Management 
The requirements for performance, design, test, and qualifi-
cation of the MDA are contained in Specification No. CPl14A1000026, 
Rev. E, dated April 1970, entitled "Contract End Item Specification, 
EI 014000A, Multiple Docking Adapter for Sky1ab Program", includ-
ing Spec Change Packages Nos. 1 thru 23. 
This specification was added to the contract by Contract 
Change Order No. 65 dated December 1969, and subsequently incor-
porated by Supplemental Agreement No. 145, dated July 1970~ 
Prior to incorporation, in response to Change .Order No. 47, C&DM 
personnel, with inputs from and working closely with Engineering 
and other technical personnel, prepared and submitted to MSFC 
a draft copy of Revision D to this specification. The draft was 
reviewed and further refined by MSFC and subsequently placed on 
contract by Change Order No. 65 (as Rev D, dated Nov. 1969). 
Under the formal incorporation by Supplemental Agreement No. 145, 
the revision letter was changed from "D" to "E" and the date of 
the spec. changed from "Nov. 1969" to "April 1970". 
9-11 
., 
~ , 
I 
t! 
t; 
~ 
Subsequent to incorporation, as directed by Change Order 
No. 65, MMC assumed responsibility for the control and maintenance 
of the spec., with C&DM performing overall coordination and final 
preparation of Specification Change Notices (SCNs). During the 
ensuing period twenty-three (23) Change Packages were prepared 
and issued. These change packages incorporated a total of one 
hundred sixty-one (161) approved SCNs while twenty-four (24 
numbered SCNs were either disapproved or cancelled. Each SCN 
was submitted to MSFC as an integral part of an ECP by Change 
Management w:i.th final review and disposition by the MSFC Con-
figuration Control Board (CCB). 
9.2.2.3 Plans and Requirements Management 
Various planning and requirements documents were prepared 
and maintained during the MilA contract period of performance. 
Those which were formally incorporated into the contract are 
identified below, along with other information showing status 
at the end of the program. Other planning documents which were 
prepared and maintained by organizations other than C&DM but 
which were not formally incorporated into the contract are 
identified in the Data Requirements List/Data Requirements 
Description (DRL/DRD, Annex I to Exhibit A). 
Updating 
Doc. No. ~ ~ Title CNs: 
ED-2 002 -1002 Basic 4-1-70 MIlA Reliability Plan 1 
ED-2002-l003 Basic 4-1-70 MIlA Quality Control Plan 1, 2 
ED-2002-1004 Basic 4-1-70 MIlA Configuration Manage- 1 thru 6 
ment Plan 
ED-2002-l005, Basic 4-1-70 MIlA General Test Plan, 1 thru 8 
Volume I General Test Require-
ments 
ED-2002-l005, Basic 4-1-70 MilA General Test Plan, 1 thru 14 
Vo1u~e II Qualification Require-
ments 
ED-2002-l008 Basic 4-1-70 MDA Systems Safety Plan None 
ED-2002-1032 Basic 8-20-70 MDA EMC Control Plan 1 thru 4 
ED-2002-2020 A 10-7-71 MilA Systems Test and 1 thru 19 
Checkout Requirements 
(Flight Article) 
ED-2002-2028 Basic 8-31-71 MilA Critical Items List 1 thru 5 
ED-2002-2032 Basic 2-11-73 MDA Systems Test and 1 thru 9 
Checkout Requirements 
(Backup Article) 
ED-2002-2040 B 12-7-72 MIlA Post Deliver Opera- 1, 2 
tions flan 
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9.2.2.4 Configuration Status and Accounting 
Configuration Status and Accounting (CS&A) of the MDA Pro-
gram was initiated concurrent with the receipt of MSFC Change 
Order 65 in December 1969. Change Order 65 established the 
requirement for an MDA Configuration Management Plan (ED2002-l004) 
with the guidelines for the requirements of the CS&A function. 
Contract End Item Specifications, design and build drawings and 
changes thereto were utilized as the configuration description 
upon which the status and accounting function was based. As 
each specification, drawing and change was processed through the 
formal approval/release system it was entered into the CS&A 
system as a permanent record. CS&A for the MDA Program used the 
existing MMC mechanized status and accounting system. All basic 
release of design engineering was entered into the system as it 
occurred. Concurrently a Design and Build List was initiated and 
maintained showing all contract end item design and bUL1d require-
ments, tpeir usage, and the end item serial numbers assigned. 
A. Departures from Standard Practice - In conjunction 
with the development of the Configuration Management Plan, 
departures from MMC standard CS&A practices were implemented for 
selected hardware end items. 
(1) Ground Support Equipment (GSE), Trainers, and 
Mockups were designed to form 4 (sketch type) 
engineering drawings with no formal release or 
status and accounting. Upon completion of the 
initial build (and prior to acceptance) of the firat 
article of an end item series a Quality Control 
verification of the as-built hardware to the 
drawings was accomplished. Red line drawing changes 
were incorporated as necessary to reflect the as-
built configuration and the drawings were formally 
released 8S basic. It was at this point in the 
program that CS&A was implemented for this catagory 
of hardware. 
(2) A Liaison Call change system was established at 
the St. Louis/MDAC-E facility to allow the d.ocumen-
tation of required changes to GFP hardware during 
the integration testing at St. Louis. The Liaison 
Calls, when approved by the local NASA Resident 
Management Office (RMO), authorized the design 
changes to be accomplished expeditiously, commen-
surate with the tight test schedules. The formal 
submittal/approval cycle with formally released 
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engineering changes followed and was closed by 
Quality verification of the work effort previously 
completed by the Liaison Call. 
B. Status and Accounting System - Each EDCS originated to 
process a change was reviewed by CS&A for serialization impact, 
completeness of effectivity, contract documentation impact, and 
special quality control verification requirements. Upon approval 
the resultant engineering design changes were reviewed (prior to 
release) for compliance to the contract change authorization. 
The Quality Control (Q.C.) incorporation verification require-
ments of the design change were determined, and the mechanized 
CS&A record was established. The mechanized syste~ was cycled 
twice each week providing an updated status of those changes 
requiring verification of incorporation by Q.C.. Verification ,of 
each incorporation was documented on a Manufacturing Incorporation 
Verification Buy-Off Transmittal form and forwarded to CS&A for 
processing into the mechanized system. This closed-loop system 
provided a total record of all engineering design changes and 
the evidence of manufacturing incorporation of those changes 
was established. 
Coincident with the statusing of each engineering design 
change, each contract change was also statused in terms of the 
total impact to configuration controlled documentation, and the 
hardware end items affected. These records were certified versus 
the contract authority for the change by the AFP;RO on a continua,l 
basis up to the time of acceptance of the hardware. Once certi-
fied, the record could not be changed without AFPRO re-certificati9n. 
This status provided a ready reference of all contract changes, 
the impact to configuration controlled documentation and hard-
ware, and formed the basis for acceptance of that hardware. 
Historical status reports were retrieved from the CS&A 
files to support the various design reviews, vehicle movements, 
custamer acceptances, and selected program milestones. 
C. Configuration Status and Accounting Support to Design 
Reviews, Acceptances, and Program Mi1es~9nes - Prior to movement 
of the Flight Article MDA to the Vertical Test Facility (VTF), 
all unincorporated changes in the CS&A system were reviewed to 
determine those changes which had to be worked prior to proof 
pressure testing. Subsequent to VTF testing the Flight Article 
was moved back to the Factory and then to the Space Support 
Building (SSB) for final assembly and additional tests. At this 
time, the CS&A, system was reviewed again, this time in conjunction 
with NASA personnei. This review certifie4 the readiness of the 
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vehicle for movement to the SSB. At completion of the activities 
at SSB, a final verification of the MMC CS&A records versus the 
MSFC Status and Accounting System was performed to establish the 
compatibility of the two systems and certify the readiness for 
acceptance and shipment to St. Louis/MDAC-E. The MMC CS&A 
system was maintained throughout the life of the program in 
accordance with the contract requirement and was utilized repeat-
edly to verify and certify the MSFC status at subsequent reviews 
and milestones where configuration status of MDA hardware was 
a requirement. 
D. Acceptance 0D250s - CS&A provided Acceptance 00250s for 
all deliverable hardware on the MDA Program. Subsequent to 
acceptance, each retrofit modification was documented on a 00250 
at shipment and at instaUation. One hundred seventy-six (176) 
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) end items and forty-two (42) 
Flight hardware end items (including the Flight and Backup MDA) 
were documented on acceptance 00250s. In addition, one hundred 
twenty (120) Modification Kits on the One-G Trainer were sold on 
installation 00250s; one hundred forty-one (141) Modification 
Kits on the Flight Article MDA were sold on shipment and instal-
lation 0D250s~, Eighty-four (84) Kits were sold at KSC, one 
hundred eighty-eight (188) Kits at St. Louis, one. hundred twenty 
(120) Kits at JSC, and nineteen (19) Kits at MMC or other Con-
tractors, for a total of four hundred eleven (411) Modification 
Kits. 
E. St. Louis/MDAC-E Activity - During the integration 
testing of the MDA at the St. Louis facility, CS&A maintained 
status of all modifications to be accomplished. Mod work authori-
zation packages were issued in accordance with the more detailed 
status provided by CS&A at St. Louis. Close coordination was 
, maintained with the Test and Quality activity to ensure an 
accurate status of all mods in relation to the test milestones. 
CS&A maintained coordination with the local NASA Resident Manage-
ment Officer (RMO) and obtained interim authorization to accomp-
lish changes via the established Liaison Call method (Ref. Para 
9.2.2 .4.A •. 2). CS&A maintained control of the Liaison Call book 
at St. Louis and ensured ECP/Mod Kit ~ollow-up and closeout of all 
work accomplished to Liaison Calls. Technical authorization 
was obtained from the RMO for shipment of GFP hardware in accor-
dance with program needs. Prior to shipment of the MDA to KSC, 
verification of the MMC status and accounting system to theMSFC 
status and accounting system was accomplished, to recertify the 
MSFC status and accounting system and provide a basis for the 
Certificate of Flight Worthiness (COFW) Endorsement 2 and shipment 
of the equipment to KSC. 
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F. KSC Activity - During the KSC activity period, configuration 
changes to the Flight Article were implemented by type A Test 
Preparation Sheets (TPSs). Engineering drawing changes were 
developed and released in conjunction with these TPSs. CS&A 
received all type A TPSs at Denver and tracked the change an~ 
design releases within the CS&A system to ensure total account-
ability of changes. Closeout of changes on TPSs was also monitored 
at Denver and transferred to the CS&A and MSFC mechanized status 
as they occurred. A continuous verification of the MMC status 
to the MSFC status was performed to ensure total visability of 
all change activity. The MMC mechanized status was provided 
to the MMC/KSC personnel twice each week for status of open 
modifications. 
G. One-G Trainer Activity - The Onc-G Trainer was refur-
bished from the Engineering Mockup with form 4 sketch type 
engineering and sold on acceptance DD250 at Denver. The CS&A 
system was utilized at Denver in the same manner as for the GSE 
(Reference Para 9.2.2.4.A.l.). CS&A of retrofit configuration 
changes to the One-G Trainer waa maintained within the MMC system 
and a status of all open retro~eit work was provided as required. 
The nature of the training ha~dware at JSC dictated that mod 
incorpora.tions be accomplish/~d during !-,reselected mod periods. 
Verification of modificatio.~i incorporations was documented at 
JSC initially by completion: of an Installation Notice Card 
(MSFC Form 2490). The MMC @S&A records were closed at Denver, 
based upon copies of the compl~ted Installation Notice Card 
received. Concurrently, installation DD250s were provided by 
CS&A and sold at JSC. 
H. Conclusions and Recommendations - The importance of 
both MMC and MSFC CS&! systems during the various phases of the 
program was developed incrementally. As their roles developed, 
it became increasingly important that both systems track each 
other. The reviews and verifications that were performed were 
very beneficial to both systems but were usually done in bulk 
just prior to an event. The bulk of the data and the importance 
of compatibility of both systems dictates that reviews and veri-
fications of this nature should be conducted earlier in the 
program and incrementally rather than all at once. 
Earlier MSFC identification of Acceptance Data Package (ADP) 
documentation would have been more Program effective. This type 
of documentation requires that data must be collected incrementally 
as the hardware progresses through the deSign/build/test cycle. 
If this data initiation and collection is not started concurrent 
with hardware build, the task becomes difficult, is not cost 
effective and contributes to documentation that compromises its 
effectiveness. 
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9.2.3 Change Management 
The Change Management Section was responsible for the con-
tractual submittal and approval of Engineering Change Proposals 
and also facilitated implementation of approved changes into the 
cont,ract by Supplemental Agreement. These submittals covered 
engineering changes that were generated by NASA direction or 
by a technical requirement of the hardware. Each of these 
changes required the preparation an.d submittal of a contraet 
proposal letter, the Engineering Change Proposal and the associated 
contractual documentation (Change Notices, PIRNs or ICDs). The 
preparat:l.on of the eo'atract change proposal required the Change 
Management Section to initiate internal schedules, attend planning 
meetings, coordinate internal department inputs, work with all 
internal departments to assure that the change was being imple-
mented in accordance with the requirements of the contract and 
maintain a working knowledge of the interrelationship of the 
changes I 1.mpact on other portions of the program (Earth ResQurces, 
etc). Upon receipt of completed internal inputs, the Change 
Manager prepared the contractual letter, ECP and assembled all 
supporting contractual docu~ents into a submittal package that 
was in accordance with NASA p~quirements for contractual paper. 
The Change Manager was responsive to the NASA by providing status, 
contractor hardware information, 1ia1.son or assistance a.s required 
to expedite timely approval of the change and to prevent delays 
in hardware modification. Upon approval of the change by NASA, 
the Change Manager notified all internal departments of the 
approval and authoriz~d its final implementation into the system. 
A total of one thousand ninety-one ( 1091 ) ECPa were dispositioned 
during the program. 
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10. l-IISSION OPERATION S SUPPORT 
10.1 GENERAL MMC SUPPORT PHILOSOPHY 
Martin Marietta had diverse technical responsibilities to 
several NASA centers for Skylab operations support. A "Total 
Company" mission support team concept was developed to meet 
these responsibilities in a technically consistent and timely 
manner. Portions of this team were located at the various NASA 
centers with a centralized facil{ty at Denver to monitor the 
mission and coordinate MMC Skylab operations support efforts. 
The MMC Skylab MSFC (MDA .. and SE&I), JSC and Headquarters managers 
and the Skylab Engineering Manager maintained their direct inter-
nal reporting responsibility as well as their customer reporting 
responsibilities for mission support (see Figure 10.1-1). 
MANNED SYSTEMS 
VICE PRESIDENT 
I I 
SKYLAB MSFC-
MDA/SE&I , 
SKYLAB 
- ENGINE ERING ,I SKYLAB SKYl,AB HEADQUARTERS MSC WASHINGTON , 
, 
MMC - HUNTSVILLE , 
, 
, 
- - - - - INDICATES INTERNAL 
MMC COORDINATION 
INTERFACES 
\ , 
\ , MMC - HOUSTON 
\ I " 
'\ ' /" 
, \ , " , / 
~~\~~~,~---~/ 
SKYLAB MISSION SUPPORT MANAGER 
HQ MISS SUPPORT 
,,' GROUP " DENVI:R 
" 
o COORDINATE TOTAL MMC MISSION SUPPORT COMMITMENT 
o DENVER SUPP·ORT ROOM 
COMMUNICATION 
MISS ION STATUS 
DATA DiSTRIBUTION 
PROBLEM TRACKING/COORDINATION 
SUPPORT SERVICES (REPRO, LIBRARY. ETC.> 
Figure 10.1--1 Internal MMC Skylab Mission Support Interfaces 
10-1 
The position of MMC Skylab Mission Support Manager was established 
to coordinate the overall MMC mission support efforts. A Denver 
Support Room (DSR) was established to serve as a communications, 
data, mission information and activity coordination center for 
all program elements having mission, support responsibilities. 
MDA mission support personnel were fully integrated into this 
effort. 
10.2 NASA/MSFC SUPPORT 
MSFC, as the Skylab integration center, was required to 
provide technical support and assistance to the Johnson Space 
Center throughout the Skylab missions for the modules and 
experiments which were their development responsibility. 
MSFC support to Orbital Assembly (OA) flight operations 
was provided through the JSC Flight Operations Management Room 
(FOMR). The FOMR provided a single point interface between the 
JSC Mission Control Center (MeC) flight operations :and the MSFC 
and JSC Program Offices with their respective engineering 
support organizations. '(See Figure 10.2-1) 
10.2.1 MSFC Support Organization 
The MSFC Support Organization (see Figure 10 .. 2-2) was a 
mission-specific functional overlay on the existing MSFC program 
and engineering line organizations. This overlay utilized to 
the maximum extent the normal technical responsibility, communi-
cation and problem solving channels that existed during hardware 
and mission development. It provided a direct interface to the 
launch and flight operations organizations, a central coordi-
nation staff, rapid data exchange, and the flexible communica-
tions system necessary for timely and effective mission support . 
. 
10.2.1.1 Mission Support Groups (MSGs) 
MSGs were established for each primary OA system area, in 
order to provide the most. direct and timely response to mission 
problems. A responsible Leader and Assistant Leader(s) were 
identified for each system group, as well as the necessary 
representatives from other line organizations to provide com-
plete coverage of the system area. The MSG was organized around 
normal S&E Laboratory technical responsibilities and a senior 
person from the applicable laboratory was selected to lead the 
group. 
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Figure 10.2-2 MSFC Sky1ab Operations Organization 
The MSG Leaders were recognized authorities in the appli-
cable system area, and were able to identify from th~ gI0up 
membership those specialists necessary to work a given problem. 
They were responsible for coordinating problem disposition and 
documenting technical responses. MDA technical personnel were 
members of these Mission Support Groups. 
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10.2.1. 2 Huntsville Operations Support Center (nOSC) 
The center of Skylab Mission Support Activity at MSFC was 
the Huntsville Operations Support Center (nOSC) with its support 
organizations and facilities. Arrangement of the facility vas 
such that concurrent support to launch and OA operations was 
possible. Conference Work Areas (CWAs) were established within 
the HOSC and assigned to MSGs and other supporting organizations 
required to directly interface with the MSFC Skylab Mission 
Support Organization. 
10.2.2 Action Reguests 
Support Requests originated by the Flight Control Organi-
zation at JSC were forwarded through the FOMR to the HOSC. 
Responses to such requests and other inputs to the mission 
flowed back from HOSC to the FOMR and to the Flight Control 
Organization. 
MSFC, by monitoring real time mission data and voice 
communica tiOll ne tworks, was ab Ie to identify hardwa re anoma lies, 
procedure pro',blems, etc. and generate Action Requests (ARs) to 
the MSGs, Module Contractors or the JSC through the FOMR. 
10.3 MDA CONTRACTOR OPERATION 
MMC was under contract to support the MSFC Skylab Project 
Offices; the various laboratories of the Science and Engineer-
ing (S&E) Directorate; and the Mission Operations Office. The 
main areas of on-site support was to the AM/MDA Project Office 
and to the various MSGs. Technical personnel on-site at MSFC 
were assigned to the applicable MSGs to assist in system perform-
ance assessment, anomaly identification and resolution. On-site 
personnel assi~ned to a MSG were technically responsible to their 
MSG Leader (MSGL) while maintaining the technical and administra-
tive interface with the design sections in Denver and the Contrac-
tor Representative at HOSC. The Contractor Representative was 
the major on-site ·interface with the MDA program office. 
On-site personnel were the prime mode for providing anomaly 
support for MDA related problems. Personnel located at Denver 
actively coordinated with their on-site representative and pro-
vided backup analyses even when support was not requested by the 
MSGL. Figure 10.3-1 illustrates the MMC mission support organi-
zation. 
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10.3.1 MMC On-Site MSFC Operations 
Commensurate with the company's overall Sky1ab support 
role, MMC-Huntsvil1e (MMC-H) operation supported the MSFC 
Sky1ab Program Office and MSFC Skylnb Project Offices; the 
various laboratories under the S&E Directorate; and the MisHion 
Operations Office. Although the supporting activities took 
p1ace'in different physical locations in the MSFC complex nnd 
at several MMC locations, the support activities were centered 
around operations at the HOSC. 
Contractor representation at the HOSC covered three 
functional responsibilities: 
. 
• Contractor Senior Representation 
• MDA Project Representation 
• MDA Technical Support 
10.3.1.1 Contractor Senior Representation 
The Contractor Senior Representative at HOSC performed 
the following major functions: 
'. MMC representative to the MSFC Operations Support 
Manager (OSM) or Operations Director (OD) providing 
MMC support upon request. 
• Communications with the DSR concerning status of 
MMC assigned actions, mission status, etc. 
• Liaison capabilit,y' for MMC personnel from all locations 
for mission oper~tions related information. 
• Provided mission 'status information daily to the MMC 
Huntsville Operations Manager and participated in the 
MMC Management daily telecon. 
10.3.1.2 MDA Project Representation 
The MDA Project Representative performed the following 
functions: 
• Attend HOSC daily review meetings and represent the 
MDA Project Office Representative during these meetings 
when directed. 
• Provide technical support to the OSM and the Project 
Office Manager. 
• Provide a liaison function between the MSFC Systems 
Coordinator at the DSR and Mf.I: members of the MSGs. 
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• Provide the Denver engineering perf;onnel wi th a da ily 
appraisal of on-going mission activities and Skylnh 
progress reports. 
The Project Representative also functioned as bnckllJl [en-
the Contractor Senior Representative in the performance of 
his previously noted duties. 
10.1.1.3 MDA Technical Support 
The on-site p.ersonnel had multiple mission support roles 
to perform. They provided technical support to the MSGs 
responsible [or a particular OA system, and were responsiva 
to Program Office requirements. Their priority [unction was 
to provide on-going mission operations support including access 
to Skylab engineering drawings, specifications, test data, 
and other similar documentation. The contractor HOSC facility 
maintained top level engineering and stowage installation 
drawings in support of this function. They also maintained a 
complete set of MDA Engineering Drawings on microfilm aperture 
cards for authorized access during the mission. In most cases, 
this support was provided to the MSGs Who in turn supported 
the fUnctions MSFC provided to the MCC through the FOMR. 
On-site personnel were an integral part of the following Mission 
Support Groups: 
• Electrical Power Systems 
• Instrumentation and Communications 
• Structural and Mechanical 
• Crew Systems 
• Corollary Experiments 
• Environmental and Thermal Control Systems 
The on-site personnel, when not actively involved in 
anomaly resolution support, were responsible for the deter-
mination of system performance and to keep Denver personnel 
aware of changes in system status during the mission. This 
daily assessment was made using real time telemetry data, 
Mission Operation Planning System (mpS) data, and mission 
progress and status information generated at MSFC or obtained 
from JSC through the HOSC. This information was provided to 
Denver by phone or Magnafax facsimile transmission during both 
the manned and unmanned periods. 
Systems Engineers were also located on-site and, although 
they were not assigned to any MSG, they did perform a supporting 
role and functioped a~ contractor representatives at the HOSC • 
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10.3.2 Denver Operations 
10.3.2.1 Denver Support Room Facility 
The DSR facility was established to serve os a focal point 
[or MMC mission support activities. The facility waH used for 
premission simulations and was continuously utilized in support 
of tile Skylab mission on a 24-hollr per day basis. 
The MDA program has shared this facility with other MMC 
Skylab elements supporting MSFC, JSC and Headquarters. The 
common facility provided an opportunity to coordinate and 
integrate technical responses provided to different centers. 
The DSR was used primarily as a communications center providing 
on-site personnel access to backup information and personnel 
at Denver. Communication links were provided between Denver 
and all MMC support operations and the NASA support facilities 
at MSFC HOSC and JSC Mission Evaluation Room (MER). The room 
also served as a focal point for dissemination of mission status 
and support information for all Denver technical groups and 
managemen t. 
A DSR library was provided to facilitate immediate access 
to Skylab documentation, current mission data and personnel 
location and availability data. 
Access to MDA drawings was provided through the implemen-
tation of procedures [or 24 hour day availability/of the Denver 
Central Engineering File 10. Quality Control data, including 
the build log and as-run test procedures, were indexed and made 
available in the DSR library. Similarly indices of contract 
data were made available in the library and 24 hour access 
implemented py the Skylab Data Manager. 
A. DSR Operations - The DSR organization is shown in 
Figure 10.3-2. The Shift Supervisor responsible for admin-
istering the DSR facilities and.equipment, was the single 
spnkesman for the DSR for mission infot;mation and status. He 
daily chaired a meeting which provided the interchange of 
nd ssion status and support inIormation between Denver manage-
ment and management on-Hite at St. Louis, MSFC, JSC, and 
Wash ington. 
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Figure 10.3-2 Denver Support Room Organization 
A Mission Status position was provided to keep the Shift 
Supervisor informed on mission status and developments. This 
position kept a detailed chronological log of key mission events 
and Flight Director discussions from the communication networks. 
An accurate mission information index was therefore available 
for all technical groups. Informatiot. could be retrieved from 
24 hour continuous tap~ recordings of this information. 
, ' . 
An Anomaly Investigator was also provided to support the 
Shift ~upervisor by statusing the support activities, i.e., 
ARs, Mission Action Requests (MARs), etc, that were being 
worked for the on-site personnel either at MSFC orJSC and any 
other problems being worked internally for MMC management. 
B. DSR Participation - MDA program personnel were signi-
ficantly involved in the DSR planning and operations beginning 
with facility requirements definition and data requirements 
and progressing into full participation in the use of the DSR 
during premission simulations and mission operations. Each 
MDA technical discipline used the DSR during high mission 
activity to monitor progress and keep in close contact with 
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MDA on-site personnel. During normal mission periods, the MDA 
technical personnel were either present in the DSR or on-call. 
Complete coverage for the MDA technical disciplines was provided 
by a MSFC Systems Coordinator during the manned phases of the 
mission. During the unmanned phases, single shift coverage 
by the Systems Coordinator was utilized to provide MDA represen-
tation in the DSR. 
The Systems Coordinator provided the DSR with technical 
support and interfaces with the MDA design groups at Denver. 
He assessed/coordinated all NASA generated mission action 
requests for MDA impact/cation in Denver. He also assured that 
each problem was worked in a time frame consistent with real 
time mission support requirements. MDA technical representatives 
and/or the Systems Coordinator also monitored the Flight Director 
and air-to-ground communications network to maintain current 
mission status. This effort permitted early identification of 
real and potential MDA problems and rapid mobilization of Denver 
mission support personnel. Mission problems which affected more 
than one MDA system were coordinated with the other support 
groups by the MSFC Support Coordinator to assure that a total 
response was pr~vided from Denver to the Mission Support Groups 
at MSFC. 
10.3.2.2. Mission Problem Evaluation 
During the mission, the DSR provided the capability to res-
pond to a variety of mission related problems. Requests for 
action or problem support from either NASA or MMC on-site 
personnel were documented on a Problem Tracking Request (PTR) 
by the MSFC Systems Coordinator and provided to the affected 
disciplines. 
Basically, problems worked by the MDA were generated in two 
distinct ways: 
• The MSFC Systems Coordinator at Denver generated PTRs 
based on real time information obtained by monitoring 
the air-to-ground or Flight Director nets or from 
information provided by the MDA on-site personnel. 
Additionally, PTRs were generated at the request of 
MMC managemen t • 
• NASA at JSC or MSFC generated actions which were 
assigned to MMC disciplines either by the MSG, the OD 
or the MDA program office at HOSC. Coordination, 
integration and assignment of these problems with other 
affected disciplines was provided by the Systems 
Coordinator (at Denver). 
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Using the PTR system through the DSR, Denver personnel 
provided support to NASA and the on-site personnel as required 
throughout all mission phases. The following indicates the 
total number of action requests reviewed 'for MDA impact or 
action and the number of items assigned to MDA disciplines for 
action or review: 
• 1662 Items reviewed by Systems Coordinator for MDA 
impact 
• 506 Assigned to MDA for action or review 
-226 Originated at MSFC 
-163 Originated at JSC 
-117 Originated at MMC 
The DSR maintained displays of problem status for manage-
ment tracking during the mission and a library of all problem 
and action requests for historical purposes. 
10.3.2.3 Implementation of Mission Support 
MDA personnel located in Denver provided support on a 
priority basis to the on-site personnel. The on-site personnel, 
in turn, provided liaison between the MSG Leaders and the 
Denver Engineering Sections so that each section chief was 
kept aware of on-site support activities and the status of 
anomaly resolution. 
The prime activities of the Denver personnel were to 
provide long term evaluation of systems performance and detail 
backup for the on-site personnel. . 
Most action requests worked at Huntsville were also worked 
at Denver to keep management and the technical design groups 
up-to-date on system status or operational changes requiring 
in-depth analysis. 
MMC support personnel at HOSC were responsible to the DSR 
shift supervisor to assure that all MARs, ARs or the content 
thereof was provided to Denver for use by the engineering support 
personnel. Normally, this was accomplished via telephone. When' 
Denver action may have been required, copies of the action 
request (AR, MAR, etc) were provided to the DSR in the most 
expeditious manner. MARs with action assigned to MMC or "All 
MSGs" were always transmitted to the DSR. Others were Mlagna£axed 
to the DSR on an as-required basis. 
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Denver responses to requests for action were processed 
at Huntsville as follows: 
• The on-site representative to a MSG, was notified ,(:l.f 
its availability. 
• A copy was delivered, ~hen requested, to the S&E Senior 
Representatives on duty and a copy of all MDA related 
responses was provided to the NASA MDA Project Office 
Representative. 
The DSR was notified of and supplied MSFC responses to 
ARs or MARs. The latest status of all Action Requests being 
statused at HOSC was communicated to the DSR. 
10.3.3 MMC/JSC Interfaces 
Interfaces with JSC were formally implemented through the 
MSFC S&E Laboratories, the MDA Program Office and Mission 
Operations Office. Primary interfaces with JSC included the 
technical review of operations documents such as: 
• Flight data file (checklists~ flight plans, mal-function procedures) 
• Flight Mission Rules 
• Systems and Experiments Handbooks 
• Operations Data Book 
An informal method of submitting review comments existed 
through the MMC personnel on-site at JSC. MDA related comments 
to any of these books were coordinated with the appropriate 
NASA technical counterparts at MSFC and informally transmitted 
as preliminary information to MMC personnel at JSC. These MMC 
personnel supported JSC in the preparation of various operations 
documents and crew training activities. Figure 10.3-3 illustrates 
the MDA approach to this review cycle which was continuous 
throughout the mission period. Other MDA mission support was 
provided utilizing the formal NASA program and communications 
routes established by the MDA Project Office and MSFC Mission 
Operations as detailed in Figure 10.2-1. 
10.4 BACKUP ARTICLE AND STU-STDN 
10.4.1 Backup Article 
The MDA Backup Article was located at the MDAC-E facilities 
in St. Louis. Its general configuration was maintained as close 
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as possible to the flight article with the following exceptions: 
• No EREP sensors or Electronic Support Equipment 
• Minimal Stowage 
• ATM C&D had the qualification test panels 
The backup article was maintained in this configuration to work 
hardware problems in support of the on-going mission. These 
activities included fit checks, crew procedure verification, system 
interaction verification, inf1ight maintenance task checkout, 
malfunction re-enactment and troubleshooting procedure verification. 
(See Section 7.8.2 for detailed mission support activities per-
formed on the Backup article.) MDA personnel located in St. Louis 
provided 24 hour per day support during launch, activation and 
deactivation. During normal mission periods the MDA personnel were 
on duty 16 hours per day and the vehicle was powered up for 2 hours 
every third shift. During the remaining 8 hours per day short 
notice on-call schedules were maintained. 
Backup article personnel provided support to all NASA disciplines 
under direction or approval of the AM/MDA Program Office at MSFC. 
Support was also provided to Denver through the interim MMC 
channels. See Figure 10.4-1 for the MDA Backup Artic;a Mission 
Support Flow. 
10.4.2 STU/STDN 
The SWS STU/STDN, located at MDAC-E, was designed to simulate 
OA and ATM airborne and ground communication systems. The STU/STDN 
was a combination of component simulators, development hardware, 
qualification hardware and actual ground station equipment. 
MMC had prime responsibility for TV system operations at this 
facility. Commensurate with this responsibility, MMC provided 
the STU with qualification test hardware, engineering tools and 
personnel for set-up and checkout prior to the mission. During 
the mission period, MMC provided key personnel on-site at St. 
Louis to coordinate test requirements, procedures and test support. 
STU TV activity in support of the mission can be divided into 
two categories: 
• Direct mission support, and 
• "Nonmission" support. 
Direct mission support was specifically tied to the 1&C MSGL at 
MSFC. Enginee1;"ing Work Orders and "as-run procedures" were 
supplied to MMC-MDA-TV personnel and to the DSR for information. 
The mission support activities performed at STU/STDN are detailed 
in Sectio~ 7.9.4. 
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10.5 VENDOR ON-CALL SUPPORT 
The principal subcontractors to MMC-MDA on the Skylab program 
were maintained on contract throughout most of the mission period . 
(through 12/73). TablelO.5-l lists these firms and their hardware 
responsibility. All of these organizations were contacted prior 
to the mission start and specific individuals were identified as 
a point-of-contact in the event vendor support was required. 
Accessory Products Company 
Division of Textron, Inc. 
AMETEK/CALMEC 
~iResearch Manufacturing Co. 
Div. of the Garrett Corp. 
Actron Industries, Inc. 
Subsidiary of McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation. 
AMETEK/STRAZA 
Bendix Navigation & Control 
Division 
Corning Gla'ss Work 
HY-CAL Engineering 
Instrument DivisiCln, Kratos 
Metal Bellows Corporation . 
McDonnell Douglas .Astronautics 
Company 
Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. 
Servonic Division 
Gulton Industries, Inc. 
Space-Flex Corporation 
Thermal Systems, 
Div. of Axial Corporation 
Valve, Equalization 
Valve Assy., Manual, 
Astronaut Operated 1/4" 
4" Vent Valve Assy., Motor 
Operated 
Coolant Valve, Manual 
4 Port, Selector 
Wi.ndow Assy., S190 
Bellows, Vent Line 
Video Switch 
Panel Safety Shield S190 Window 
Transducer Temp., Surface 
Gage.Assembly, Pneumatic 
Line, Coolant, Flexible (Avica) 
Sealing Device, Habitation Area 
Adapter Flange Assembly, Vent 
Sealing Device 
Fitting Assembly Seal 
Windows S19l and S192 Experiments 
Transducer Pressure, Absolute 
Duct, Flexible 
Assembly Thermostat 
Heater Sys, Docking Tunnel, 
Thermostat· Assembly 
Table 10.5-1 Vendor Support 
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10.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The "total company" mission support team concept worked 
exceptionally well in helping the MDA meet its mission support 
responsibilities. The DSR, which served as a focal point for 
all MMC mission support activities, was the heart of this con-
cept. A significant amount of information exchange and coordi-
nation between the diverse elements within the company support-
ing the several NASA centers came from this facility. In future 
long term space missions, it is recommended that each major con-
tractor establish a communications, data, mission information 
and activity coordination center similar to the DSR. 
The MMC"MDA design groups prepared for their mission 
support role by taking part in mission simulations and develop-
ing detailed ,plans and procedures for their mission support 
efforts. This planning effort was r~warded by a smoothly func-
tioning, flexible and responsive MMC MDA support team, demon-
strating the usefulness of a strong planning effort. 
From the module contractor standpoint, technical respon-
sibility for problem analysis and wor~around determination 
sho~ld ,remain within the affected design group(s). Their Sky1ab 
expertise permitted rapid assessment of the problem and timely 
and accurate problem solutions. 
MMC mission support planning included the requirement for 
timely avai1ahi1ity of the post acceptance (pre-launch) test 
data. This data was not available until well into the mission. 
No MDA mission problems occurred wh~ch necessitated this data 
and support capability was not compromised. However, MMC recom-
mends that in order to make technical support potentially more 
responsive test data be made promptly available to the techni-
cally responsible Project Office • 
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11.0 NEW TECHNOLOGY 
11.1 AEROSPACE APPLICATIONS 
11.1.1 Application of Spacecraft Leak Criteria 
The mass leakage rate of a spacecraft is larger at sea 
level than on orbit at the same pressure differential. This is 
primarily due to fluid density and varies somewhat with the type 
of structure and type of leakage path. 
During the test definition phase of,MDA, it was apparent 
that the use and value of a sea level to orbit factor was incon-
sistent among the various contractors and NASA Agencies, i.e., 
1.0 to 2.6. 
An analysis of available test data and a research of test 
history resulted in a factor of 2.4 for Denver testing and a . 
2.6 for St. Louis and KSC testing. These factors proved to be 
conservative by the Altitude Chamber Testing at St. Louis which 
indicated a factor of approximately 7.0. A comparison of pre-
liminary flight data, to KSC test data, revealed a factor of 
approximately 4.4. 
The leakage rate of the SWS in orbit has been determined 
to be approximately 20 percent of the allowable which further 
substantiates a conservative factor. 
The application of the se~ level to orbit leakage ,criteria 
to the MDA test program proved to be a significant factor in 
making it more efficient and timely. 
11.1.2 Super Insulation 
A description of the insulation blanket design and fabri-
cation is stated in Section 2.2.1 of this report. 
The innovations incorporated in 
and "boot hooks". Swiftachments were 
replaced individual string hand ties. 
grommets for attaching the blankets to 
these features allowed fabricating and 
at a Significant reduction in cost and 
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the design are swiftachments 
installed using a gun and 
Boot hooks replaced thru-
the vehicle. Both of 
installing the blankets 
schedule on the MDA program. 
J 
11.1.3 Development of a Pressure Sensitive Adhesive System for 
the MilA Hatch Seal 
A silicone pressure sensitive adhesive system was developed 
for the MDA hatch sea1so The adhesive used was Dow Corning DC282 
silicone adhesive catalyzed with 2.3% Huperco CST. The mixed 
adhesive was thinned with toluene and applied by brush to the 
seal and cured (See Section 2.2.1). This produced an adhesive 
system with excellent adhesion to the silicone rubber seal and 
moderate adhesion to aluminum. Thus when the seal is removed for 
replacement, the adhesive comes off with the seal and no adhesive 
is left on the aluminum. This allowed installation of the new 
seal with no cleaning of the aluminum substrate. 
11.1.4 Application of Nonflammable Flexible Electrical Cabling System 
A nonflammable system of protecting electrical cables was 
developed on MilA which allowed the cables to be fabricated outside 
the MDA on cable boards and then installed. 
This replaced the original design which consi~ted of a1uminu~ 
conduits and raceways. 
The new cabling system makes cables nonflammable in an 
oxygen enriched atmosphere. 
1l.1.5 8190 Window 
The 8190 Window design successfully coupled very high opti-
cal quality with a very large optical viewing area and incorpor-
ated these features into a single-paned window assembly whose 
structural integrity, pressure sealing integrity and optical 
performance was demonstrated by extensive testing. The window 
also incorporated several other unique design features which were 
significant improvements over the technology then existing for 
spacecraft optical window. Considering its large size and combi-
nation of structural and optical requirements, the 8190 Window was, 
in a practical sense, the best optical window that could be pro-
duced. Among the window's unique design features may be listed 
the following: 
• Large viewing area - 21.75 x 16.00 inches 
• Single pane of annealed optical glass - 1.60 inches thick 
• Float:f.ng suspension system - springs on both sides of 
the glass and molded seal. 
• Molded seal l.;rith redundant sealing lips, pressure acti-
vated and compatible with the operation of the floating 
suspension system. 
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• Use of an automatically controlled heating system to 
keep the window at a uniform temperature and thus minimize 
optical distortion in the glass. 
11.2 OTHER APPLICATIONS 
11.2.1 Development of a Pressure Sensit!ve Adhesive System for 
MIlA Hatch Seal 
A. Seals on refrigerator doors - present seal designs 
require disassembly of the interior of the door to replace the 
seal. Most people would not attempt to themselves, and replace-
ment by a service man would probably run between $35 - $60. 
Therefore, people are content to pay more on their electric bills 
and allow the leakage of cold air out and varm air into their 
refrigerators. We feel this is a waste of energy which could 
be averted. A seal coated with pressure sensitive adhesive 
applied to a flat area around the door could easily be replaced 
by a conS\.UIler. 
B. Washers, dryers and dishwashers - same as above. 
11.2.2 Application of Nonflammable Flexible Electrical Cabling System 
Protection of portable power cables used in oxygen enriched 
atmospheres, such as hospitals, research labs, oxygen generating 
plants, etc. It may also preclude fires and explosions in coal 
mines and other mining operations. 
1102.3 Application of Systems Test Integration Approach (To 
activation of large industrial plants, i.e., chemical plants, 
petroleum plan~s, etc.) 
Technique would employ definition of test requirements, 
and preparation of test procedures for component and system level 
tests with the goal of significantly reducing time for a proces-
sing plant to go on-stream from the point of installation completion. 
11.2.4 Revere Universal Weight and Center of Gravity Table 
The Revere Universal Weight and Center of Gravity Table 
was procured by MMC, installed in the High Bay Clean Room, and 
checked out and.put in operation to meet actual measurement 
requirements of the MIlA. The system was designed to handle a 
total mass of 25,000 pounds. The system was specified and veri-
fied for a weight accuracy of .1% of applied load, and C. G. 
accuracy ± .02 inches. 
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The system consists of a table mounted on electronic load 
cells connfacted to an electronic readout with both visual and 
printed out:put. Alignment of the part being measured to the 
table coordinates is accomplished using tooHng bars and optical 
instrument8 which ure part of the system. 
The feature of this system that puts it in the new technology 
category iEl versatUity. Existing high precision devices are 
designed for specific applications, whereas, the Revere system 
developed for the MDA, is highly flexible and can be used for 
essentially any component or module. 
11.2.5 Finite Element Analysis Applied to Automobiles 
Response of an elastic structure, like an automobile, to 
the applied forcing functions can be done mathematically by 
modelling the structure with finite elements and adding discrete 
dampers like shock absorbers and bumper shock absorbers. This 
analysis would be a tool to aid in preliminary design. 
i~e more difficult problem of analyzing an automobile 
collision would have to be attacked by the finite element method. 
The aerospace industry has a lot of experience with finite element 
analysis. Part of this experience involves two elastic bodies 
docking. There was no plastic deformation involved with the dock-
ing problem, but this experience could be a start for research 
into the collision problem. 
11$2.6 Earthquake Analysis 
The analysis of buildings in earthquake prone areas is done 
by the finite element method. Earthquakes can be statistically 
defined as a random forci~g function. Current aerospace analytical 
methods involve finding the loads and stresses 1n finite element 
mod.els forced by random forcing functions. The analogy follows 
a'one-to-one correspondence. The contribution the aerospace 
industry could make is application of methods of handling large 
matrices sparse programming, consistent mass, matrix generation, 
modal coupling, three dimensional computer plotting subroutines. 
The expertise is readily applicable. 
11.2.7 Electrical Connector Pin Height Go/No Go Gauge and Light Tool 
Two tools were developed by MMC to provide means to check 
and evaluate electrical connector pin heights and further to 
evaluate proper pin/socket mating. The tools developed are 
discussed in su:f.f;!,c.:i.eI"~t detail to present configuration, usage and 
j ust:f.fiC'H:ion= 
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A. Pin Height Gauge - The pin height gauge gives a very 
quick go/no go visual indication of adequacy of receptacle pin 
contact heights, with respect to the key feature of the receptacle 
coupling device, to insure adequate pin and socket contact 
engagement in mated plug and receptacles. The gauge measures 
all pin contacts in the receptacle, up to 61 pins including coax 
contacts, at one time. 
( 1) Description - The use of Air-Lock, Inc. coupling 
devices on Microdot, Inc. electrical connectors 
on the Gemini, Apollo and Sky1ab programs gives 
rise to possible open circuits, or worse yet, 
intermittent circuits, due to tolerance build-ups 
allowing inadequate engagement of pin and socket 
contacts. Since almost all of the Apollo and 
most of the Sky1ab components and cables had been 
assembled at the time this discrepancy was uncov-
ered by MMC; an urgent need existed for a method 
to determine if assembled connectors were satis-
factory. 
The subject receptacle pin height gauge is basi-
cally a mating plug; except instead of wired 
contacts it contains accurately machined spring 
loaded gauge pins. When the gauge is mated to the 
recep\tac1e each gauge pin is pushed up by each 
pin contact in the receptacle. If the gauge pin 
is raised to f1ush'with or above the gauge surface, 
the corresponding receptacle pin is high enough. 
The gauge surface is a plane at the back of the 
gauge which is very accurately located with respect 
to the key coupling feature (ball location) of 
the gau~;e coupling nut. 
The gauge'goes to the very "business end" of the 
receptac:1e, the pin tip location with respect to 
the coupling feature; and, allows the maximum 
"buy in" of receptacles which otherwise might be 
rejectec1l if ir:termediate tolerances had to be 
accommoc:l,ated. 
Each gauge is universal for N (normal), -1 and -2 
polarizations of each insert arrang~ment, e1imi-
n~ting the need to procure separate gauges for 
separate polarizations. 
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(2) Usage - The gauges were procured and uB~d on equip-
ment throughout the Skylab cluster, and many 
receptacles have been found that were inadequate 
to insure electrical mating with worst case 
toleranced plugs. 
The device has been successfully applied to the 
Microdot/Air-Lock connectors on Apollo, LM, and 
Skylab. With minor design changes for the coupling 
method, it would be appropriate for the pure Micro-
dot connector receptacles, which have a history of 
suspected low pin contacts on Launch Vehicles and 
other equipment. 
(3) Justification for Tool - There was no prior practice 
for determining pin height adequacy in Microdot/ 
Air-lock connectors. The practice on pure Micro-
dot connectors is to measure individual, suspect, 
low pins using a depth micrometer, measuring from 
the nose of the receptacle to the tip of the pin. 
This method is not applicable for the Air-Lock 
adapter because the adapter coupling feature is 
not precisely located with respect to the nose of 
the Microdot receptacle. 
(4) Potential Tool Growth - This design principle is 
readily adaptable to all connector "families", 
including bayonet coupled, threaded, ball lock, 
etc. It could also be adapted to connectors which 
have the pin contacts installed in the plugs 
instead of the receptacles. With more precision 
in design and machining it could be adapted to 
plugs or receptacles with socket contacts. Such 
design, however, would verify the presence of an 
effective socket spring member as well as its 
location. There have been suspected near flight 
failures and known test failures due to missing 
or damaged socket spring members. 
With extreme precision in machining this design 
can be extended to include adequate pin contact 
alignment as well as contact height. 
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B. Go/No Go Light Tool - The Go/No Go Light Tool was con-
ceived and used as an aid when using the Pin Height Go/No Go 
Gauge. It is used to determine if the small metal gauge pins 
(0.035 dia) in an electrical connector pin height gauge are below 
or flush with/above the gauge go/no go surface. The light is 
essentially a continuity tester; except, instead of having two 
separate electrical probes, it has a single small probe divided 
into two electrically separated contact surfaces. If both halves 
touch the same conductive surface, the circuit is completed and 
the bulb lights. 
(1) Description - The Go/No Go Light is simply a 
small indicator light assembled onto an individual 
16 gauge connector pin contact which has been 
split into two electrically isolated contacts. 
The separate power supply is a pen light battery 
pack. 
See the -029 assembly on Dwg. SK820TK7780 for the 
details and assembly of this device. In summary, 
the device is made from readily available parts 
and materials using simple machine shop practices. 
This device was designed as an inspection aid for 
an electrical connector pin height gauge. Its 
purpose is to eliminate the visual judgment from 
the determination of whether the metal gauge pins 
in the connector gauge are below or flush with/above 
the nonmetallic go/no go surface. The probe is 
placed over the gauge pin in question and if the 
gauge pin is high enough to be touched by the 
probe, the bulb lights. If the gauge pin is below 
the go/no go surface, it cannot be touched by the 
probe and the light does not light. 
Since the device depends only on flat surfaces, 
the tolerance on the accuracy of its measurement 
is essentially zero. If a device with sliding 
contacts were used, its accuracy would depend on 
the machining accuracy of the many individual 
parts, as well as the accuracy of assembly. This 
device is also electrically independent of the 
electrical circuits in the connector under 
inspection. It does not require passing a current 
through, or applying a voltage to, the contacts 
of the connector. Such currents or voltages 
could be very hazardous to the circuit elements 
connected to the connector under inspection. 
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(2) Usage - In its existing form, this device is 
useful in determining if a surface is conductive, 
or if any particular location on a surface is 
conductive. 
The original device was essentially used as a 
depth indicator (flush with/above) light. With 
fixed or adjustable insulated stops added along 
its length, it could be used to "measure" the 
depth of any conductive surface in almost any 
recess. Such application would include the measure-
ment of press fits or adjustments to determine if 
an internal part had been engaged far enough, or 
too far, into the external part. 
(3) Justification for Tool - This device is the only 
known single probe conductivity tester or continuity 
tester. 
This device was originally designed to be used 
with the electrical connector pin height gauges 
~ designed to implement the requirements of MSFC ~ Alert No. 72-4. 
(4) Potential Tool Growth - The uses of a "single" 
probe conductivity or continuity light are limited 
only by the need for such a light. The probe 
could be made much smaller, or larger, if needed. 
It could also be designed as a single unit by 
including small "hearing aid" or electric ,~atch 
batteries and a small light bulb or a light 
emitting diode. 
With a spherical tip, or tips, it would be useful 
as go/no go light for measuring internal diameters, 
or depth of chamfers/tapers. This shape would 
also be useful in determining the presence of 
effective internal spring members in electrical 
sockrat contacts. 
With more widely spaced contacts, it would be 
useful as a go/no go light in determining the 
perpendicularity of any conductive surface with 
respect to the axis of the probe. 
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12. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The MD~ was developed and utilized on the Skylab Program 
without any significant problems. Its performance on-orbit, 
was, we believe, exemplary in that it successfully accomplished 
all objectives and, in fact, demonstrated its versatility v1hen 
called upon to facilitate several OA contingency operations 
encountered during the mission. The problems encountered during 
prelaunch testing and their impact on the established schedule 
were minima 1. 
12.1 MISSION PERFORMANCE 
The following discussion summarizes the MDA performance 
during the Skylab Mission and presents recommendations for 
consideration in the design of future manned spacecraft systems. 
A. Structures 
( 1) Conclusions - The MDA Structure performed its 
functions without any problems throughout the 
Sky1ab mission. Besides meeting all .requirements 
for the nominal mission, structural hardware 
successfully accommodated contingency conditions 
that occurred during flight. The MDA withstood 
the high temperatures resulting from the high 
pitch angle during the first two weeks of the 
mission. It provided support for the Rate Gyro 
6-Pack, installed by the SL-3 crew, and for the 
fan which was used to cool th·s gyros. MDA mech-
anisms functioned satisfactorily and all three 
crews commented on their ease of operation. 
(2) Recommendations 
(a) Use of self-locking blind fasteners and 
inserts should be restricted to permanent 
one-time installations. Equipment that may 
be removed for preflight checkout of in-flight 
maintenance should use replaceable nuts and 
bolts to prevent damage to hardware that may 
be difficult or impossible to replace. 
(b) Structural glass windows must be flaw-screened 
to eliminate invisible defects that could 
result in service failures. The flaw screening 
test should be based on a fracture mechanics 
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analysis and should simulate flight loading 
to assure that all areas of the glass are 
adequately screened. After testing, all 
surfaces should be protected to prevent 
introducing any new flaws in the glasa. 
(c) Mechanical drives of the type used for the 
MDA windo\-. externa 1 cover provide a simple 
and reliable means for controlling external 
components. The use of similar devices is 
recommended for future spacecraft designs. 
B. Environmental Control System (ECS) 
(1) Conclusions - The MDA ECS performed as designed 
throughout the total Skylab Mission. 
Some ECS hardware was utilized for functions and 
time periods \-lhich were not part of the original 
design requirements. These unplanned functions 
included the use of the axial hatch pressure 
equalization valve as a means through which the 
MDA atmosphere could be sampled prior to SL-2 
activation, and the operation of Cabin Fan No. 2 
during storage periods to provide cooling of the 
6-Pack rate gyros. All ECS limited life hardware, 
except cabin fans, had additional operating time 
or cycles remaining at the end of the 84-day SL-4 
mission. The as-flown mission required that all 
three MDA fans exceed their design life of 3360 
hours:, but all performed satisfactorily. All 
MDA ECS hardware performed as designed with no 
anomalies. 
(2) Recommendations - Components and tubing within 
the ATM C&D coolant loop consisted of a combination 
of aluminum alloys and stainless steel. Because 
the various materials wer.e in contact within the 
fluid loop, there was concern for possible corrosion 
problems. See Page 2-96 for further discussion 
of the coolant loops material concerns. 
It is recommended that all fluid systems on future 
programs be made from similar materials and not 
include a combination of metals. 
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C. Thermal Control System 
(1) Conclusions - The MDA TCS performed as designed, 
throughout the total 8-month Sky1ab Mission. 
When sufficient power was available, and the wall 
heaters were thermostatically controlled, the TCS 
kept the MDA 'i'i'ithin the crew comfort box. The 
system was exposed to several off-nominal conditions, 
during various orbital periods, but there was no 
evidence of TCS hardware malfunctions. 
(2) Recommendations 
(a) Analysis vs Test - The MDA thermal effort 
involved many analyses because of the desire 
to reduce expensive testing. In some cases, 
testing would have been less expensive, and 
,,'ould have provided more assurance of a 
successful produc't. One case involved an 
extensive analysis performed to predict the 
ascent venting characteristics of the multi-
layer insulation blanket. This type of 
engineering problem does not lend itself 
well to an analysis. A test could have been 
set up and conducted for a fraction 7f the 
cost that it took to do the analysis. 
It is recommended that future programs give 
careful consider~tion toward running brief 
tests as a potential cost savings to certain 
analysis tasks. 
(b) Thermal Characteristics of Electrical Components -
Prior to flight, a defect in the S190 window 
controller was identified. The problem was 
due to thermal design on the circuit board 
level. Some electrical components were pre-
dicted to exceed allowable temperatures in 
a Zero-G environment. This was due to the 
lack of natural convection in space. The 
controller was modified prior to flight and 
tested in a near vacuum to prove the ability 
of the design to bet:ompatib1e with no 
natural convection. 
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A similar problem with overheating electrical 
components, on the circuit board level, ~1as 
found on the Backup Inverter Lighting Control 
Assembly (BILCA). A thermal fix was incor-
porated on a transistor to assist heat 
dissipation. Once again a test at near 
vacuum conditions verified ability of the 
design to dissipate heat. 
It is recommended that future design reviews 
of spacecraft electronic assemblies specifi-
cally address the possibility of overheating 
at the component level. 
(c) Instrumentation - Temperature sensor placement 
on the MDA allowed for thorough monitoring 
of the MDA thermal performance. However, 
several recommendations are. made concerning 
the instrumentation: 
• The S190 window was closely monitored 
during the mission due t'~~ the possibility 
of moisture condensation rm its internal 
surface. Many analyses were performed 
to extrapolate measurement values from 
nearby instrumentation in order to predict 
window temperatures. A temperature trans-
ducer, located on the internal surface 
of the window, would have eliminated much 
analysis and given accurate real time 
information. It is therefore recommended 
that future spacecraft windows, that are 
sensitive to temperature, be equipped with 
temperature transducers ~1herever possible. 
• The axial docking port had two separate 
temperature transducers to monitor temper-
ature. Shortly after launch, when the 
cluster was put in the pitch-up attitude, 
the temperature transducers in the axial 
tunnel pegged out on the high side at 
1130 F. Analyses had to be performed to 
estimate the true maximum telnperature. It 
is, therefore, recommended that wherever 
redundant or dual in,strumentation is pro-
vided on future spacecraft, consideration 
be given toward making the calibration 
ranges different in order to allow for 
contingencies. 
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• The two measurements of dew point temper-
ature (C0207 & C021S) were lost many times 
during the three manned missions due to 
shutdown of the molecular sieve fans. 
It was necessary to power down the fans 
as part of a power management procedure 
to conserve electri;~al power during EREP 
and other maneuvers. Likewise, the measure-
ment of I/LCA base plate temperature was 
lost .each time the ;{I.lJAwas powered d~rn. 
The aforementioned difficulties complicated the 
real time decision making process and made post-
flight data reduction and analysis less accurate. 
It is recommended that in future designs, such 
difficulties be circumvented by designing the 
measurement system to be independent of the ON/OFF 
status of the measured component. In some systems, 
this can be accomplished by supplying sensor exci-
tation from a separate source such as an instrumen-
tation power supply rather than from the component 
which is being measured, but in others, this may 
require some additional hardware. 
D. Electrical 
(1) Conclusions - The MDA Electrical System performance 
of all missions and orbital storage was· satisfactory. 
The first two weeks .of the SL-1 mission, the MDA 
Electrical System demonstrated its capability to 
function under extreme environmental condition.s. 
During this time, the axial tunnel exceeded the 
temperature range of the instrumentation. Using 
a modified thermal computer modlal, the maximum 
temperature of the electrical connectors was 
predicted. Electrical connector tests were 
performed to establish confidence in the hardware 
during this abnormal environment. The successful 
use of these connectors during manned missions 
demonstrated the adequacy of their design. 
(2) Recommendations'-
(a) SL-2 crew comments on the Interior MDA 
Lighting were that illumination levels at 
the ATM C&D ~ane1 are marginal for reading 
and writing and that when working at a work 
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station, if they turned their heads they were 
looking directly into. the lights. 
The 8L-4 crew stated in their debriefing that 
because of the personal preference associated 
with the lighting level, they would like to 
have had control of the lighting around the 
ATM Panel at the panel, itself. 
For the situations described above, the 
following recommendations should be considered: 
Two types of lighting should be used; i.e., 
general, and workstation lighting: 
• General lighting should provide illumination 
levels required for movement within the 
vehicle and access to stowage containers. 
The general lighting should be indirect 
and continuously dimmable. 
• Workstation lighting should be close to 
the control panel such as in 'hand rails 
around the panels, A s'pecific area should 
be provided for reading and writing such 
as an extension of the control panel where 
reading and writing material could be 
clipped in place. The illumination should 
be directed toward the panel and 3hould 
be continuously dimmabl~ at each work 
station. 
(b) During 8L-2,. 8L-3 and SL-4 missions, it was 
found that the allocation of high power 
accessory outlets was not adequate for con-
tingencies. It is recommended that additional 
outlets be provided on future manned space 
missions. 
(c) The need existed to pperate portable equip-
ment in the MDA during unmanned phases of 
the m.ission. The power source for the portable 
equipment (high and low power utility outlets) 
was not controllable ~fram the ground •. ,It is~ 
therefore,recOmmended'that at--least one high 
and one low power outlet be controllable via 
Des command. 
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(d) Trouble-shooting during ground test activities 
was difficult and time consuming due to lack 
of circuitry access. Terminal jUIlctions 
incorporated into the MilA Electrical System 
would have enhanced ground test, trouble-
shooting, in-flight maintenance and incor-
poration of in-flight modifications. 
(e) The SL-4 crew suggested for future missions 
that cabling associated with portable equip-
ment be color coded for easy identification, 
and dispensed out of cable caddies with coil 
spring returns. MMC concurs with these 
recommendations but suggest a crank return 
be used instead of a spring return. 
(f) An evaluation of MDA connectors was performed 
as part of the postflight data analysis and 
crew debriefings. The results were that all 
MilA connectors (NB, Micro-dot Airlock, and 
Zero-G) were functional in space environments. 
For in-flight mating and demating, the CT,ew 
expressed a preference for both the Micro-
dot and Zero-G connectors. The crew also 
suggested that in future space applications, 
the in-flight maintenance connectors should 
be standardized. throughout the spacecraft. 
MMC concurs with the recommendation for 
standardization of crew in-flight maintenance 
connectors. 
E. Communications 
(1) Conclusions - The communications system operated 
with minimal problems during the entire Skylab 
Mission. 
(2) Recommendations - The three crews had various 
comments concerning the operation of the system. 
The recommendations which follow are based on 
these comments as well as observation during 
mission support tusks. 
To expedite intercom usage and prevent erroneous 
switch usage, more consideration should be given 
to different types of swi~c:hes or switch actuating 
mechanisms. Such panels that are utilized 
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extensively by crew members should be designed for 
efficient interfacing from any attitude in a 
Zero-G environment. It is also recommended that 
personal communications assemblies be developed 
to permit crew communication from any location 
and any attitude \o,1th each other and with the 
ground. This assembly should incorporate a 
transmi~ter/receiver, an earpiece and receiver 
volume control with an alert tone when volume is 
too low and the received signal is not being 
amplified to a preset level. This concept would 
give considerably more freedom to cre'Y' members, 
eliminate cables and eliminate the feedback problem. 
F. Television 
(1) Conclusions - The Skylab Television (TV) system 
was well utilized throughout the mission. It 
provided real and delayed time information 
regarding the performance of experiments and the 
progress of various repairs performed during the 
missions. T,he crews had little trouble with the 
operation of the system. 
(2) Recommendations - The crew had various comments 
concerning the overall system and the need for 
improvements for future missions. They recommended 
a system status light for similar systems as 
expansive as the one employed in Sky lab. If one 
TVIS was inadvertently left on,the ground did not 
receive TV. A status light would contribute to 
the avoidance of any data loss. The crew also 
recommended a large monitor, finding it difficult 
to focus the picture with the minimonitor. It is 
our recommendation that an overall TV control panel 
be used on future flights where all equipment could 
be remotely monitored and operated. 
From our experiences during the development and 
testing of various flight equipments, the following 
general suggestions are offered for future programs. 
(a) A Thermal Cycle Test should be part of a 
unit's Acceptance Test Program. 
(b) Cabling should be uniform. 
G. Instrumentation 
(1) Conclusions - The Instrumentation system performed 
exceptionally well during the entire mission. The 
Signal Conditioner was operated continuously 
without failure. A trend analysis, performed 
during the mission, confirmed the stability of 
the circuits. 
(2) Recommendations - The equipment, while reliable, 
employed outdated packaging concepts due to an 
early decision to use already developed hardware. 
Future programs should take advantage of state-of-
the-art packaging concepts to reduce the weight 
and size of operational equipments. 
H. Crew Systems 
(1) Conclusions - The MDA from a crew systems stand-
point met all its functional objectives and per-
formed successfully as an experiments/stowage 
module for all the Skylab missions. Th.ere were 
no MDA problems or anomalies that prevented the 
accomplishment of scheduled functions or the 
gathering of scientific data. The minor anomalies 
that did occur were easily solved by the crew or 
worked around, allowing the scheduled events to 
be conducted. 
A number of the MDa crew stations received 
excellent crew comments, especially those fitted 
with the triangular grid foot restraint platforms. 
All MDa crew stations.provided appropriate inter-
faces to allow them to successfully gather experi-
ment data. 
'MDa performance beyond design was provided on the 
SL-3 and 51-4 missions when a Rate Gyro Six Pack 
assembly was installed (SL-3) in the MDA to "replace 
the function of the failed rack mounted gyros. 
The MDa was used as an on-orbit suit stowage 
location and also as a sleep module by at least 
one member of each mission. 
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12.2 TESTING 
Recommendations - Future equipment designs should 
capitalize significantly if the Skylab experience 
and crew insights are used in hardware development 
stages. A significant observation was the excel-
lence of crew stations in the MilA fitted with the 
triangular grid foot restraints. It is recommended 
that all crew stations involving long duration 
tasks incorporate triangular grid foot platforms. 
More temporary stowage restraints, such as velcro, 
and bungies at the work positions would further 
improve future crew stations. 
Mockup and trainer orientations were carried over 
into the on-orbit activities and preferred by the 
crew. Future manned systems should reflect this 
preference and provide more of a "one gil envir.on-
ment, e.g., a floor and a ceiling. Experience 
also suggests that more wall space be used as 
work and stowage areas as was accomplished in the 
MDA. 
Skylab ha~ demonstrated that established human 
engineering criteria was most useful in equipment 
design development. Future manned systems should 
benefit from the established principles used 
and validated in Skylab. 
the following discussion presents conclusions and recom-
mendations regarding the MilA Test Program. The conclusions 
discuss the overall test program and the value of the MDA Back-
up Article for Mission Support. The recommendations presented 
should be considered as candidates for improvement of future 
space programs that may involve hardware and prelaunch test 
programs approaching the sophistication of Skylab. 
A. Conclusions - The soundness of the total test integra-
tion concept employed on the MDA program was adequately demon-
strated by the excellent performance of the MDA throughout the 
Sky lab mission. This concept utilized formal control of all 
phases of the test program. It started with top level test 
plans for overall component and system level test definition. 
Implementation of these plans was then identified .by specific 
test requirements documentation for component acceptance, 
qualification, and system level tests. Finally, successful 
demonstration of c_ompo_n_~n!= ~nd _~~tem l~~~l t~st perfo~nc~ 
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was effected by Test Operations personnel and their use of test 
procedures witnessed by the applicable quality organizations. 
Sufficient flexibility for various hardware problem investiga-
tions and resolutions was provided by the "Engineering Test 
Order (ETO)" system for both on- and off-module testing with 
minimum schedule impact. . 
The value of maintaining the MDA Backup Article in readiness 
to support the Skylab Mission was evidenced by the sixteen ETOs 
performed on this testbed at St. Louis. These tests measureably 
contributed to solving real and contingency type on-orbit pro-
blems. 
B. Recommendations - The total test integration approach 
,utilizing top level test plans, specific test requirements 
documents (component and system level), and acceptance test 
procedures for test performance aQq demonstration should be 
maintained on future programs similar to the MDA. Some improve-
ments, particularly in the mechanics of implementation, could 
be provided by the following: 
(1) Provide a Top Test Procedure Document -'This 
document would identify procedures in which the 
various systems test requirements were scheduled 
to be satisfied. The Flight MDA Program identified 
this information in the Systems Test and Checkout 
Requirements document (STACR). However, as a 
result of program changes, many Class I changes 
were created in the Type I STACR. A Top Test 
Procedure with a contractual Type III designation 
would have significantly reduced the STACR change 
traffic. 
(2) Provide a Component Acceptance Test Plan - This 
plan should identify component level acceptance 
tests on an overall basis. We believe this would 
provide better program visability and uniform 
acceptance test information for use by the 
applicable design sections. 
(3) Provide a Program Verification Document - This 
docume'L},t should identify all verification methods 
that are planned to assure complianc~ with the 
requirements of the Contract End Item Specification 
(CEX) or other program source specifications. 
______ Th~ MfJA program achi.ey_~d these, ~?al.s_~'y uti.1.!.zing 
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Section 4 of the CEI, which identified haw each 
Section 3 requirement was to be satisfied (test, 
analysis, or assessment). It also made use of 
the various program test compliance matrices. 
Providing this information in one document, we 
believe, would be more efficient and would improve 
the visibility of the overall program verification 
requirements, 
A. Prelaunch - Contractor support to M~ prelaunch and 
launch activities was timely and effective, and contributed 
significantly to the successful launch of the Skylab workshop. 
Major accomplishments resulting fram these activities were: 
• Delivery of mod kits to KSC. 
• Test and checkout of mod kits using Backup and/or 
One-G Trainer Al"ticle.s to preclude Flight; Article 
ppoblems. 
• Timely closeout of changes at KSC by "Fa:st Response" 
team. 
• Establishment of adequate spares at KSC. 
• Assignment of key personnel to all work shifts to 
assure proper and timely preparation of MDA for 
launch. 
• Support to program reviews on a demanding schedule 
without delay. 
All MDA components were qualified and assessed to be flight-
worthy at the Flight Readiness Review. The final flight hardware 
performed properly during the series of prelaunch tests including 
those conducted for the first time, such as the MDA/CSM docking 
test, with no significant schedule delaying hardware, or systems 
problems encountered. 
'B. MiSsioh - The MMC MDA design groups prepared for their 
mission support roles by developing detailed plans and procedures 
describing their mission support effort. These plans and pro-
cedures were tested and revised through participation in pre-
mhal.on simulations and were integrated into the total mc 
mission support effort. The MnA and other MMC support planning 
efforts were im.pl:.ement~~d using a "total. ~_ompanyll team effort 
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employing a central facility, the Denver Support Room (DSR). 
This facility served as a focal point for all mission support 
activities. It was used as a single mission information, 
communications, data and activity coordination center between 
the MDA groups and the NASA centers. The resulting success of 
the MDA effort was due, in part, to their timely and accurate 
responses to all related mission problems. 
This effort illustrated that a flexible and resou!t'ceful 
mission support team could be developed through adequate pre-
planning, simulation, dedicated integration facilities and a 
total team commitment to technical excellence. 
C. Conclusions - OUr support of the Skylab activities at 
KSC and subsequently during the mission reflected the Martin 
Marietta Corporation commitment to provide a successful MDA 
Spacecraft that in turn would be expected to significantly 
contribute to the success of the Skylab mission. We' believe 
that the effectiveness of this approach was demonstrated in the, 
timely launch of the SWS and the highly successful performance 
of the module and related subsystems during the mission. 
D. Recommendations - We firmly recommend that future 
spacecraft contractors, whether they are responsible for hard-
ware or perform some other supporting role, continue to utilize 
the entire resources at their command in fulfilling their 
commitment to program support. We believe we have done this in 
our support of Skylab and can make no better recommendation 'than 
for the continuance of this total commitment by all support 
organizations. 
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13. REFERENCES 
This section is limited to the identification of Martin 
Marietta Corporation (MMC) documentation referenced in this 
report. All government publications identified herein can be 
obtained from the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Repository. 
All Service Engineering Department Reports (SEDRs) are available 
in the applicable Airlock Module (AM) Acceptance Data Package 
(ADP) (Flight or Backup). 
The following MMC documents are available in the applicable 
(Flight or Backup) ADP and the MSFC Repository: 
A. Drawings -
82000000205 - Design Criteria, Materials Processes and Finishes 
82000000304 - Automated Wiring System 
82000000335 - Details and Assemblies, Standoff Frame 
82000000401 - Electrical Schematics, MDA 
82000000503 - Equipment and Wiring Harness Installation Interio'r 
82000000603 - Equipment and Wiring Harness Installation - Exterior 
82000000713 - MDA Cabling Interconnect Diagram 
82000000721 - Details and Assemblies, Radiator and Meteoroid 
Shield Support 
82000000900 - MMC Acceptance Tests 
82000000916 - Equipment Specification, Power Distributor Assembly 
82000001000 - Signal Conditioning Assembly 
82000001016 - Equipment Specification, Signal Conditioner Assembly 
82000001018 - Test Specification, Range Card.s 
82000001026 - Range Card Assembly 
82000001027 - Range Card Electrical Schematic 
82000001505 - Design Criteria, Electrical System, MDA 
82000001720 - Duct Assemblies, ECS Area Fan Outlet 
82000001816 - Light Switch Specification 
82000003800 - Top Assembly, TVIS 
82000003801 - Top Assembly Schematic, TVIS 
82000003816 - TV Input Station, Equipment Specification 
82000003826 - Case and Cover, TVIS 
82000003827 - Input Filter, TVIS 
82000003828 - Inductors, Input Filter, TVIS 
82000003829 - Preregulator, Converter, TVIS 
82000003830 - Transformers and Inductors, DC-DC Converter 
82000003831 - Output Filter, TVIS 
82000003832 - Inductors, Output Filter, TVIS 
82000003833 - Amplifier, TVIS 
82000008200 - Outlet Box Assembly 
82000008520 - Muffler Assembly, Inlet 
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82000008620 - Muffler Assembly, Outlet 
82000009100 - MMC Acceptance Tests 
82000009820 - Valve Assembly, Manually Operated, Vacuum Shutoff 
82000040320 - Valve, Equalization, Pressure 
82000042920 - Contingency Cables 
82051000010 - Critical and Limited Life Component Drawing 
PD32 00048 - Line, Coolant, Flexible 
PD4400011 - Bellows, Vent Line 
PD4700l81 - Coolant Valve, Manual, 4-Port Selector 
PD6000l95 - Duct Flexible 
PD6000202 - Heater System, Docking Tunnel 
PD1100078 - Video Switch 
PD740008l - Pressure Transducer 
PD7400082 - Temperature Transducer 
PD7400083 - Thermostat Assembly, Wall Heater 
PD8300l39 - Gage Assembly, Pneumatic 
B. Reports 
(1) General/Plans 
ED2002-l002 - Reliability Plan 
ED2002-l003 - Quality Program Plan 
ED2002-l004 - Configuration Management Plan 
ED2002-l005 - MDA General Test Plan 
ED2002-l008 - System Safety Plan 
ED2002-l032 - EMC Control Plan 
ED2002-l072 - Fire Detector Implementation 
ED2002-1264 - Structural Test Article Loads 
ED2002-l550 - Television Input Station Report 
ED2002-2002 - GSE Description Document 
ED2002-2004 - Failure Modes Effect Analysis 
ED2002-20l0 - Launch Loads Analysis 
ED2002-2017 - Design Safety Analysis 
ED2002-2020 - System Test and Checkout Requirements 
ED2002-202l - Materials List 
ED2002-2025 - EMC Test Plan 
ED2002-2028 - Critical Items List 
ED2002-2032 - Backup System Test and Checkout Requirements 
ED2002-2033 - Launch Loads Analysis 
ED2002-2040 Postdelivery Operations Plan 
ED2002-2045 - MDA Planned Work at KSC 
ED2002-2048 - Hatch Seal Tests 
(2) Qualification Test Reports/Procedures 
(a) Martin Marietta 
M-64-119 
3179 
3180 
3181 
3183 
3184 
3278 
3300 
3310 
3512 
MMC Supplier Quality Assurance Program 
Requirements Document 
Signal Conditioner 
Power Distributor Assembly Procedure 
Muffler Assembly 
Outlet Boxes Procedure 
Diffuser 
TV Input Station 
Manual Operated 4" Vent Valve 
Fan Shroud Assembly 
TV Input Station (A Qualification) 
(b) Subcontractor 
Accessory Products Co. 500200-1: Pressure 
Equalization Valve 
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Actron HWS-190-Dl-9~1: S190 Window Assembly 
Actron HWS-190-Dl-9-2: Heater Controller/Cable 
Assembly 
Actron ETL(R)-73-002: Heater Controller Delta 
Qual. 
AETL 5350-00-9023: Flexible Coolant Line 
AETL 5350-00-9171: Wall Heater Thermostat 
AETL 5350-00-9237: Docking Tunnel Heater System 
AETL 5310-00-9627: Coolant System Flex'ib1e Hose 
AiResearch 71-7933: 4 Port Selector Valve 
Ametek/Calmec CM512: 1/4" Battery Vent Valve 
Ametek/Calmec CM605: 41i Vent Valve 
Ametek/Straza 8-480119: Bellows Vent Line 
Bendix 5426A: Video Switch 
Bendix MT-17701: Video Switch Delta Qual. 
Durkee Test Labs QT86l9 : Flexible Hose, Coolant 
System 
Durkee Test Labs QT9060: Flexible Hose, Coolant 
System 
Gulton Industries 3031-11801: Pressure Transducer 
Hy-Ca1 Engineering 70-522A: Temperature Transducer 
James, Pond and Clark QTR-557: Coolant Selector Valve 
Kratos KER-68l: Pneumatic Gage Assembly 
Lyon Environmental Lab 71-341: Flexible Duct 
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C. Procedures 
(1) Denver 
MDA-OCP-O-lOOOl - Caution and Warning System Test 
MDA-OCP-D-2000l~ Insulation Purge System Test 
MDA-OCP-O-20002 - Environme-ntal Control and Vent· System Test 
MDA-OCP-D-20003 - Final Insulation Purge System Test 
MDA-OCP-O-3000l - Proton Spectrometer Test 
MDA-OCP-O-30003 - S009 Functional Test 
MDA-OCP-D-3002l - Radio Noise Burst Monitor (RNBM) Functional Test 
MDA-OCP-D-4000l - Communications Systems Test 
MDA-OCP-O-40002 - Television System Test 
MDA-OCP-O-SOOOl - MDA Mechanica 1 Devices Functional Test 
MDA-OCP-D-S0002 - MDA Leak and Decay Test 
MDA-OCP-O-50003 - MDA Shipping Cover Leak 'rest 
MDA-OCP-O-S0004 - S190 Window Cover Test 
MDA-OCP-D-50006 - MDA Final Leak Test 
MDA-OCP-D-6000l - Ground Isolation and Power Transfer Test 
MDA-OCP-O-60002 - Electrical System Test 
MDA-OCP-D-60003 - Wall Heater Thermal Test 
MDA-OCP-O-60004 - Light Filter Illumination Verification 
MDA-OCP-D-7000l - Instrumentation System Test 
MDA-OCP-D-80001 - Crew Compartment Fit and Functional C2F2 Test 
(2) St. Louis - The following documents are available in 
the Backup Article (ADP): 
MDA-OCP-S-20002 
MDA-OCP-S-30002 
MDA-OCP-S-30004 
MDA-OCP-S-30010 
MDA -OCP- S-3 00 18 
MDA-OCP-S-3002S 
MDA-OCP-S-30026 
lvtDA-OCP-S-30027 
MDA -OCP-S -3 005 0 
MDA-OCP-S-30054 
MDA-OCP- S-40002 
MDA-OCP-S-60002 
MDA-OCP-S-6000S 
MDA-OCP-S-8000l 
MDA-OCP-S-80003 
. OMT-OCP-S-20032 
OMT-OCP-S-30036 
OMT-OCP-S-30041 
OMT-OCP-S-30042 
OMT-OCP-S-30044 
OMT-OCP-S-30046 
- Vent Valve Operation and Leak Rate Verification Test 
- M512 Functional Test 
- BI/LCA Functional Test 
- Leak Check of the ATM C&D/EREP Coolant Loop 
- Simulated Flight Test 
- I/LCA Functional Verification 
- ATM C&D Installation Verification Test 
- ATM C&D Functional Verification 
- EREP Ground Isolation Verification 
- EREP Super System Functional Interface Verification 
- TV/VTR System Functional Test 
- S190 Window Heater Contro1.1er System Verification 
Performanc e Test of MDA Fan Assemblies 
- Crew Compartment Fit and Functional (Horiz) 
- Flight Crew and Equipment Stowage and Config • 
- OMT-S193 Off Module Test Procedure . 
-.EREP Support Equipment Field Support Test Procedure 
- OMT-S192 Functional Interface Verification 
- OMT-Sl93 Off Module Test Verification 
- EREP System Bench Functional Interface Verification 
- EREP Support Equipment Bench Functional Interface 
Verification 
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(3) Engineering Tests - The following Engineering Test Orders 
were employed on the Backup MDA: 
. 
MDA/SL/BU/78 - TV Contingency Cable Test 
MDA/SL/BU/79 .' BI/LCA to ATM C&D Console Functional Verification 
MDA/SL/BU/80 - BI/LCA to ATM C&D Console Functional Verification 
MDA/SL/BU/8l - EREP ESE Checkout 
MDA/SL/BU/82 - S193 Experiment Checkout 
MDA/SL/BU/83 - EREP Expanded Systems Test 
MDA/SL/BU/84 - BI/LCA to ATM C&D Console Functional Verification 
MDA/SL/BU/85 - EREP EDDU Functional Verification Test 
MDA/SL/BU/89 BI/LCA to ATM C&D Console Functional Verification 
MDA/SL/BU/90 - BI/LCA to ATM C&D Console Functional Verification 
MDA/Sl./BU/92 EREP Coolant Tube Evaluation 
MDA/SL/BU/93 - EREP Coolant Loop Evaluation 
MDA/SL/BU/94 - MDA Work Station Evaluation 
MDA/SL/BU/95 - Radial Hatch/Docking Probe Interference Test 
MDA/SL/BU/96 - Determination of AM/MDA EM! Noise Leve~s in Support 
of SL-l 
MDA/SL/BU/97 - Multipurpose Electrical Furnace (MEF) Control 
Package Flammability Specimen Mounting Ring 
Electrical Resistance Test 
MDA/SL/BU/98 - Removal of MDA Cabin Fan #2 Diffuser With In-
Flight Maintenance Tools 
MDA/SL/BU/99 - Fit Check of S082 Timer Cable 
MDA/SL/BU/IOO - Fit Check of ATM TV Bus Redundancy Connector Module 
MDA/SL/BU/10l -Timer Cable Crew Interface 
MDA/SL/BU/l02 - Fit Check of S082 Timer Cables 
MDA/SL/BU/l03 - Fit Check of Two TV Bus Connector Modules 
MDA/SL/BU/104 - Radial Docking Port Insulation Blanket Removal 
Verification 
MDA/SL/BU/105 - Fit Check of Cable for the "Carry Up" Rate Gyro 
Package 
MDA/SL/BU/106 - MDA Ground Measurements Analysis 
MDA/SL/BU/l07 - M5l8 Power Adapter Assembly Test 
MDA/SL/BU/l08 - Fit Check of Flight S082 Timer Cable 
MDA/SL/BU/l09 - Evaluation of Screw Removal Tools 
(4) Misc~llaneous 
SL-884l-70-2 : 
SL-884l-70-3 : 
SL-884l-70-4: 
MDA Maintenance Requirements 
Operation, Maintenance, and Handling Procedures 
for MDA-GSE 
Operation, Maintenance, and Handling Procedures 
for MDA TV-GSE . 
SL-884l-70-6: MDA In-Flight Maintenance Data 
13-6 
11 I~j 
,AJf«,' " .. ,''',-. 
t i"'..... ::;.,. 
JI( " ,.,,<, > .. 
APPROVAL 'lMX-64812 
MDA FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 
By Martin Marietta Corporation 
rbe information in this report has been reviewed for 
security classification and it has been determined to be 
unclassified. 
This document has also been reviewed and approved for 
technical accuracy. 
NASA TMX-64812 
APPROVAL 
MSFC SKYLAB MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 
AIRLOCK/MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER PROJECT OFFICE 
The information in this report has been reviewed for security 
classification. Review of any information concerning Department of 
Defense or Atomic Energy Commission programs has been made by the 
MSFC Security Classification Officer. This report, in its entirety, 
has been determined to be unclassified. 
This document has also been reviewed and approved for technical 
accuracy. 
~ Yf\.c; C<'~ 42 • (l\' McCool . 
~:?j ect Manager, Airlock/Multiple Docking Adapter 
R. Ise 
Program Manager, Skylab Program Office 
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